State v. Finley

• Decision Date: 28 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 13324,13324
• Citation: 644 A.2d 371,34 Conn.App. 823
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Samuel FINLEY.

Page 371

644 A.2d 371

34 Conn.App. 823

STATE of Connecticut v. Samuel FINLEY.

No. 13324.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 28, 1994.

Decided June 28, 1994.

Susan M. Hankins, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, was G. Douglas Nash, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

James A. Killen, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Mary M. Galvin, State's Atty., for appellee (State).

Before EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, LAVERY and HEIMAN, JJ.

HEIMAN, Judge.

The defendant appeals ¹ from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a trial to the court, of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111(a)(1). ² On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) rendered a judgment of conviction because the state failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove a violation of § 53a-111(a)(1), (2) excluded evidence, and (3) rendered its finding prior to final argument by defense counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are necessary for a proper resolution of this appeal. In the summer of 1992, an addition to the Laurel Ledge School was being constructed in Beacon Falls. On July 22, 1992, the defendant began working at the construction site. On July 23, 1992, after complaints from the foreman about the defendant's work production, Claude Boutote, the superintendent of the construction company, laid off the defendant. Boutote told the defendant that the lay off was due to lack of work. The following morning, the defendant returned to the construction site and walked into Boutote's trailer office. The defendant was carrying a clorox bleach container. The defendant said to Boutote, "I'm going to work today." In response, Boutote said: "No, you're not. You were laid off yesterday and you just go out and go home." The defendant then punctured the clorox bleach container. It contained kerosene that the defendant began spreading around the trailer, splashing some on Boutote's pants while stating "if I can't work, nobody else will." ³ After spreading the liquid, the defendant attempted to light a match as Boutote exited the trailer. ⁴ The defendant then followed Boutote out of the trailer and ran away. Immediately following the defendant's exit from the trailer, Boutote noticed that the trailer was on fire. The fire was extinguished by some construction workers. The fire caused damage to the trailer and to papers that were in the trailer. ⁵ The trial court found the defendant guilty. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly rendered a judgment of conviction because the state failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove a violation of General Statutes § 53a-111(a)(1). Specifically, the defendant asserts that the state failed to present evidence to satisfy the requirement that the building was occupied or inhabited or that the defendant had reason to believe that the building may have been occupied or inhabited. We are unpersuaded.

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence in arson cases, we look to the time that the defendant started the fire to ascertain whether the elements of § 53a-111(a)(1) were met. See State v. Moye, 199 Conn. 389, 399, 507 A.2d 1001 (1986); State v. Parmalee, 197 Conn. 158, 162, 496 A.2d 186 (1985). "When we are called upon to review a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we impose a two-part analysis. We first construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. State v. Salz, 226 Conn. 20, 31, 627 A.2d 862 (1993); State v. Rivera, 32 Conn.App. 193, 200-201, 628 A.2d 996, cert. denied, 227 Conn. 920, 632 A.2d 698 (1993); State v. Hooks, 30 Conn.App. 232, 238, 619 A.2d 1151, cert. denied, 225 Conn. 915, 623 A.2d 1025 (1993). We next determine whether, from that evidence and all the reasonable inferences that flow from the evidence, a trier of fact could reasonably find that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salz, supra [226 Conn. at 31, 627 A.2d 862]; State v. Rivera, supra [32 Conn.App. at 200-201, 628 A.2d 996]." State v. Reddick, 33 Conn.App. 311, 332, 635 A.2d 848 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 924, 638 A.2d 38 (1994). Here, the trial court had before it evidence that Boutote saw the defendant strike the match as Boutote was departing the trailer, that the defendant exited the trailer immediately after Boutote, and that the trailer was on fire immediately after the defendant ran from it. Thus, even though there was no witness to the match igniting while Boutote was in the trailer, the trial court could reasonably infer from this evidence that the match ignited prior to Boutote's departure. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find the defendant guilty of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111(a)(1).

