State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 19 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. 67963-1.,67963-1.
• Citation: 11 P.3d 714,142 Wash.2d 17
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Harlan M. WILLIAMS, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

11 P.3d 714

142 Wash.2d 17

STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Harlan M. WILLIAMS, Respondent.

No. 67963-1.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued March 9, 2000.

Decided October 19, 2000.

Jim Krider, Snohomish County Prosecutor, S. Aaron Fine, Deputy, Everett, for Appellant.

Washington Appellate Project, Jason Brett Saunders, Seattle, for Respondent.

Tom P. Conom, Edmonds, Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

MADSEN, J.

The State appeals a trial judge's order suppressing the admission of heroin into evidence in this criminal proceeding. The suppression order relates to the legality of a police entry into a third party's home to serve an arrest warrant on the defendant. Two Everett police officers arrested Harlan Williams, pursuant to an arrest warrant, while he was a guest in a friend's home. During a search of the defendant incident to that arrest, the police officers discovered heroin in the defendant's pocket. At trial, the defense moved to suppress the heroin. The defendant asserted that under the decision of State v. Simpson, 95 Wash.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980), he had "automatic standing" to challenge the legality of the police officers' entry into the apartment. The defense further argued that under the bright-line rule stated in State v. Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d 103, 960 P.2d 927 (1998), the police search of the apartment was invalid since the police officers failed to inform the tenant of his right to refuse consent to a police search absent a search warrant. The trial judge agreed and suppressed the heroin, which had the practical effect of terminating the case. We hold that the defendant lacked standing to contest the police entry into a third party's home. We further conclude that even if the defendant does have standing to object to the officer's entry, the police's conduct in this case did not constitute a "knock and talk" search within the meaning of the Ferrier decision.

FACTS

During the afternoon of April 27, 1998, a citizen contacted Everett police officer Jeff Katzer outside of the Snohomish County Jail and informed the officer that Harlan Williams, the defendant, had a warrant out for his arrest and that he was currently at a local residence. The citizen also provided a description of the defendant's clothing and green van. The officer confirmed that Williams had an outstanding felony arrest warrant, drove to the described residence, and identified the defendant's green van parked outside in the parking lot. Officer Katzer requested further assistance, and Officer McAllister arrived on the scene.

The two officers approached the apartment's open door and called inside for Williams. The tenant, Alan Jelinek, appeared at the doorway. Officer Katzer told Jelinek that he was looking for the defendant, whose van was in the parking lot. Jelinek said that he did not know the defendant nor the owner of the green van. Officer Katzer advised Jelinek that there was a warrant for Williams' arrest and asked for Jelinek's consent to enter into the apartment to look for the defendant. Jelinek said yes and stepped back to allow the officers to enter.

When the officers entered the apartment, they immediately spotted the defendant. The officers identified the defendant by the scars on his arms. The defendant shortly thereafter confirmed his identity. The officers placed the defendant under arrest. In a search incident to the arrest, the officers found .8 grams of a black tar substance in the defendant's pocket that field-tested positive for heroin.

Later, Officer Katzer contacted Jelinek and confirmed that the defendant was not living at Jelinek's apartment and that the defendant had just come over to help move some of Jelinek's belongings with the van. He also confirmed that Jelinek had willingly given the officers permission to enter his home on April 27.

ANALYSIS

The State challenges the trial court's reliance on Simpson to grant the defendant automatic standing to challenge the validity of the search of Alan Jelinek's apartment. The United States Supreme Court has rejected the doctrine of automatic standing in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980), and the State contends that Washington has never adopted the doctrine under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. This case requires revisiting the automatic standing doctrine and its applicability in this case.

