State v. Fernando-Granados

Decision Date02 July 2004
Docket NumberNo. S-03-471.,S-03-471.
Citation682 NW 2d 266,268 Neb. 290
PartiesSTATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE, v. LUIS FERNANDO-GRANADOS, ALSO KNOWN AS LUIS VARGAS, APPELLANT.
CourtNebraska Supreme Court

Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, for appellant.

Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and James D. Smith for appellee.

HENDRY, C.J., WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD, STEPHAN, McCORMACK, and MILLER-LERMAN, JJ.

STEPHAN, J.

After a bench trial, Luis Fernando-Granados, also known as Luis Vargas, was convicted of one count of first degree murder and one count of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. He was sentenced to life in prison on the first degree murder conviction and to 10 to 20 years' incarceration on the weapon conviction, the sentences to be served consecutively. He perfected this appeal in which he contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police because he was inadequately advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), prior to making the statements. He also contends that the district court erred in receiving certain DNA evidence at his trial.

I. BACKGROUND

On Sunday, May 26, 2002, the body of Mindy Schrieber was found in the parking lot of a restaurant in Douglas County where she was employed as a manager. Schrieber had been responsible for closing the restaurant on the evening of May 25. Investigators at the crime scene observed a tire tread pattern on the curb near the location where Schrieber's body was found and on the body itself. Other markings on the body were found to be consistent with markings on the oil pan of a Ford Escort automobile. The cause of death was determined to be multiple stab wounds and blunt trauma consistent with being struck by a motor vehicle.

Fernando-Granados and his girl friend were living together in May 2002. Fernando-Granados had been employed as a cook at the same restaurant where Schrieber had worked. Fernando-Granados' girl friend testified that on May 25, Fernando-Granados left their residence with Victor Hernandez in a Ford Escort owned by Hernandez. Fernando-Granados returned at approximately 3 o'clock the next morning, and on the following day, Fernando-Granados and his girl friend made a downpayment of $600 on a used car. Fernando-Granados made the payment in $100 bills. His girl friend learned of the homicide from news reports and on June 5, called Crimestoppers to leave an anonymous tip that Hernandez may have been involved. On June 6, Fernando-Granados' girl friend found Schrieber's checkbook and driver's license hidden in a box of crackers in a kitchen cupboard of the residence she shared with Fernando-Granados.

On June 5, 2002, Omaha police notified the Douglas County Sheriff's Department that they were holding Fernando-Granados on an unrelated charge. Deputy Robert Jones and Det. John Pankonin interviewed Fernando-Granados at Omaha police headquarters on that day. Prior to this interview, Fernando-Granados was advised of his Miranda rights, in Spanish, from a form utilized by the sheriff's office. He indicated in Spanish that he understood the warnings and agreed to speak to the officers. During an interview that lasted approximately 1 hour, Fernando-Granados denied any involvement in the death of Schrieber.

On June 6, 2002, Hernandez implicated Fernando-Granados in the homicide. Deputies reinterviewed Fernando-Granados later that same day. Prior to this second interview, he was again advised of his rights in Spanish using the same advisory form and again indicated that he understood and agreed to give a statement. During this second interview, Fernando-Granados admitted that he killed Schrieber in the course of robbing the restaurant where they had worked. Prior to trial, Fernando-Granados filed a motion to suppress the statements which he gave to law enforcement officers. The district court denied the motion.

Fernando-Granados also filed a pretrial motion in limine to exclude evidence of DNA testing and the results of such testing. A hearing was conducted on whether the evidence was admissible under the standards articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court overruled the motion in limine.

Fernando-Granados waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial was conducted on March 20 and 21, 2003. At trial, the State offered the statements Fernando-Granados made to law enforcement officers and DNA evidence relating to blood found on a $1 bill taken during the robbery and on a portion of the wheel well of the Ford Escort owned by Hernandez. Fernando-Granados renewed the objections asserted in his pretrial motions, and the court overruled the objections and received the evidence.

Additional facts will be included in our analysis of the issues presented for appellate review.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Fernando-Granados assigns, restated, that the trial court committed reversible error (1) by denying his motion to suppress his statements because the rights advisory form written in Spanish did not conform to the requirements established by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), and (2) by admitting evidence and testimony concerning DNA testing, analysis, and results because the State failed to meet the foundational requirements of Daubert, supra.

III. ANALYSIS
1. Denial of Motion to Suppress
(a) Miranda v. Arizona

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides in part that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination "is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964).

In Miranda, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically addressed the application of the Fifth Amendment to interrogation of persons held in the custody of law enforcement agencies. The Court held in Miranda that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." 384 U.S. at 444. Specifically, the Court in Miranda held that

when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

384 U.S. at 478-79. The Court further held that such warnings and waiver "are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement" made by a defendant in police custody. 384 U.S. at 476. Miranda announced a "constitutional rule" which "requires procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and which will assure the suspect that the exercise of that right will be honored." Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442, 444, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000).

(b) Suppression Hearing

[1] In this case, Fernando-Granados filed a pretrial motion seeking to suppress "any and all statements obtained from him by members of the Douglas County Sheriff's Department or members of the FBI on or about June 7, 2002." The bases for his motion included that the statements were obtained "without properly advising him of his right to counsel, and his right against compulsory self-incrimination" and that he "did not make a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel, and his right against compulsory self-incrimination." Where, as in this case, suppression of a statement is sought based upon a claimed violation of Miranda, the State bears the burden of proving waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S. Ct. 619, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1972).

The State called Jones, Pankonin, and Gilberto Balli as witnesses at the suppression hearing. Jones was a deputy for the Douglas County sheriff's office, and Pankonin worked as a detective for that office. On June 5, 2002, they interviewed Fernando-Granados and three other individuals at the Omaha central police station in connection with the investigation of the death of Schrieber. The interviews were conducted by Pankonin. Jones, who is fluent in Spanish, assisted with translation where necessary.

At the beginning of the June 5, 2002, interview, Jones and Pankonin ascertained that Fernando-Granados spoke both English and Spanish. It was agreed that the interview would be conducted in English and that Jones would translate it into Spanish if necessary. Before the interview began, Jones advised Fernando-Granados of his rights utilizing a...

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