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly excluded evidence thereby violating his constitutional rights to present a defense, to testify and to assistance of counsel. Specifically, the defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining the state's objection to defense counsel's questions about the defendant's state of mind when he walked into the trailer on the morning of July 24, 1992. ⁶ The defendant concedes that he did not properly preserve this claim because he failed to articulate properly the constitutional claims. Practice Book § 4185. The defendant, however, requests review of this claim under the doctrine of State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). We are unpersuaded.

"Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on an unpreserved claim of constitutional error 'only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.' Id. [at] 239-40 . The first two conditions are determinations of whether a defendant's claim will be reviewed, and the third condition involves a review of the claim itself." State v. Crosby, 34 Conn.App. 261, 264, 641 A.2d 406 (1994). Here, the defendant cannot satisfy the third condition enunciated under Golding that he was clearly deprived of a fair trial.

"There is no rule in this jurisdiction which prevents a witness from testifying to relevant facts within his personal knowledge merely because his testimony may be self-serving. Such an extraordinary rule presumably would disqualify as witnesses most parties in civil suits as well as the defendant in a criminal case. General Statutes § 52-145(a) expressly provides that a 'person shall not be disqualified as a witness in any action because of, (1) his interest in the outcome of the action as a party or otherwise....' We have repeatedly upheld against constitutional challenge an instruction that the jury in weighing the credibility of an accused's testimony may consider his interest in the outcome of the case. State v. Wright, 198 Conn. 273, 280, 502 A.2d 911 (1985); State v. Frazier, 194 Conn. 233, 239, 478 A.2d 1013 (1984); State v. Maldonado, 193 Conn. 350, 366-67, 478 A.2d 581 (1984). This instruction is presupposed by our recognition and acceptance of the fact that the testimony of an accused may be self-serving. It is the task of the cross-examiner to discredit a witness by exposing his motive or interest in testifying. See, e.g., State v. Ortiz, 198 Conn. 220, 502 A.2d 400 (1985); State v. Milum, 197 Conn. 602, 608-609, 500 A.2d 555 (1985). The ultimate issue, credibility, is for the [fact finder], not the court, to decide.

"The governing principle with respect to this issue is that relevant evidence is admissible unless excluded for some reason of policy. 'Evidence is admitted, not because it is shown to be competent, but because it is not shown to be incompetent.' State v. Sharpe, [195 Conn. 651, 659, 491 A.2d 345 (1985) ]; State v. Schaffer, 168 Conn. 309, 317, 362 A.2d 893 (1975)." State v. Silveira, 198 Conn. 454, 474-75, 503 A.2d 599 (1986). Here, the defendant's state of mind was relevant to his guilt under § 53a-111(a)(1). State v. Ramsundar, 204 Conn. 4, 14, 526 A.2d 1311 (1987). "We have consistently held that mental condition is a fact, and, where relevant to an issue in the case, the witness concerned may testify directly to it.... The defendant's testimony as to his prior mental condition was not hearsay because it concerned a fact within his own personal knowledge. His testimony with regard to this fact was no more and no less self-serving than his testimony with regard to any other fact. The trial court erred by excluding it on the ground that it was self-serving." State v. Silveira, supra, 198 Conn. at 475-76, 503 A.2d 599.

The determination that the trial court acted improperly does not necessarily require reversal of the judgment. Id. at 476, 503 A.2d 599. The defendant claims that the erroneous rulings deprived him of his right to testify under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution as well as his federal due process rights to present a defense and assistance of counsel.

"With respect to the state constitutional right to testify, we recently stated that State v. King, [187 Conn. 292, 303-304, 445 A.2d 901 (1982) ], where that right was mentioned, 'did not effect any fundamental change in the law.' State v. Wright, [198 Conn. 273, 280, 502 A.2d 911 (1986) ]. We therefore consider the harmfulness of the erroneous rulings under the due process clause. Our inquiry, under the due process clause, is whether the erroneous exclusion of evidence 'was so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial. State v. Ruth, 181 Conn. 187,...