State v. Flegel, 17459

• Citation: 485 N.W.2d 210
• Decision Date: 24 October 1991
• Docket Number: No. 17459,17459
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Arnold L. FLEGEL, Defendant and Appellant. . Considered on Briefs
• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota

Page 210

485 N.W.2d 210

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Arnold L. FLEGEL, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 17459.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs Oct. 24, 1991.

Decided April 22, 1992.

Mark Barnett, Atty. Gen., Sherri Sundem Wald, Charles D. McGuigan, Asst. Attys. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee.

David R. Wurm, Rapid City, for defendant and appellant.

MILLER, Chief Justice.

Arnold L. Flegel (Flegel) appeals his conviction for fourth offense driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWI). We remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

At approximately 10:00 p.m. on the night of November 5, 1990, a woman driving on a muddy rural road in Pennington County, South Dakota came upon an abandoned car that had slid into the ditch along the roadside. After stopping and confirming there was no one in the car, the woman continued on her way home. A short time later she came upon a man "staggering" down the road with blood on his face. The woman stopped and picked up the man, offering to drive him to a hospital. Declining the offer, the man told the woman to keep driving but did not say where he wanted to go. ¹ After traveling for about five minutes, the woman became apprehensive and pulled into the driveway of a neighbor's residence to, "call somebody." As the woman got out of her car, the man also jumped out and ran away.

The woman later relayed the above information to the highway patrol and, at approximately 10:30 p.m., a trooper visited the scene of the abandoned car. After confirmation of the registration of the vehicle and several phone calls, including a call to Flegel's father, the trooper was able to identify Flegel as the possible driver. The trooper proceeded to Flegel's trailer home where he talked to Flegel's father who lived in an adjacent trailer. The trooper asked to speak to Flegel and the father went to another room to get him while the trooper remained in the kitchen/living room area of Flegel's residence. Shortly thereafter, Flegel came into the living room where he met the trooper. Flegel "staggered" when he entered the room and he had a gash on his forehead and dried blood in his mustache and beard.

During the trooper's ensuing conversation with Flegel, Flegel admitted driving earlier that evening and sliding off the road. Flegel also admitted consuming several beers earlier that night. The trooper informed Flegel he was going to arrest him and that he needed to get dressed. After Flegel dressed, the trooper placed him under arrest for driving with a revoked license and took him to the patrol car where the trooper proceeded to administer a series of field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test. Based upon the results of these tests and the trooper's observations of Flegel's manner and appearance, the trooper arrested Flegel for DWI and transported him to the Pennington County jail.

Flegel was subsequently charged in an information with one count of driving while under the influence of alcohol (SDCL 32-23-1(2)), an alternative count of driving with .10 percent or more of alcohol in his blood (SDCL 32-23-1(1)) and one count of driving with a revoked license (SDCL 32-12-65(1)) ². Additionally, Flegel was charged in a Part II information with fourth offense DWI (SDCL 32-23-4.6). Prior to trial, Flegel filed a motion to suppress all statements and evidence obtained by the highway patrol trooper on the grounds that the same were obtained as a result of his warrantless seizure in violation of both the constitutions of the United States and of the State of South Dakota. Flegel's motion was denied after a suppression hearing on January 7, 1991.

Flegel's jury trial proceeded on February 1, 1991. During trial, Flegel renewed his objection to the previously challenged evidence and his objection was again denied. After presentation of all the evidence, the jury returned a verdict finding Flegel guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol (SDCL 32-23-1(2)). Flegel subsequently waived trial on the Part II information for fourth offense DWI and admitted his prior DWI convictions. A judgment and sentence were entered accordingly and this appeal followed.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING FLEGEL'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY THE HIGHWAY PATROL TROOPER?

Flegel argues the trooper's warrantless entry into his home to effect his arrest violated the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article VI, Sec. 11 of the South Dakota Constitution requiring suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of that entry. He asserts the trial court erred in failing to suppress that evidence during trial.

A trial court's findings of fact from a suppression hearing must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Pfaff, 456 N.W.2d 558 (S.D.1990).... This court's function under the clearly erroneous standard is to determine whether the decision of the lower court lacks the support of substantial evidence, evolves from an erroneous view of the applicable law or whether, considering the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Corder, 460 N.W.2d 733 (S.D.1990). In making this determination, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's decision. Id.

To disturb a trial court's ultimate decision [concerning the suppression of evidence], this court must find that an abuse of discretion has occurred. Pfaff, supra. This refers to a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence. Id. In this regard, we do not determine whether we would have made a like decision but only whether a judicial mind, considering the law and facts, could have reached a similar decision. Id.

State v. Baysinger, 470 N.W.2d 840, 843 (S.D.1991).

In this instance, the trial court did not enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law after the suppression hearing but merely entered oral findings and conclusions on the record at the close of the hearing. See, State v. Bonrud, 393 N.W.2d 785 (S.D.1986) (although written findings of fact and conclusions of law are preferred, a trial court may verbally enter on the record at a motion hearing the findings and conclusions on which it bases its opinion). The trial court denied Flegel's suppression motion based on its conclusion that the trooper had two exigent circumstances to consider in entering Flegel's trailer: first, the trooper knew Flegel was injured and was concerned he needed medical attention; and, second, evidence of Flegel's blood alcohol content would dissipate if he took time to obtain a warrant.

"[A] warrantless arrest that occurs inside an individual's home is unconstitutional unless the officers demonstrate the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances.... It is well established that a warrantless arrest within the confines of the home, barring exigent circumstances, is unconstitutional." Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir.1989) (footnote omitted). See also, State v. Heumiller, 317 N.W.2d 126 (S.D.1982).

In Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) the U.S. Supreme Court held the defendant's warrantless home arrest violated the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution because of the absence of any exigent circumstances justifying the arrest. Welsh, supra, involved a set of facts and circumstances highly analogous to those in the instant case. A witness observed a car swerve off a road and into an open field. The witness stopped and was approached by the other driver who asked for a ride home. When the witness suggested waiting for assistance, the other driver walked away from the scene. Police arrived on the scene and checked the registration of the abandoned car, identifying Welsh as the owner. Without obtaining any warrant, they proceeded to Welsh's home. Welsh's stepdaughter admitted the police into the residence and they proceeded to Welsh's upstairs bedroom where they placed him under arrest for DWI.

Welsh subsequently refused to submit to a breath test. During trial court proceedings to revoke Welsh's driver's license because of that refusal, the trial court concluded Welsh's warrantless home arrest was lawful. The Wisconsin Supreme Court later found three exigent circumstances that justified the arrest: the need for hot pursuit of the suspect, the need to prevent physical harm to the offender and the public, and the need to prevent destruction of evidence.

Welsh appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The high court found the claim of hot pursuit unconvincing because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of Welsh from the scene of a crime. As for the claimed threat to public safety, the Supreme Court found because Welsh had already arrived home and abandoned his car, there was little remaining threat to public safety. Finally, as to the need to preserve evidence, the court held:

The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible. This is the best indication of the State's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest.

Given this expression of the State's interest, a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant. To allow a warrantless home entry on these facts would be to approve unreasonable police behavior that the principles of the Fourth Amendment will not sanction.

Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754, 104 S.Ct. at 2100, 80 L.Ed.2d at 746 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

Welsh was closely adhered to by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363 (8th Cir.1985), another case bearing...