State v. Gartlan

• Decision Date: 16 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. COA98-518.,COA98-518.
• Citation: 132 NC App. 272,512 S.E.2d 74
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. William Richard GARTLAN.

512 S.E.2d 74

132 NC App. 272

STATE of North Carolina v. William Richard GARTLAN.

No. COA98-518.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

February 16, 1999.

Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender by Mark D. Montgomery, Assistant Appellate Defender, Durham, for the Defendant.

Michael F. Easley, Attorney General by Laura E. Crumpler, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

WYNN, Judge.

Sometime during the night of 19 August 1996, defendant William Richard Gartlan, an ordained minister with no criminal history, was awakened by his older daughter who informed him that his younger daughter was crying. In fact, the defendant's younger daughter was semiconscious and non-responsive. Additionally, his older daughter was experiencing difficulty breathing, and his son was completely unconscious.

The source of these difficulties was traced to the family's car which was running with the garage door closed. After turning off the car, defendant called 911. The emergency personnel treated them for carbon-monoxide poisoning. They were taken to the hospital and later released.

The next day, while being interviewed at the police station by Detective Bayliff, the defendant cried and confessed to attempting to kill himself and his three children by running his automobile in the closed garage. He stated that he had been depressed and that "he could not kill himself because the kids would be alone and have no one to take care [of] them. This was a way they could all be together." However, the defendant changed his mind after seeing his younger daughter turn blue with breathing difficulty.

The defendant signed a written statement prepared by Detective Saul which included the following concluding remarks:

I knew the police would eventually ask what happened. I decided I would just tell the event that happened and just leave out the part about who started the car. In closing, I would like to say that I did do this; but, no words can say how sorry I am for it.

Additionally, a social worker called the police station on August 21 after the defendant told her:

I know that I did this to myself and to the children what I've been accused of by the police and everyone else. But I guess I just wanted to convince myself that I did not do it.

The defendant was indicted for three counts of attempted first-degree murder. Following his conviction of these crimes, he brought this appeal contending that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to give instructions on the defense of abandonment, (2) admitting improper lay opinion testimony, and (3) denying his motions for dismissal, mistrial, and suppression of evidence. We find no prejudicial error.

I.

The defendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his written request for jury instructions on the defense of abandonment of the attempted murder crimes. We disagree.

"The elements of an attempt to commit any crime are: (1) an intent to commit the substantive offense, and (2) an overt act done for that purpose which goes beyond mere preparation, but (3) falls short of the completed offense." State v. Miller, 344 N.C. 658, 667, 477 S.E.2d 915, 921 (1996). Specifically, a person commits the crime of attempted first-degree murder if: (1) he or she intends to kill another person unlawfully and (2) acting with malice, premeditation, and deliberation does an overt act calculated to carry out that intent, which goes beyond mere preparation, but falls short of committing murder. See State v. Cozart, ___ N.C.App. ___, 505 S.E.2d 906 (1998)

.

"In North Carolina, an intent does not become an attempt so long as the defendant stops his criminal plan, or has it stopped, prior to the commission of the requisite overt act." Miller, 344 N.C. at 669, 477 S.E.2d at 922. An overt act for an attempt crime,

must reach far enough towards the accomplishment of the desired result to amount to the commencement of the consummation. It must not be merely preparatory.

State v. Price, 280 N.C. 154, 158, 184 S.E.2d 866, 869 (1971).

Consequently, "[a] defendant can stop his criminal plan short of an overt act on his own initiative or because of some outside intervention." Miller, 344 N.C. at 669, 477 S.E.2d at 922. "However, once a defendant engages in an overt act, the offense is complete, and it is too late for the defendant to change his mind." Id.

The Court in Miller further stated that "[a]n abandonment occurs when an individual voluntarily forsakes his or her criminal plan prior to committing an overt act in furtherance of that plan." Id. at 670, 477 S.E.2d at 922. Thus, contrary to the defendant's contention, the Court in Miller did not abolish the common law defense of abandonment in North Carolina; rather, the Court clarified the limited application of the defense by holding that a person could not abandon an attempt crime once an overt act is committed with the requisite mental intent—a common-sense application because the crime of attempt is at that point already completed.

