State v. Galli

Decision Date16 June 1998
Docket Number960122,960123,Nos. 960018,s. 960018
Citation967 P.2d 930,345 Utah Adv. Rep. 7
Parties345 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Adam B. GALLI, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Laura Dupaix, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Lisa J. Remal, Linda M. Jones, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

HOWE, Chief Justice:

Defendant Adam B. Galli entered conditional pleas of guilty to charges of aggravated robbery in three separate cases before separate trial judges. All three cases have been consolidated for purposes of this appeal. On appeal, Galli contends that (1) the three trial courts erred in failing to suppress his confession to police; (2) Judge Pat B. Brian erred in ordering him to pay restitution to his family for amounts they forfeited when he jumped bail; and (3) Judges Glenn K. Iwasaki and Kenneth Rigtrup erred in ordering him to serve consecutive prison sentences. We consider each of these assignments of error below.

BACKGROUND

In 1992, Galli committed a string of armed robberies in Salt Lake City with his brother, Aaron Galli, and two cousins, Nathan and Christopher Galli. On April 29, 1992, Galli and his two cousins, Nathan and Christopher robbed the King's English Bookstore. Galli and Christopher went inside the bookstore while Nathan waited outside for the purpose of running interference if Galli and Christopher were pursued by police. Galli pointed a gun 1 at the store clerk and took approximately $250 in cash from the two cash registers 2 at the store.

On May 5, 1992, Galli and Christopher, armed with handguns, robbed the Trolley Corners Theaters. While Galli and Christopher were inside the theater, Aaron and Nathan waited outside in a separate car to keep lookout. When a witness ran out of the theater after Galli and Christopher, Nathan pulled up and told the witness to call the police while he pursued the robbers and obtained their license plate number. Galli and his accomplices took over $900 in cash from the theaters.

On June 6, 1992, Galli, disguised in a black wig, entered the Tool Shed and pointed a gun at the store clerk, Sylvia Nordoff. He said, "This is a stickup, give me all of your money or I'll kill you." When Ms. Nordoff refused to hand over the money, Galli grabbed nearly $180 in cash from the till and ran out of the store. Ms. Nordoff chased after him and tackled him just outside the store. Her son, Michael Nordoff, helped her hold Galli down. However, Christopher was waiting just outside the store. He threatened Ms. Nordoff and her son with a weapon and told them to let Galli go. Galli and Christopher ran to their car and fled. When witnesses attempted to pursue the two men, Nathan drove up and told them to call the police while he chased the robbers. Nathan later returned to the scene and gave false information to the police.

In June and July of 1992, Galli was charged with all three armed robberies and warrants for his arrest were issued. On July 10, 1992, he was arrested in King County, Washington. While being held in the King County Jail in Seattle, he was advised of his Miranda rights by two detectives from the Salt Lake City Police Department. He voluntarily waived his rights and agreed to talk to the detectives. During questioning, he incriminated himself and confessed to all three robberies.

In each case below, Galli moved to suppress his statements to the police. He contended that during questioning, he reinvoked both his right to counsel and his right to remain silent and that his confession was therefore obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and Utah law. The judges in all three cases denied his motion to suppress.

Prior to his trial dates, Galli was released from jail after his family posted a bond for his release. However, in November 1992, he absconded from the state. His family forfeited nearly $40,000 in cash and real estate as a result of his flight from justice.

In August 1995, Galli was recaptured in Minnesota by authorities. Upon his return to Utah, he entered conditional pleas of guilty to charges of aggravated robbery and was sentenced in all three cases. 3 Judge Brian sentenced him to an indeterminate term of five years to life in prison and ordered him to pay $40,000 in restitution to his family for the money they forfeited when he absconded. Judge Iwasaki sentenced him to an indeterminate term of five years to life in prison with his sentence to run consecutively to Judge Brian's sentence. Judge Rigtrup also sentenced him to five years to life in prison with his sentence to run consecutively to the sentences imposed by Judge Brian and Judge Iwasaki.

We now turn to Galli's assignments of error.

