State v. Gedrose
| Decision Date | 24 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20200277,20200277 |
| Citation | 961 N.W.2d 288 |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant v. Orin GEDROSE, Defendant and Appellee |
Ashley L. Lies, State's Attorney, New Rockford, ND, for plaintiff and appellant.
Leah R. Carlson, West Fargo, ND, for defendant and appellee.
[¶1] The State appeals from a judgment dismissing its criminal complaint against Orin Gedrose after the district court held N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16(1)(d) is unconstitutional. The State argues the statute does not violate due process. We reverse the judgment and remand, concluding the district court erred in deciding N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16(1)(d) is unconstitutional.
[¶2] Gedrose was charged with issuing a check without sufficient funds in violation of N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16(1)(d), a class C felony. The State alleged on October 31, 2017, Gedrose made and delivered to the Peterson Law Office a check for $120,000 payable to "Peterson Trust Acc't," and the check was returned on November 6, 2017, for non-sufficient funds.
[¶3] Gedrose moved to dismiss the charge, arguing N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16(1)(d) is unconstitutional under the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the North Dakota Constitution. He argued the statute is unconstitutional because it lacks a mens rea requirement for a violation and it does not qualify as a public welfare offense. He also claimed a mens rea element was required because innocent conduct could be severely punished. The State opposed the motion, arguing the statute is a strict liability offense and the lack of a mens rea requirement does not violate due process.
[¶4] After a hearing, the district court granted Gedrose's motion to dismiss. The court stated strict liability criminal laws generally are disfavored, and courts have expressed a strong aversion to saddling a person with the severe consequences of a felony conviction for what may have been an innocent mistake. The court noted a violation of N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16(1)(d) is a felony and a felony conviction has life-changing consequences, including imprisonment, the inability to travel out of state without permission from a probation officer, loss of the right to use firearms for a period of time, and negative economic consequences. The court concluded due process requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gedrose acted with at least some degree of bad intent before he can be subjected to the consequences of a felony conviction. The court considered federal and North Dakota case law and concluded, in light of the severe consequences of a felony conviction, N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16(1)(d) violates due process and is unconstitutional. The court dismissed the complaint, and judgment dismissing the charge was entered.
[¶5] The State argues N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16(1)(d) is constitutional and the district court erred in dismissing the complaint against Gedrose. The State contends N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16(1)(d) is a strict liability offense, strict liability offenses do not violate the due process clause, and the district court erred in finding that the statute punishes a defendant for innocent conduct and that the felony penalty is unconstitutional.
[¶6] It is presumed the legislature intended to comply with the federal and state constitutions when it enacted a statute. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-38. A statute is presumed constitutional "unless it is clearly shown that it contravenes the state or federal constitution." McCoy v. N.D. Dep't of Transp. , 2014 ND 119, ¶ 27, 848 N.W.2d 659 (quoting Haney v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau , 518 N.W.2d 195, 197 (N.D. 1994) ). Any doubt in a statute's constitutionality must be resolved in favor of its validity, when possible. McCoy , at ¶ 27. "Whether a statute is unconstitutional is a question of law, which is fully reviewable on appeal." State v. Meador , 2010 ND 139, ¶ 7, 785 N.W.2d 886.
[¶7] Generally, "a defendant must be ‘blameworthy in mind’ before he can be found guilty, a concept courts have expressed over time through various terms such as mens rea , scienter, malice aforethought, guilty knowledge, and the like." Elonis v. United States , 575 U.S. 723, 734, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 192 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015). Criminal statutes generally are interpreted to include mens rea requirements to ensure the defendant has a guilty mind. Id. "[A] defendant generally must ‘know the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense,’ even if he does not know that those facts give rise to a crime." Id. at 735, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (quoting Staples v. United States , 511 U.S. 600, 608, n.3, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) ). Courts generally avoid interpreting a statute to eliminate the mens rea requirement if doing so "criminalize[s] a broad range of apparently innocent conduct." Staples , at 610, 114 S.Ct. 1793 (quoting Liparota v. United States , 471 U.S. 419, 426, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) ).
[¶8] A strict liability offense requires no proof of the defendant's intent, knowledge, willfulness, or negligence for conviction. State v. Olson , 356 N.W.2d 110, 112 (N.D. 1984). Although strict liability offenses do not contain a mens rea requirement, "[s]trict-liability statutes in criminal law do not invariably violate constitutional requirements." Id. "The constitutional requirement of due process is not violated merely because mens rea is not a required element of a prescribed crime." United States v. DeCoster , 828 F.3d 626, 634 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Greenbaum , 138 F.2d 437, 438 (3rd Cir. 1943) ).
[¶9] The United States Supreme Court has recognized regulatory crimes or "public welfare offenses" without a mens rea requirement may not violate due process. See United States v. Freed , 401 U.S. 601, 607-10, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971). The Court has explained with public welfare offenses the accused is usually in a position to prevent a violation with "no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities." Morissette v. United States , 342 U.S. 246, 256, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). The court also noted the penalties for public welfare offenses often are relatively small and the conviction does not do grave damage to the offender's reputation. Id. We have recognized, "public welfare [statutes], i.e., regulatory measures enacted by the legislature under the exercise of the police power, which dispense with mental culpability requirements, have generally been upheld if the accused is in a position to prevent the offense with no more care than society might reasonably expect and the penalty provided is small." Olson, at 112-13 (quoting State v. Carpenter , 301 N.W.2d 106, 111 (N.D. 1980) ).
[¶10] Issuing a check without sufficient funds is a criminal offense under N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16, which provides in relevant part:
[¶11] In State v. McDowell , 312 N.W.2d 301, 308 (N.D. 1981), we held a prior version of N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16 did not violate due process when a violation of the statute was a class B misdemeanor. This Court said a culpability element is not required to violate the statute. Id. at 303. We concluded that it was proper for the legislature to enact laws making the violation a matter of strict criminal liability without a culpability requirement and that N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16 was a permissible exercise of that power. Id. at 306. We held N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16 is a regulatory statute passed for the public welfare to help facilitate transactions in commercial business activities. Id. This Court said it was consistent with the purposes of a regulatory statute to allow the imposition of a fine or imprisonment for a violation of the offense without offending due process. Id. We noted the violation of the statute in that case was a class B misdemeanor, the penalty for violating the statute was substantially less than the penalty for violating a strict liability offense in certain federal cases, and a misdemeanor conviction does not carry the same repercussions of a felony conviction. Id. at 307. We held "it is constitutionally permissible to sentence an offender to the penalty of a class B misdemeanor for a violation of [N.D.C.C.] § 6-08-16." Id. at 308.
[¶12] Gedrose contends this case is different from McDowell because N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16 has been amended since 1981 to add enhanced penalties based on the amount of the insufficient funds, and here the violation is a class C felony. He argues N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16(1)(d) is an unconstitutional strict liability offense and the lack of a mens rea requirement in the statute violates the due process clause. He claims N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16(1)(d) is not a public welfare offense because it does not regulate potentially harmful or injurious items, it criminalizes innocent conduct, the penalty is severe, and a conviction would gravely damage an individual's reputation.
[¶13] The State and Gedrose agree N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16 does not contain a mens rea requirement and is a strict...
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