Ware v. Graham

Decision Date31 August 1966
Docket NumberNo. A--13962,A--13962
Citation417 P.2d 936
PartiesCharles WARE, Petitioner, v. The Hon. Raymond W. GRAHAM, and the Hon. W. Lee Johnson, Judges of the District Court, Tulsa County, Oklahoma, Respondents.
CourtUnited States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where the jury has returned its verdict which has been received by the court, the jury has been discharged, and has left the presence of the court and mingled with the public, the court is without power to recall the members of the jury and to require or permit them to amend the verdict.

2. The court lacks the power to recall a discharged jury to amend a faulty verdict; and it likewise lacks the power to recall a jury which returned no verdict at all.

3. The jury cannot be discharged after the cause is submitted to them, unless at the expiration of such time as the court deems proper, it satisfactorily appear that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree. 22 Okl.St.Ann. § 896.

4. Whether the circumstances are such as to justify the conclusion that the jury will be unable to agree on a verdict is to be determined by the exercise of sound judicial discretion. The conclusion of the court is not open to collateral attack.

5. If the jury render a verdict not in form, the court may, with proper instructions as to the law, direct them to reconsider it, and it cannot be recorded until it be rendered in some form from which it can be clearly understood what is the intent of the jury. 22 Okl.St.Ann. § 919.

6. When the trial judge reaches the conclusion, after having made sufficient inquiry, that the jury cannot reach a verdict in the cause, he is justified in declaring a mistrial and discharging the jury.

7. When the court declares a mistrial and discharges the jury, their functions as jurors cease, and they cannot be recalled.

Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County; Raymond W. Graham, Judge.

Original proceeding for issuance of an alternative writ of prohibition, prohibiting the district court of Tulsa County from trying Charles Ware for the crime of murder; and requiring the district court of Tulsa County to accept an alleged verdict of guilty for the crime of manslaughter, and for the court to assess the punishment therefor. Writs denied.

Curtis L. Lawson, Tulsa, for petitioner.

David Hall, County Atty., and Ted Flanagan, Asst. County Atty., Tulsa County, Tulsa, for respondents.

BRETT, Judge.

This is an original proceeding in which petitioner requests this Court to issue a writ of prohibition to prohibit the district court of Tulsa County from trying petitioner a second time for the crime of murder; and for the issuance of a writ of mandamus requiring respondents to accept an alleged verdict of 'guilty for first degree manslaughter', and for said court to pronounce sentence on petitioner.

This Court assumed jurisdiction of this matter and heard oral arguments on July 13, 1966. At the conclusion thereof an evidentiary hearing was ordered to be conducted by the Hon. Raymond W. Graham, district judge. Insofar as petitioner alleges certain actions to have occurred between the court and the jury after it was discharged, the evidentiary hearing was directed to inquire into matters contained in th petition filed herein.

The Honorable District Judge conducted said hearing on July 22, 1966. A second hearing for further oral argument was set in this Court to be had on July 26, 1966, after the transcript of the district court hearing became available. Petitioner was represented by Curtis Lawson, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and the respondents were represented by Ted Flanagan, assistant county attorney for Tulsa County.

Petitioner alleges that he was tried in Tulsa County district court on December 16, 1965, for the crime of murder. That after both sides rested their case, the jury was properly charged, and the case was submitted to the jury. The jury deliberated for a considerable length of time, and was returned to the court room about 10:45 P.M. The foreman announced that the jury was deadlocked. The court proceeded to inquire of the foreman concerning the cause of the deadlock. The court then proceeded to poll the jury individually by asking, 'Do you feel that there is any possibility of reaching a verdict?' Each member of the jury indicated that they could not, and that further deliberation would be futile.

Thereafter the following transpired between the court and the foreman:

'The Court: Now, I would state to the jury that if the deadlock is a result of the amount of punishment that the defendant may receive, that that matter may be left to the discretion of the Court and that the Court assess the punishment, but if your deadlock concerns guilt or innocence, of course, that could never be resolved by anyone but you, and I would ask the foreman of the jury at this time, is the deadlock concerning guilt or innocence, or is it concerning the amount of punishment that the defendant would receive?

'The Foreman: The great difference is between guilt--

The Court: Guilt and innocence?

'The Foreman: And not the sentence. We have explored a number of ways, every way it could be.

'The Court: Well, the Court has no alternative but to declare the mistrial and release the jury from further service. Think you for your attention during the trial. You are now excused to report back at the regular time tomorrow.'

Petitioner contends that immediately after the judge declared the mistrial, and while all the members of the jury, the prosecutor and defendant were still in the court room, some of the members of the jury stated to the court that the jury had reached a verdict of manslaughter, but was deadlocked on the punishment to be given the defendant. Petitioner's counsel then moved the court to reconvene the trial, accept the jury's verdict of guilty on a manslaughter charge, and to assess the punishment therefor.

The court having already discharged the jury, refused to reverse his order declaring the mistrial. Thereafter, petitioner filed his action in ...

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2 cases
  • McDaniels v. Sci
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • July 6, 2017
    ...855 (Ind. 1950); State v. Hurd, 8 A.3d 651, 662 (Me. 2010); Sargent v. State, 11 Ohio 472, 474 (1842) (en banc); Ware v. Graham, 417 P.2d 936, 939 (Okla. Crim. App. 1966); Yonker v. Grimm, 133 S.E. 695, 697-98 (W. Va. 1926). 18. See, e.g., People v. Hendricks, 737 P.2d 1350, 1358-59 (Cal. 1......
  • State v. Fungone
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • June 12, 1975
    ...391, 194 N.W.2d 718, 720--722 (Ct.App.1971); Hayes v. State, 44 Ala.App. 499, 214 So.2d 708, 710 (Ct.App.1968); Ware v. Graham, 417 P.2d 936, 939 (Okl.Ct.Crim.App.1966); People v. DeStefano, 64 Ill.App.2d 389, 212 N.E.2d 357, 366--367 (Ct.App.1965); People v. Hughes, 171 Cal.App.2d 362, 340......

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