ANALYSIS
I. THE CONFESSION

The first question presented is whether the trial courts erred in failing to suppress Galli's confession to all three aggravated robberies. He contends that he reinvoked his Miranda rights during questioning and that the detectives refused to scrupulously honor those rights and terminate further questioning. He argues that his assertion was unequivocal and unambiguous but that even if his invocations of his Miranda rights were equivocal, the detectives were required to limit further discussion to clarifying questions only.

First, we must determine whether Galli at any time reinvoked his Miranda rights, equivocally or otherwise. After reviewing the taped recordings and transcripts of his confession, Judges Brian and Iwasaki found that he had not reinvoked either his right to counsel or right to remain silent during questioning. Judge Rigtrup did not rule on Galli's motion on the ground that Judge Brian's ruling precluded relitigation of the suppression issue under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Judge Rigtrup incorporated Judge Brian's findings, conclusions, and order into his own order.

We review the trial courts' factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error, while conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1995).

Galli contends that although he initially waived his Miranda rights, he reinvoked his rights to counsel and to remain silent early on during the interrogation. His argument relies on the following emphasized portions of his confession transcript:

Q: ... Let's start with the King's English. Back on the 29th of April.

A: King's English. What do you want me to say.

Q: What happened.

A: You know....

Q: I know this is hard for you.

A: I can't even talk right now. (Whispered)

Q: (Oliver) That's Ok Adam. If you need a minute, that's fine.

Q: Do you want us to turn this off for a minute.

....

A: I ... look you guys I want to do everything I can Ok.

Q: Well let's do it.

A: But they ... the FBI guys told me to absolutely not talk to anybody at all.

Q: That's not true because I talked to the FBI today when we got here.

A: He said talk to the prosecuting attorney.

Q: That's not true. Don't lie to me. I talked to the FBI agent that arrested you. His name is Jeff Bicker.

A: The big blonde guy.

Q: Big blonde guy.

A: He said not to ... the prosecuting attorney.

Q: If you're going to sit here and lie to me, you're insulting my intelligence. I have not insulted yours. Please don't insult mine, because I talked to Jeff today and he told me he had feelings that you were going to cooperate and I did too when I walked in here, but you start telling me that the FBI told you not to talk to anybody I can't believe that.

Q: (Oliver) Adam, these cases happened in Salt Lake City. We're Salt Lake Police Officer's [sic]. FBI; these are not Federal cases. They don't have any....

Q: The only reason the FBI arrested you is because the FBI was looking for you as an Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution. It's called UFAP.

Q: (Oliver) Because you left the state of Utah.

A: He said I should talk to an attorney. He said not to talk to any cops. I'm not trying to lie. I'm not. I don't have anything to gain, I don't have anything. What else can I lose.

Q: You can lose a lot, but you can also gain a lot. You can gain your dignity, your self respect, your redemption, her dignity, her respect of you.

Q: (Oliver) It'll probably feel a lot better if you got it off your chest.

Q: The charges are there. They're already defined.

A: I don't know what to do. I don't know if I should. Look you guys, I've only seen the movies, okay. I don't know.... I think you're supposed to talk to, like, the attorney, and not talk to any cops. Ok.

Q: Well is that what you want to do. You've also seen the movies where the cop talks to the suspect and he confesses it. I'm not going to beat you. I'm not going to rubber hose you or anything else. You've seen movies both ways because that's the way they are, and that's the way life is. In your situation you're sitting here ... you're not a bad guy. You're sitting here crying because of things that have happened. Things are eating you alive inside. Get them out. Get them out on the table.

(Emphasis added.) Galli asserts that the foregoing transcript shows that he reinvoked his Miranda rights during questioning and that the trial courts erred in failing to suppress his confession. We disagree.

Most jurisdictions have held that a suspect's request to speak to a prosecuting attorney is not equivalent to an invocation of the right to counsel under Miranda, equivocal or otherwise. See People v. Manges, 134 Mich.App. 49, 350 N.W.2d 829, 832 (1984) (defendant's request to speak to an attorney he knew to be the prosecutor was not even an ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel); Riley v. State, 501 So.2d 551, 553 (Ala.Crim.App.1986) (request to speak to district attorney not an assertion of right to counsel); United States v. Brown, 27 M.J. 614, 617 (A.C.M.R.1988) (request to speak to attorney who was a prosecutor was not an ambiguous invocation of right to counsel); Trice v. State, 853 P.2d 203, 211 (Okla...

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