Automatic standing began as a unique method to deal with a particular problem in search and seizure cases where possession is an element of an offense. In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960),overruled on other grounds by Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83,100 S.Ct. 2547,65 L.Ed.2d 619, the Supreme Court perceived two distinct problems inherent in challenging police searches that produced contraband. The first problem was "that a defendant charged with a possessory offense might only be able to establish his standing to challenge a search and seizure by giving self-incriminating testimony admissible as evidence of his guilt...." Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 83,100 S.Ct. 2547,65 L.Ed.2d 619 (Syllabus). The second "dilemma" was the "`vice of prosecutorial self-contradiction' whereby the Government would assert that the defendant possessed the goods in question while simultaneously asserting that he did not possess them for the purposes of claiming the protections of the Fourth Amendment...." Id. The Court in Jones attempted to eliminate these dilemmas by creating automatic standing, which allowed the defendant to challenge police searches without making self-incriminating statements, where the fruits produced evidence of a possessory offense.

The Supreme Court abandoned the automatic standing doctrine in Salvucci. The Court recognized that Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), eliminated most of the defense and prosecutorial dilemmas which had led it to adopt the doctrine. The defendant in Simmons challenged the government's right to use, at trial, his incriminating statements made during a suppression hearing. The Court held that there is an "undeniable tension" created when a defendant must decide whether to sacrifice his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in order to assert his equally valid Fourth Amendment right of protection from illegal searches and seizures. Simmons, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247. The Court therefore held that a defendant's testimony in a suppression hearing cannot be used as evidence to help establish guilt during the trial. The Salvucci court found that Simmons adequately protected the defendant's Fourth and Fifth Amendment interests, and abandoned Jones and its automatic standing rule. The Court reasoned that "defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated ." Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619.

Although defunct in the federal courts, automatic standing still maintains a presence in Washington. We first adopted automatic standing in State v. Michaels, 60 Wash.2d 638, 646-47, 374 P.2d 989 (1962), where we approved of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Jones. After Salvucci, we addressed the changes to federal law and a plurality of the Court determined that the Washington Constitution's greater privacy protections required adherence to the automatic standing doctrine. State v. Simpson, 95 Wash.2d 170, 181, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980). The plurality recognized that "Simmons, as interpreted by the [Supreme] Court in Salvucci, does not provide sufficient protection against the self-incrimination dilemma. In Washington, prior statements made by a defendant are admissible at trial for purposes of impeachment." Simpson, 95 Wash.2d at 179-80, 622 P.2d 1199 (citing State v. Peele, 10 Wash. App. 58, 67, 516 P.2d 788 (1973)). The plurality concluded that "[u]nder these circumstances, we discern both a continuing policy basis and firm state constitutional grounds for adherence to the automatic standing rule. The rule is already established under our state constitution and has served our state well for 17 years...." Id. at 181, 622 P.2d 1199 (citing Michaels, 60 Wash.2d at 646-47, 374 P.2d 989). Although there may be ample support in this statement to conclude that our state constitution requires automatic standing, we agree with the State that this is not a proper case to apply automatic standing.

In Michaels, we acknowledged that application of automatic standing is proper where (1) "[the defendant] is legitimately on the premises where a search occurred" and (2) "the fruits of the search are proposed to be used against him." Id. at 646-47, 374 P.2d 989; see Jones, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697. Based on that language, the trial court here concluded that automatic standing exists whenever there is a search and a subsequent seizure of contraband. We believe, however, that this is an overly broad interpretation of the conditions for automatic standing outlined in Jones. Inherent in the conditions for automatic standing is the principle that the "fruits of the search" bear a direct relationship to the search the defendant seeks to contest.

Here, the defendant fails to meet the criteria for application of the automatic standing doctrine. The defendant stipulated that the police officers found the heroin on his person. The defendant has standing to object to an illegal search of his person. But, the defendant does not challenge the search of his person, which was a valid search incident to his arrest under a valid arrest warrant. He is challenging only the officer's entry into a third party's residence to serve the arrest warrant. The defendant's ability to challenge that entry does not depend upon his admission to possession of contraband or to any other illegal activity. We cannot agree that the...