State v. Evans

• Decision Date: 11 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 77700-4.,77700-4.
• Citation: 150 P.3d 105,159 Wn.2d 402
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Danny Wayne EVANS, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

150 P.3d 105

159 Wn.2d 402

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Danny Wayne EVANS, Petitioner.

No. 77700-4.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued October 19, 2006.

Decided January 11, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John A. Hays, Longview, WA, for Petitioner.

Susan Irene Baur, Cowlitz Co. Prosecutor's Office, Kelso, WA, for Respondent.

ALEXANDER, C.J.

¶ 1 Danny Evans denied ownership of a briefcase that was located in the backseat of his truck. Police officers seized the briefcase and discovered materials in it that lead to Evans's conviction on charges of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with an intent to deliver. Before trial, Evans's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a consequence of the warrantless seizure of his briefcase was denied by the trial court. In doing so, it concluded that Evans's denial of ownership of the briefcase constituted abandonment of it. Evans thereafter was found guilty of the charges against him. The Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the convictions. We granted review and now reverse the Court of Appeals.

I. Factual and Procedural History

¶ 2 Danny Evans owned a house and a converted garage in Cowlitz County, Washington. The house was rented to another person, but only Evans had access to the garage. The Cowlitz-Wahkiakum Narcotics Task Force executed a warrant, which authorized a search of the house and garage.

¶ 3 Evans was present during the search of the garage. After the police officers found materials consistent with the production of methamphetamine in the garage, they arrested Evans and placed him in a patrol car. Evans remained in the patrol car while the search continued. One of the police officers, Sergeant Kevin Tate, contacted Evans in the car and read him his "Miranda¹ warnings." DVD Taped Proceedings at 56. Evans indicated that he understood his rights and told Tate that he "didn't want to talk about any details." Id.

¶ 4 Tate then asked Evans for permission to search Evans's truck, which was parked in a driveway leading to the house. Evans agreed to permit the search after Tate made it clear that the warrant did not cover the truck and that it, therefore, could not be searched without Evans's permission. Evans indicated that his agreement was contingent upon being allowed to observe the search and object to any part of it.

¶ 5 During a search of the truck, Tate located a silver briefcase in the backseat. Because it was locked, Tate asked Evans if he had a key. Evans did not respond. Tate then asked if the briefcase belonged to Evans. Evans denied owning it and said that he could not give Tate permission to open the briefcase and that he objected to it being seized. Despite Evans's objection, Tate seized the briefcase. Several days later, the briefcase was searched pursuant to a warrant. It contained additional materials consistent with the production of methamphetamine.²

¶ 6 Evans was thereafter charged with one count of manufacture of a controlled substance and one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. He was found guilty of both charges. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Evans argued, as he had at trial, that the briefcase was illegally seized. He contended, therefore, that any evidence found in it should have been suppressed. The Court of Appeals disagreed with Evans, holding that his denial of ownership of the briefcase amounted to a voluntary abandonment of it. It affirmed the convictions. We granted Evans's petition for review.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 7 We conduct a de novo review of conclusions of law set forth in a suppression order. See, e.g., State v. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d 166, 171, 43 P.3d 513 (2002).

III. Issue Presented

¶ 8 Does a defendant's denial of ownership of an object that is seized in an area where he has a privacy interest constitute voluntary abandonment of that object?

IV. Analysis

¶ 9 Initially we note that we agree with the Court of Appeals that Evans has standing to challenge the seizure of the briefcase. State v. Evans, 129 Wash.App. 211, 221, 118 P.3d 419 (2005), review granted, 157 Wash.2d 1001, 136 P.3d 758 (2006). In Washington, a defendant has "`automatic standing'" to challenge the legality of a seizure "even though he or she could not technically have a privacy interest in such property." State v. Simpson, 95 Wash.2d 170, 175, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (affirming automatic standing under Washington Constitution article 1, section 7, notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's decision to abolish the automatic standing rule under the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980)); accord State v. Williams, 142 Wash.2d 17, 23, 11 P.3d 714 (2000). Evans meets both parts of the test for automatic standing: (1) possession was an "`essential' element of the offense," and (2) he "was in possession of the contraband at the time of the contested search or seizure." Simpson, 95 Wash.2d at 181, 622 P.2d 1199 (describing two part test). We next turn to the constitutionality of the seizure of the briefcase.

