State v. Glenn

Decision Date28 January 2021
Docket NumberDocket: And-19-480
Citation244 A.3d 1023
Parties STATE of Maine v. Brandon GLENN
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Henry W. Griffin, Esq. (orally), Auburn, for appellant Brandon Glenn

Andrew S. Robinson, District Attorney, and Patricia A. Mador, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District III, Lewiston, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.

CONNORS, J.

[¶ 1] Brandon Glenn appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered on his conditional guilty plea pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), to the offense of possession of sexually explicit material, 17-A M.R.S. § 284(1)(C) (2020). He argues that the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Clifford, A.R.J. ) erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to police regarding sexually explicit material depicting minors found on his electronic tablet and any evidence of sexually explicit material depicting minors discovered as a result. The primary thrust of his argument is that because he has a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), he was incapable of giving voluntary consent. Because we discern no error in the trial court's determination, we affirm its decision.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] The following facts, drawn from the testimony of the two officers involved in the investigation and an audio recording of the events at issue, are essentially undisputed. On March 13, 2018, two Maine State Police officers—a special agent with the Computer Crimes Unit and a detective—went to a home in Lewiston after receiving a tip from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) that an internet protocol address associated with the residence was engaged in unlawful internet activity. The officers arrived at the residence at approximately 9:30 a.m. and wore civilian clothing. They knocked on the door several times before a woman and a young man answered the door. The two individuals would later identify themselves as Joseph, the son of the homeowner, and Deborah, the homeowner's girlfriend. The officers identified themselves and asked if they could step inside the residence; Joseph and Deborah agreed.

[¶ 3] Once inside, the special agent asked, "Is it just the two of you that live here?" Deborah answered, "No, there's Kevin and there's another boy."1 At no point did Deborah deny living in the home. The other individual that Deborah mentioned would later be identified as the defendant, twenty-seven-year-old Brandon Glenn.

[¶ 4] The special agent explained that he was in the early stages of an investigation of "child pornography" and asked Joseph and Deborah whether they had any information about whom in the residence may have downloaded images from the internet. Deborah or Joseph stated that Glenn might have information and escorted the officers to his room.

[¶ 5] The officers knocked on Glenn's bedroom door and he answered. Although Glenn told the officers that he had been up all night watching anime, the special agent described him as "[p]retty pleasant and conversational ... very pleasant, very polite, very candid." Initially, the special agent asked to speak with Glenn in the hallway outside his bedroom. The special agent asked Glenn if he had any information about whom in the home had downloaded sexually explicit material depicting minors, and Glenn immediately responded that he had downloaded a number of images. Given the nature of the conversation, the special agent asked Glenn if he would prefer to speak one-on-one or with the other family members. Glenn replied that he would prefer to speak outside the presence of his family members, and they proceeded into his bedroom. The special agent showed Glenn multiple images that had been flagged by the NCMEC and asked him if he recognized them.2 Glenn responded that he recognized the images and that he had in fact downloaded them.

[¶ 6] Following this admission from Glenn, the special agent asked how he was able to find and download the images. As the conversation progressed, the special agent asked Glenn if he would be willing to show him more of the images that he had downloaded. Although Glenn initially declined to show the special agent more images, eventually he told the special agent that he had downloaded onto his tablet approximately 1,600 images of sexually explicit material depicting minors and showed the special agent a number of them.

[¶ 7] The conversation between the special agent and Glenn continued, and the special agent expressed his desire to search Glenn's tablet. During this exchange, Glenn told the special agent that he had difficulty working because he has "the old Asperger's." The special agent repeatedly told Glenn that he did not have to consent to the search. Glenn ultimately signed the consent-to-search form, however, after the special agent informed Glenn that he would seize the tablet and then apply for a warrant.

[¶ 8] Both officers testified at the suppression hearing that Glenn did not exhibit any signs that would lead them to believe that he was unable to fully comprehend the consequences of signing a consent form. At no point during the encounter did the special agent tell Glenn that he was under arrest or otherwise not free to terminate the encounter. In fact, Glenn was not arrested at the scene but was given a summons to appear at a later date.

[¶ 9] On September 4, 2018, a grand jury in Androscoggin County indicted Glenn on twenty-five counts of possession of sexually explicit materials (Class C) in violation of 17-A M.R.S. § 284(1)(C). On January 24, 2019, Glenn filed a motion to suppress all incriminating statements he made to the officers as well as all the images of sexually explicit material depicting minors that had been discovered on his tablet. Specifically, Glenn contended that he had been subject to custodial interrogation and thus should have been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He also argued that due to his ASD, neither the statements that he made to the police nor the consent to search his tablet had been voluntary.

