State v. Fungone

• Decision Date: 12 June 1975
• Citation: 134 N.J.Super. 531,342 A.2d 236
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Joseph FUNGONE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 531

134 N.J.Super. 531

342 A.2d 236

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Joseph FUNGONE, Defendant-Appellant.

Superior Court of New Jersey,

Appellate Division.

Submitted May 12, 1975.

Decided June 12, 1975.

Stanley C. Van Ness, Public Defender, for appellant (Maurice J. Molyneaux, of counsel and on the brief).

William F. Hyland, Atty. Gen., for respondent (Robert A. Jacobson, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges MICHELS, MORGAN and MILMED.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals from a conviction of the high misdemeanor of larceny (N.J.S.A. 2A:119--2), contending that he was denied the right to a speedy trial, that his rights pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detailers (N.J.S.A. 2A:159A--3) were violated by his trial beyond the 180-day period from the date upon which he demanded trial while incarcerated at the federal prison at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, and that the trial judge should have disqualified himself. Indentical claims of error were held to be without merit in a companion case filed today, State v. Fungone, Docket No. A--35--73, and the reasons for the court's ruling will not be repeated in this opinion. He also claims the sentence imposed was excessive.

Defendant, however, also contends that the trial judge committed reversible error when he reassembled and reconvened the jury he had previously discharged, and which had been dispersed after rendition of its verdict, in order to receive and record a part of the verdict they had neglected to report and the trial judge had neglected to request. The indictment charged defendant with the theft of a 1967 Chrysler automobile of undetermined value (N.J.S.A. 2A:119--2), and with knowingly receiving a stolen motor vehicle (N.J.S.A. 2A:139--3). After trial the jury returned its verdict acquitting defendant of the 'receiving' charge and finding him guilty of larceny. In his charge the trial judge instructed the jury to make a finding as to whether the vehicle in question had a value in excess of $500 or less than $500. When the verdict was returned the jury failed to report a finding with respect to value and the judge forgot to ask for that finding. After the jury was discharged the matter was brought to the attention of the judge, and in order to correct the omission he ordered that the jury be reassembled the following morning. After they had reassembled the judge inquired as to whether they had arrived at a finding as to the value of the stolen motor vehicle. They reported that they had and the value was in excess of $500.

Defendant was thereafter sentenced to a term of one to three years in New Jersey State Prison, to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed the same day upon defendant's conviction for armed robbery (Indictment No. 831--71), but consecutively to 'any other outstanding sentence.'

The State contends that the action of the trial judge in reassembling the jury was proper because it was not returned to further deliberate but only to report on a verdict it had already reached but did not report. We disagree.

Only one New Jersey decision deals with this subject matter and that one is distinguishable. In State v. Brandenburg, 38 N.J.Super. 561, 120 A.2d 59 (Cty.Ct.1956), the foreman of the jury announced its verdict of acquittal for two defendants. No poll of the jury was requested or taken. The jury was discharged. As the members of the jury dispersed some protested that their verdict had not been correctly reported. The court officers, on their own, reassembled the jury. The judge, on returning to the courtroom, questioned the court officers and discovered that it was in a passageway and corridor outside the court that some of the jurors made known their displeasure with the verdict. Ten minutes had elapsed from the time of discharge until the jury was reassembled. The judge instructed the jury to retire and to deliberate further, after which the jury announced they were unable to reach a verdict. Defendant's motion to declare null and void all proceedings following the return of the verdict of acquittal was granted on the ground that when the jury was discharged after rendition of its verdict and departed from the courtroom, its existence as a fact-finding entity under the continuous control and supervision of the trial judge ceased, and its members could not be reassembled to alter the verdict originally returned.

The overwhelming weight of authority elsewhere supports the position taken in Brandenburg. People v. Rushin, 37 Mich.App. 391, 194 N.W.2d 718, 720--722 (Ct.App.1971); Hayes v. State, 44 Ala.App. 499, 214 So.2d 708, 710 (Ct.App.1968); Ware v. Graham, 417 P.2d 936, 939 (Okl.Ct.Crim.App.1966); People v. DeStefano, 64 Ill.App.2d 389, 212 N.E.2d 357, 366--367 (Ct.App.1965); People v. Hughes, 171 Cal.App.2d 362, 340 P.2d 679, 682--685 (Ct.App.1959); Commonwealth v. Cano, 182 Pa.Super. 524, 128 A.2d 358, 366 (Super.Ct.1956), aff'd 389 Pa. 639, 133 A.2d 800 (Sup.Ct.1957), app. dism. 355 U.S. 182, 78 S.Ct. 267, 2 L.Ed.2d 186 (1957); West v. State, 228 Ind. 431, 92 N.E.2d 852, 855 (Sup.Ct.1950); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 359 Pa. 287, 59 A.2d 128, 129--131 (Sup.Ct.1948); Ex parte Brown, 139 Kan. 614, 32 P.2d 507, 511 (Sup.Ct.1934); Melton v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 703, 711--712, 111 S.E. 291, 293--294 (Sup.Ct.App.1922).

The fact that the jury was not returned for further deliberation but merely to report a verdict previously reached does not constitute a distinguishing feature sufficient to validate the later verdict. In Commonwealth v. Cano, supra, the jury was not returned to deliberate and nonetheless the proceedings subsequent to their discharge were invalidated because they had been permitted to disperse. See also, People v. DeStefano, supra. The fact that the uncontradicted evidence disclosed...