¶ 10 It is undisputed that the search of Evans's truck and the seizure of the briefcase found within it was warrantless. Warrantless searches and seizures may be permitted within the confines of "`a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions'" to the warrant requirements of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and Washington Constitution article I, section 7. State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash.2d 814, 817, 676 P.2d 419 (1984) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). The exceptions are " ` "jealously and carefully drawn" ' " and the "burden rests with the State to prove the presence of one." State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash.2d 61, 72, 71, 917 P.2d 563 (1996) (quoting State v. Bradley, 105 Wash.2d 898, 902, 719 P.2d 546 (1986) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971))).

¶ 11 One of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is for voluntarily abandoned property.³ State v. Reynolds, 144 Wash.2d 282, 287, 27 P.3d 200 (2001). As we explained in Reynolds, "Needing neither a warrant nor probable cause, law enforcement officers may retrieve and search voluntarily abandoned property without implicating an individual's rights under the Fourth Amendment or under article I, section 7 of our state constitution." Id.

¶ 12 A defendant's privacy interest in property may be abandoned voluntarily or involuntarily. Involuntary abandonment occurs when property was abandoned as a result of illegal police behavior. See, e.g., State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wash.2d 126, 137, 101 P.3d 80 (2004). Because neither party has argued that Evans involuntarily abandoned the briefcase, we assume that whatever actions he took in regard to the briefcase were voluntary and that other aspects of the search and seizure were proper. See, e.g., State v. Zakel, 119 Wash.2d 563, 567, 834 P.2d 1046 (1992) (holding that this court has "repeatedly stated that we will not decide a constitutional issue unless it is absolutely necessary for the determination of a case"). Thus, we must determine if Evans abandoned the briefcase voluntarily.

¶ 13 Voluntary abandonment is an ultimate fact or conclusion based generally upon a combination of act and intent. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.6(b), at 574 (3d ed.1996). "Intent may be inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts, and all the relevant circumstances at the time of the alleged abandonment should be considered." State v. Dugas, 109 Wash.App. 592, 595, 36 P.3d 577 (2001). The issue is not abandonment in the strict property right sense but, rather, "`whether the defendant in leaving the property has relinquished her reasonable expectation of privacy so that the search and seizure is valid.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Hoey, 983 F.2d 890, 892-93 (8th Cir.1993)); see also United States v. Nordling, 804 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir.1986). Thus, Evans must show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the briefcase and that he did not voluntarily abandon it.

A. Did Evans have an expectation of privacy in the briefcase prior to its seizure?

¶ 14 To establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the briefcase, Evans must satisfy a two fold test: (1) Did he "exhibit an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy by seeking to preserve something as private?" and (2) "[d]oes society recognize that expectation as reasonable?" State v. Kealey, 80 Wash.App. 162, 168, 907 P.2d 319 (1995). Evans satisfies both parts of this test. Although the burden is on the defendant to establish a subjective expectation of privacy, he easily meets that burden. He kept the briefcase in his truck, it was closed and locked, and he objected to its seizure. Compare State v. Hepton, 113 Wash.App. 673, 680, 54 P.3d 233 (2002) (leaving garbage at an abandoned house did not show a subjective expectation of privacy). Evans satisfies the second part of the test because society recognizes a general expectation of privacy in briefcases. See Kealey, 80 Wash.App. at 170, 907 P.2d 319 ("Purses, briefcases, and luggage constitute traditional repositories of personal belongings protected under the Fourth Amendment.") (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979)).

B. Did Evans relinquish or abandon his expectation of privacy?

¶ 15 The status of the area searched is critical when one engages in an analysis of whether or not a privacy interest has been abandoned. That is so because courts do not ordinarily find abandonment if the defendant had a privacy interest in the searched area. See, e.g., Dugas, 109 Wash. App. at 596, 36 P.3d 577 (holding defendant did not voluntarily abandon his jacket by placing it on the hood of his car after being arrested). The opposite generally holds true if the search is conducted in an area...