[¶ 10] On February 27, 2019, the trial court began an evidentiary hearing on Glenn's motion to suppress. During the first day of the hearing, the court heard testimony from the special agent, the detective, and Dr. William Barter, a psychologist. While Dr. Barter had evaluated Glenn at the request of his father for a psychosexual risk assessment and had not reviewed the audio recording of Glenn's encounter with the police, his testimony in the hearing focused on how Glenn's ASD affected his ability to respond to questioning by the police. In particular, Dr. Barter testified that, given the nature of ASD as a "social cognitive disorder," individuals with the diagnosis need continued exposure to particular situations in order to respond appropriately. At the conclusion of that day's hearing, based on its assertion that some of Dr. Barter's testimony involved information not included in his report, the State asked that it be allowed to have Glenn evaluated by its own expert.

[¶ 11] On March 5, 2019, over Glenn's objection, the court granted the State's motion and ordered Glenn to submit to a mental examination pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 101-D (2020). The second day of the hearing on the motion to suppress, held on July 22, 2019, consisted exclusively of testimony from the State's expert, psychologist Luke Douglass, PhD, whose forensic evaluation of Glenn was based on his review of Glenn's medical and psychiatric records, the audio recording of the questioning of Glenn, and a three-hour interview with Glenn.

[¶ 12] Dr. Douglass testified that Glenn had a "mild deficit" but had the capacity to understand the social cues of the situation in which he was questioned and the ability to act in his own interests, including to "understand and waive his Miranda rights."3 The court then allowed Glenn a week to let the court know if he intended to present further testimony from Dr. Barter. Glenn did not file anything with the court indicating an intent to present any further testimony.

[¶ 13] Dr. Barter was recalled to testify on the third and final day of the hearing. He again testified about why he believed that Glenn's ASD interfered with his ability to give a knowing and voluntary consent to the search of his tablet and explained how he disagreed with Dr. Douglass's opinion. In particular, he opined that Dr. Douglass's administration of the Grisso's Instruments test, a test that both he and Dr. Douglass described as specifically related to assessing Miranda issues, could not have accurately determined Glenn's ability to interact with law enforcement because "too much time had lapsed" between the administration of the test and the " Miranda event." Dr. Barter acknowledged that he had not listened to the officers’ recorded interview of Glenn.

[¶ 14] After Dr. Barter's testimony, the motion judge orally denied Glenn's motion to suppress and then issued a written order incorporating his oral findings. The court concluded that Glenn had the capacity to and did voluntarily speak to the special agent and consent to the search of his tablet. The court noted that it found more persuasive the assessment of Dr. Douglass, which went more directly to the issue before the court, and observed that Dr. Douglass had reviewed all the evidence, including the audio recording of Glenn's interview with the police.

[¶ 15] Glenn entered a conditional guilty plea to all twenty-five counts of possession of sexually explicit material and was sentenced to a two-year concurrent sentence, all suspended, with two years of probation. This timely appeal followed. See M.R. App. P. 2B.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 16] Glenn contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because (1) the officers did not secure a warrant prior to entering the home; (2) the officers did not advise him of his rights under Miranda before questioning...

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6 cases
  • State v. Croteau
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • April 5, 2022
    ...The existence of a medical condition does not necessarily render consent involuntary, however. See State v. Glenn , 2021 ME 7, ¶¶ 1, 29, 244 A.3d 1023 (affirming the court's findings and conclusion that a person with Autism Spectrum Disorder had the capacity to consent to a search based on ......
  • State v. Croteau
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • April 5, 2022
    ...The existence of a medical condition does not necessarily render consent involuntary, however. See State v. Glenn, 2021 ME 7, ¶¶ 1, 29, 244 A.3d 1023 (affirming the court's findings and conclusion that a person with Autism Spectrum Disorder had the capacity to consent to a search based on t......
  • State v. Alain Uwacu
    • United States
    • Maine Superior Court
    • July 19, 2022
    ...response to interrogation."). The appropriate analysis for the determination of custody is set forth in State v. Glenn, 2021 ME 7, ¶ 21, 244 A.3d 1023, in which the Law Court found, "For purposes of Miranda, an individual is considered 'in custody1 when subject to either a formal arrest or ......
  • State v. Uwacu
    • United States
    • Maine Superior Court
    • August 8, 2022
    ...a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with formal arrest," State v. Glenn, 2021 ME 7, ¶ 21, 244 A.3d 1023, 1029 (citing State v. Hopkins, 2018 ME 100, ¶ 36, 189 A.3d 741, 752) (quotation marks omitted). We objectively review the pertinent circumstanc......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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