State v. Eversole
| Decision Date | 06 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 15-17-03 |
| Citation | 2017 Ohio 8436 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. SANDRA K. EVERSOLE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Van Wert County Common Pleas Court
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
APPEARANCES:
Blaise Katter for Appellant
John Hatcher for Appellee
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Sandra K. Eversole ("Eversole"), appeals the March 8, 2017 judgment entry of sentence of the Van Wert County Common Pleas Court. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
{¶2} On May 14, 2016, Officer Adam F. Wehage ("Officer Wehage") of the Van Wert City Police Department initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle operated by Eversole after Officer Wehage observed Eversole commit a marked-lanes violation while travelling on Westwood Drive in Van Wert, Ohio. (Nov. 29, 2016 Tr. at 14, 17-18). Following field-sobriety tests, Eversole was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs ("OVI"). (Id. at 20-24). Officer Wehage secured Eversole with handcuffs and placed her in the rear-passenger compartment of his patrol vehicle. (Id. at 24). While Eversole was handcuffed in the rear-passenger compartment of Officer Wehage's patrol vehicle, Officer Wehage searched Eversole's vehicle "for evidence of narcotics use" because he "believed she was under the influence of drugs or narcotics." (Id.). Officer Wehage found drugs and drug paraphernalia inside Eversole's purse. (Id. at 25).
{¶3} On July 8, 2016, the Van Wert County Grand Jury indicted Eversole on one count of possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(6)(a), a fifth-degree felony, with an automobile-forfeiture specification. (Doc. No. 3).1 Eversoleappeared for arraignment on October 24, 2016 and entered a plea of not guilty. (Doc. No. 13).
{¶4} On November 1, 2016, Eversole filed a motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. No. 17). Specifically, Eversole requested that the heroin found from the search of her vehicle be suppressed. (Id.). In her motion to suppress, Eversole argued that it was unreasonable for Officer Wehage to search her vehicle incident to her arrest for OVI for evidence of that offense based on Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009). (Id.).2 In Gant, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that "[p]olice may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." Gant at syllabus. The trial court held a hearing on Eversole's motion to suppress evidence on November 29, 2016. (Nov. 29, 2016 Tr. at 12); (Doc. No. 30). The State filed its memorandum in opposition to Eversole's motion to suppress evidence on December 12, 2016. (Doc. No. 27). On December 22, 2016, Eversole filed her response to the State's memorandum in opposition to her motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. No. 28). The trial court denied Eversole's motion to suppress evidence on January 10, 2017. (Doc. No. 30).
{¶5} On January 25, 2017, Eversole withdrew her plea of not guilty and entered a no-contest plea. (Doc. Nos. 33, 34). In exchange for her change of plea, the State agreed to dismiss the automobile-forfeiture specification.3 (Doc. No. 33). On January 27, 2017, the trial court accepted Eversole's no-contest plea and found her guilty. (Doc. No. 34).
{¶6} On March 8, 2017, the trial court sentenced Eversole to five years of community control. (Doc. No. 37).
{¶7} Eversole filed her notice of appeal on April 5, 2017. (Doc. No. 51). She raises one assignment of error for our review.
The Trial Court Erred by Overruling the Motion to Suppress.
{¶8} In her assignment of error, Eversole argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the heroin as evidence. Eversole argues that the search of her vehicle resulting in discovery of the heroin was conducted without a warrant and not pursuant to any exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. Relying on Gant, 556 U.S. 332, Eversole makes two arguments on appeal. First, she argues that the trial court erred by concluding "that the search incident to arrest warrant exception applied to a stated policy of searching every vehicle of every OVI arrest, for evidence of additional crimes without anyobjective connection or nexus to the vehicle." (Appellant's Brief at 3). Second, she argues that Officer Wehage lacked a reason to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest—OVI—would be found in her vehicle. For the reasons below, we conclude that Officer Wehage's search of Eversole's vehicle—which led to the discovery of the heroin inside her purse—was not lawfully conducted under the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest exception of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
{¶9} A review of the denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See also State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, "an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence." Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court's conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).
{¶10} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 14, generally prohibits warrantless searches and seizures, and any evidencethat is obtained during an unlawful search or seizure will be excluded from being used against the defendant. State v. Steinbrunner, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-11-27, 2012-Ohio-2358, ¶ 12, citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961). The Fourth Amendment does not explicitly provide "that violations of its provisions against unlawful searches and seizures will result in the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of such violation, but the United States Supreme Court has held that the exclusion of evidence is an essential part of the Fourth Amendment." State v. Jenkins, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-10-10, 2010-Ohio-5943, ¶ 9, citing Mapp at 649 and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914).
{¶11} Warrantless searches "'are per se unreasonable,' 'subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Gant, 556 U.S. at 338, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967). "Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest." Id. at 338, citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914). "The search-incident-to-arrest exception has two rationales: protecting arresting officers and safeguarding evidence that the arrestee might conceal or destroy." State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 182, citing Gant at 339. See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034 (1969) ().
{¶12} "The United States Supreme Court defined the scope of a search incident to arrest in Chimel and stated that an officer making a lawful custodial arrest may search 'the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control"—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.'" State v. Caulfield, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25573, 2013-Ohio-3029, ¶ 27, quoting Chimel at 763. "Later, in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (1981), the United States Supreme Court explained that once a police officer 'has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.'" Id., quoting Belton at 460.
{¶13} In Gant, the United States Supreme Court revisited Belton and clarified the scope of a lawful search incident to arrest. See Gant at 342-343. In Gant, the Court concluded that "[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 351. Accord State v. Grubb, 186 Ohio App.3d 744, 2010-Ohio-1265, ¶ 18 (3d Dist.).
{¶14} "At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of establishing that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that it meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness." Steinbrunner, 2012-Ohio-2358, at ¶ 12, citing City of Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), at paragraph two of the syllabus, State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978), and City of Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999).
{¶15} Because Eversole was handcuffed and detained in Officer Wehage's patrol vehicle, the issue in this case is whether Officer Wehage could reasonably have believed that evidence of the crime of arrest might be found in Eversole's vehicle. Compare State v. Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, ¶ 17 ( ...
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