State v. Garrow
| Decision Date | 03 May 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94,94 |
| Citation | 103 Ohio App.3d 368,659 N.E.2d 814 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. GARROW, Appellant. CA 1. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Douglas M. Cowles, Gallipolis, for appellee.
Bennett & Wallen and James A. Bennett, Gallipolis, for appellant.
This is an appeal from the Gallipolis Municipal Court. Appellant, Robert Garrow, was found guilty of violating Gallipolis Codified Ordinance 509.03, which prohibits disorderly conduct. Appellant assigns the following error:
"The trial court erred to the prejudice of the defendant/appellant in finding the appellant guilty of disorderly conduct after warning under the city of Gallipolis Codified Ordinance 509.03 since the appellant's conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence."
The record reveals the following facts. On the evening of August 3, 1993, the Gallipolis Police went to Garrow's home in response to a call from his wife, who was apparently complaining about domestic violence. When they arrived, the police found appellant's wife and his children outside of the home. She told the police that she had not been assaulted and that Garrow was still inside the home. She also told the police that appellant did not have any weapons, and asked the officers to enter the home to talk with him.
The three officers found Garrow sitting in the living room watching the television, which was very loud. The officers attempted to speak with Garrow in conversation, but he refused to talk and sat there deliberately ignoring them. Finally, in an effort to get the appellant's attention, one of the officers turned off the television. Garrow then turned the television back on. Next, one of the officers unplugged the television, and appellant reconnected the plug. While Garrow still would not answer any of the officers' questions, he told the police officers to "leave me alone and don't mess with my television." The officers testified that appellant eventually started to make verbal threats against them. The officers also testified that they warned Garrow several times that his conduct could result in his arrest. Finally, the officers told Garrow that he was being arrested on the charges of menacing and disorderly conduct and he submitted peacefully to his arrest.
A bench trial was held on December 10, 1993. The officers testified that, although they recognized that he had the right to remain silent, they had tried to turn off the television in order to get appellant's attention. They testified that Garrow had, in fact, threatened them and that they felt that they had reason to be afraid. The appellant testified that he did not threaten the officers. The court apparently found the testimony about the threats insufficient because it found appellant not guilty on the charge of menacing. There was also testimony that Garrow was yelling, and Garrow did admit to strongly objecting to the officers turning off his television. The court found him guilty of disorderly conduct. This appeal follows.
In his sole assignment of error, Garrow submits that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. A reviewing court will not reverse a conviction if there is substantial evidence upon which the court could reasonably conclude that all the elements of an offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Johnson (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 40, 567 N.E.2d 266; State v. Eskridge (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304. In reviewing a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court's duty is to weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether the trier of fact clearly lost his or her way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed. State v. Brown (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 528 N.E.2d 523. See, also, State v. Banks (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 206, 604 N.E.2d 219; State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 20 OBR 215, 485 N.E.2d 717. However, this review is tempered by the principle that questions of weight and credibility are primarily for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass (1968), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212.
Gallipolis Codified Ordinance 509.03, under which the appellant was charged, is identical to R.C. 2917.11(A)(1). R.C. 2917.11(A)(1) states the following:
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State v. Jones, 2005 Ohio 768 (OH 2/18/2005)
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