In the present case, the evidence showed that the defendant intended to kill his children. In furtherance of this purpose, while the children were in their beds at night, he started his car with the garage door closed. As a result, all of the children were exposed to carbon-monoxide poisoning. The children exhibited physical symptoms from the exposure—discoloration, difficulty breathing, semiconsciousness, and unconsciousness. Consequently, all of the children required medical treatment for carbon-monoxide poisoning. Only after the defendant observed his younger daughter turning blue did he decide that he could no longer continue with his plan to kill his children.

Certainly, defendant's actions amounted to more than mere preparation to commit murder. Following Miller, we conclude that after committing these overt acts, the defendant could not legally abandon the crime of attempted murder. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in failing to give the instructions on the defense of abandonment.

II.

The second issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in allowing into evidence opinion testimony regarding: (1) the defendant's confessions and (2) the defendant's appearance. We hold that the admission of this evidence did not amount to prejudicial error in this case.

First, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting Detective Bayliff's opinion testimony that defendant's statements during the interview were voluntary and that the defendant understood his Miranda rights and the nature of the interview.

"Any witness `who has had a reasonable opportunity to form an opinion' may give an opinion on a person's mental capacity." State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243, 263, 446 S.E.2d 298, 311 (1994) (quoting State v. Evangelista, 319 N.C. 152, 162, 353 S.E.2d 375, 383 (1987)). However, a witness may not "testify that a legal standard has or has not been met." Id. Thus, a witness can testify "as to whether the defendant had the capacity to understand certain words on the Miranda form, such as `right' or `attorney' but he may not testify as to whether the defendant had the capacity to waive his rights." Id.

In the case sub judice, Detective Bayliff's testimony concerning the voluntariness of defendant's statements during the interview were improper because this testimony involved the issue of whether a legal standard had been met. Further, the detective's testimony regarding whether the defendant understood his Miranda rights was tantamount to asking whether the defendant had the capacity to waive his rights. As a result, this too was improper testimony.

However, "every error is not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial." State v. Harrelson, 54 N.C.App. 349, 350, 283 S.E.2d 168, 170 (1981). "Defendant must show that the error complained of was prejudicial and thereby affected the result adversely to him." Id. In State v. Patterson, 288 N.C. 553, 220 S.E.2d 600 (1975), vacated in part on other grounds, 428 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 3211, 49 L.E.2d 1211 (1976), our Supreme Court held that it was harmless error for the trial court to permit the interrogating officers to testify that in their opinion the defendant understood his rights. Further, this Court, relying on Patterson, held in State v. Shook, 38 N.C.App. 465, 248 S.E.2d 425 (1978) that it was harmless error for the trial court to admit an officer's testimony that the defendant appeared to understand what he was doing in waiving his rights and making a statement. The errors by the trial court in Patterson and Shook, were not prejudicial because there was other competent evidence that the defendants in those cases understood what they were doing.

In the present case, like Patterson and Shook, there is other competent evidence regarding the defendant's actions and demeanor after the attempted murder which support the fact that he understood his rights and voluntarily confessed. For instance, the defendant drove himself to the police station and he exhibited no signs of carbon-monoxide poisoning such as nausea, headache, memory loss, or confusion. Given this evidence, we find the trial court's admission of Officer Bayliff's statements to be harmless error.

Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the opinion testimony regarding the officers' ability to evaluate his appearance. We find no error.

Specifically, the defendant points to the following questions asked by the prosecutor of Detective Saul:

Q. Now, Detective Saul based upon your years experience as a police officer, do you feel that you need to have specific medical background or psychiatric background to be able to observe a human being such as Mr. Gartlan for the time that you did observe him and be able to determine for yourself whether or not he appears normal?

A. I don't feel like I need that just to look at someone and give my opinion as to whether they're normal or not.

Additionally, defendant points to a similar line of questioning...