State v. Freese
Decision Date | 04 December 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 33274.,33274. |
Citation | 13 P.3d 442,116 Nev. 1097 |
Parties | The STATE of Nevada, Appellant, v. Bryan Scott FREESE, Respondent. |
Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General, Carson City; Stewart L. Bell, District Attorney, and James Tufteland, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Appellant.
Carmine J. Colucci, Las Vegas, for Respondent.
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION ON RECONSIDERATION1
In 1996, respondent Bryan Scott Freese was charged with nine criminal counts arising from sexual conduct with a minor. Pursuant to negotiations, Freese entered into a written plea agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to one count of sexual assault upon a minor under sixteen years of age. Freese entered his guilty plea on May 20, 1997. Freese filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 1998 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and challenging the sufficiency of the plea canvass.
The district court found, based upon the totality of the circumstances, that Freese's plea was freely, voluntarily and knowingly entered and that he understood the nature of the offense and the consequences of his plea. Despite this finding, the district court2 granted the petition, on the grounds that the plea canvass did not advise Freese about the elements of the offense or the rights Freese would waive by pleading guilty and the guilty plea memorandum could not be considered in determining the validity of the plea.3 We disagree, and for the reasons set forth below, we reverse the district court's order granting the post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.4
In July of 1996, Ethan Williams (Williams) was a neighbor of Freese. Williams' two-story home enabled him to view areas of the Freese residence. While in the bathroom of his residence, Williams observed Freese engaging in sexual activities, including what appeared to be sexual intercourse, with a minor female child who was later determined to be five years old. Williams then contacted the police and reported what he had observed.
After responding to Williams' report and talking to the child, the police took her to Sunrise Hospital where a physical examination was conducted by a pediatrician. The examination revealed evidence of semen around the child's genital area. Freese was informed of his Miranda5 rights, waived them, and gave a voluntary statement to the police. Freese admitted to masturbating in the child's presence and ejaculating on her.
Freese was originally charged by criminal complaint. Pursuant to negotiations, he waived his preliminary hearing and was bound over to district court for entry of a plea of guilty. Freese determined he did not wish to proceed with the negotiations and a trial date was set. Subsequently, the district attorney's office received information that caused it to present additional matters to the Clark County Grand Jury. On October 17, 1996, the grand jury returned a True Bill against Freese containing four counts of lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen years and five counts of sexual assault upon a minor under sixteen years of age. Freese was arraigned on the indictment and the previously filed information was dismissed.
A trial date was set; however, the matter was again negotiated and on May 20, 1997, Freese entered into a written plea agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to one count of sexual assault with a minor under sixteen years of age. In return for Freese's plea of guilty, the district attorney's office agreed not to proceed on the remaining counts. Freese then entered his guilty plea pursuant to the negotiations.
Prior to accepting the guilty plea, the district court, in addition to reviewing the guilty plea memorandum, conducted the following canvass of Freese:
The written plea memorandum that Freese acknowledged reading, understanding and signing in the oral canvass contained a detailed statement of the negotiations, the elements of the offense, possible sentences Freese could receive and the rights Freese would waive by pleading guilty. With respect to the elements of the crime, the plea agreement stated that:
I understand that by pleading guilty I admit the facts which support all the elements of the offense(s) to which I now plead as set forth in Exhibit "1".6
The plea memorandum also contained the following waiver of rights language:
Based upon the written plea memorandum and Freese's responses to the oral canvass, the district court determined that Freese understood the nature of the offense and the consequences of his plea and that his plea was freely, voluntarily and knowingly made. The district court then accepted the guilty plea.
On September 3, 1998, Freese filed a timely post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and challenging the sufficiency of the plea canvass. On October 14, 1998, the district court granted the petition solely on the ground that the plea canvass conducted by the district court judge was inadequate. Specifically, the district court found that the judge failed to ask Freese if he understood what rights he was waiving as a result of a guilty plea and to review the elements of the crime with Freese. The district court made its findings under the belief that the guilty plea agreement could not be considered in determining the validity of Freese's plea. The district court stated that:
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