State v. Fudge

• Decision Date: 28 February 2001
• Citation: 42 S.W.3d 226
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Austin 2001) The State of Texas, Appellant v. James Dean Fudge, Appellee NO. 03-99-00793-CR
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 226

42 S.W.3d 226 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001)

The State of Texas, Appellant v. James Dean Fudge, Appellee

NO. 03-99-00793-CR

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

February 28, 2001.

Rehearing Overruled May 17, 2001.

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 5 OF TRAVIS COUNTY, NO. 517,426, HONORABLE DAVID F. CRAIN, JUDGE PRESIDING.

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Before Justices Yeakel, Patterson and Jones. ^*

Yeakel, Justice.

Appellee James Dean Fudge was charged with driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 40.04(a) (West Supp. 2001). He filed a pretrial motion to suppress contending that the evidence of the offense was discovered during an improper investigative stop. Following a hearing, the county court at law suppressed the evidence and the State appeals. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(a)(5) (West Supp. 2001). The issue on appeal is whether the police officer lawfully stopped appellee based on unsolicited information given to the officer in a face-to-face manner. We will reverse the order of the county court at law and remand the cause for further proceedings.

Background

On October 20, 1998, Tim Pruett, an Austin police officer with eight years' experience, was in the process of arresting an individual on a traffic warrant at a Texaco convenience store and gas station located at the intersection of West Ben White and South Congress Avenue. While Officer Pruett was making the arrest, a taxi cab pulled into the parking area of the store near Officer Pruett. The cab driver got out of the cab, came over to Officer Pruett, and told him that he had seen a white pickup truck driving "all over the road," that the truck "couldn't stay on the road," and that he "believed [the driver] was drunk."¹ Just as the cab driver finished telling Officer Pruett about the white pickup, he told Officer Pruett, "That's it right there." At that moment, Officer Pruett watched as a white pickup pulled into the parking lot, drove around the back of the store and then drove back toward the front of the store. As the truck came around to the front of the store, Officer Pruett stopped the truck and asked appellee, the driver, to step out. Appellee got out of the truck and grabbed the side of the truck to maintain his balance. Officer Pruett noticed appellee's eyes were bloodshot and there was a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. Officer Pruett requested that another officer give appellee field sobriety tests. After failing the sobriety tests, appellee was arrested for driving while intoxicated.

In a pretrial motion, appellee moved to suppress the evidence obtained by the police contending that Officer Pruett stopped him without having a reasonable suspicion of any unlawful activity. During the pretrial suppression hearing, the only evidence presented was Officer Pruett's testimony. He testified that his sole basis for the stop was the unsolicited information provided to him in a face-to-face manner by the cab driver. He further testified that he did not observe appellee commit any traffic violation. The State did not elicit any testimony about the cab driver. In its suppression order, the county court at law court expressly ruled:

Court finds officer's testimony is credible but that officer had not sufficient probable cause nor reasonable suspicion for the initial detention of defendant as was stated in the record.

Accordingly, the trial court suppressed all of the evidence obtained as a result of the stop.

Discussion

On appeal, the State contends that the county court at law erred in granting the motion to suppress because the stop did not violate appellee's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, under Article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution, or under Chapters 14 and 38 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

The appropriate standard of review for a suppression ruling is a bifurcated review, giving almost total deference to the trial court's findings of fact, but conducting a de novo review of the court's application of law to those facts. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

Police officers may stop and briefly detain persons suspected of criminal activity on less information than is constitutionally required for probable cause to arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-26 (1968); Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). To justify the investigative detention, the individual officer must have a reasonable suspicion that "some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or had occurred, some suggestion to connect the detained person with the unusual activity, and some indication that the activity is related to a crime." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; Johnson v. State, 658 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Harris v. State, 913 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1995, no pet.). The officer must have specific articulable facts which, in light of his experience and personal knowledge, together with inferences from those facts, would reasonably warrant the intrusion on the freedom of the person detained for investigation. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Comer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Johnson, 658 S.W.2d at 626.

The reasonableness of a temporary stop turns on the "totality of the circumstances" in each case. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983); Shaffer v. State, 562 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Davis v. State, 794 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Tex. App.--Austin 1990, pet. ref'd). Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of the information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). "Both factors--quantity and quality--are considered in the totality of the circumstances--the whole picture . . . must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion." Id. (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)); see also Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 328-29; Reynolds v. State, 962 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd).

In this case, the county court at law expressly found that Officer Pruett's testimony was credible. Cf. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 857 (trial court made no finding of fact that officer's testimony was credible). Based on the standard of review, we will give great deference to this finding. The county court's suppression of the evidence, therefore, must rest on the determination that the facts established by Officer Pruett's testimony do not constitute reasonable suspicion for the stop. Id. at 856-57. The crucial portion of Officer Pruett's testimony was that his only basis for stopping appellee was the information provided to him in a face-to-face manner by the cab driver; he did not observe any independent acts upon which to lawfully base the stop. The issue for us in reviewing de novo the application of search and seizure law to the facts is, whether considering the totality of the circumstances, did Officer Pruett, based solely on the information provided to him in a face-to-face manner by the cab driver, have the reasonable suspicion necessary to lawfully stop appellee.

A tip by an unnamed informant of undisclosed reliability standing alone rarely will establish the requisite level of reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative detention. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000) (citing White, 496 U.S. at 329). There must be some further indicia of reliability, some additional facts from which a police officer may reasonably conclude that the tip is reliable and a detention is justified. Id.

Other courts have addressed the issue of whether unsolicitated information from a person who, in a face-to-face manner, advises an officer that a designated person present on the scene is committing or has committed a specific crime should be given serious attention and great weight by the officer. See United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1978); State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd); see also State v. Garcia, 25 S.W.3d 908 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.); J.L., 529 U.S. at 274-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

In Sierra-Hernandez, a man described only as "wearing farmer's overalls and a baseball cap and driving a late-model brown Mercedes-Benz" approached a border patrol officer who was working during mid-day checking the citizenship of workers in a field just north of the Mexico-United States border. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d at 762. The man pointed to a black pickup and said, "The black pickup truck just loaded with weed at the canebreak." The officer knew that the general neighborhood and the canebreak in particular were sites of previous incidents of drug smuggling and illegal entry of aliens. Id. Without any other information from the man, the officer radioed for help and began following the pickup. He stopped the pickup about four and a half miles later and arrested the driver, the sole occupant in the car, for possession of marihuana. The Sierra-Hernandez court held that a person who is not connected with the police or who is not a paid informant is inherently trustworthy when the person approaches a police officer and, in a face-to-face manner, gives the officer unsolicited information that a crime is being committed. Id. at 763. The court noted that just as there is no per se rule establishing the reliability of a person's information to justify a stop in every instance, likewise there is no per se rule requiring an officer to obtain the identity of a person giving information before acting on that information. In evaluating the reasonableness of the officer's conduct the court considered both the circumstances in which the information was given to the officer and the...