State v. Glenn, No. 73496

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida
Writing for the CourtMcDONALD; EHRLICH; BARKETT
Citation558 So.2d 4
Decision Date15 February 1990
Docket NumberNo. 73496
Parties15 Fla. L. Weekly S69 STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Roosevelt GLENN, Respondent.

Page 4

558 So.2d 4
15 Fla. L. Weekly S69
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Roosevelt GLENN, Respondent.
No. 73496.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Feb. 15, 1990.
Rehearing Denied April 12, 1990.

Page 5

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and David R. Gemmer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for petitioner.

Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, and Nancy L. Showalter, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for respondent.

McDONALD, Justice.

We have for review Glenn v. State, 537 So.2d 611 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), in which the district court certified conflict with Harris v. State, 520 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 536 So.2d 244 (Fla.1988). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla.Const. We quash Glenn and approve Harris.

A jury convicted Roosevelt Glenn of multiple counts of drug-related offenses arising from a single episode, including separate convictions and sentences for trafficking in, and delivery of, both cocaine and heroin. The district court affirmed the convictions and sentences. Glenn v. State, 512 So.2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1034, 98 L.Ed.2d 998 (1988). In a motion for postconviction relief, Glenn alleged that multiple convictions for a single criminal act violated the prohibitions against double jeopardy contained in the state and federal constitutions, 1 relying on Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla.1987). The trial court denied Glenn's motion. The district court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the convictions and sentences relating to the delivery charges and certified conflict with Harris.

Harris considered whether a defendant, convicted of both armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, could properly challenge those convictions in a postconviction motion based upon a change in decisional law, subsequent

Page 6

to his final appeal, declaring multiple convictions for the same act impermissible. The district court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion.

At the time of Glenn's original conviction, separate convictions for drug trafficking and delivery charges arising from a single criminal act were proper. Rotenberry v. State, 468 So.2d 971 (Fla.1985). After the affirmance of Glenn's convictions on appeal, this Court receded from its holding in Rotenberry and held that the legislature did not intend such dual punishment for charges arising from a single act. Carawan, 515 So.2d at 170. Glenn now claims that he is entitled to relief under Carawan. The issue thus presented to this Court is whether a defendant, whose convictions and sentences are final and fully adjudicated, may obtain relief in a postconviction claim that he was improperly convicted of multiple crimes arising from a single transaction. We answer in the negative.

Generally, matters which could have or should have been raised on direct appeal may not be considered by a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Smith v. State, 453 So.2d 388 (Fla.1984); McCrae v. State, 437 So.2d 1388 (Fla.1983). Some changes in decisional law rendered subsequent to final appeal, however, may be raised under the rule. As this Court held in McCuiston v. State, 534 So.2d 1144 (Fla.1988), any determination of whether a change in the law requires retroactive application should be decided upon traditional principles pertaining to changes in decisional law as set forth in Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067, 101 S.Ct. 796, 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980).

In Witt this Court reiterated its adherence to the very limited role for postconviction proceedings even in death cases. We held that only major constitutional changes of law which constitute a development of fundamental significance are cognizable under a motion for postconviction relief. Most such "jurisprudential upheavals" in the law fall within two broad categories, i.e., decisions such as Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (death penalty inappropriate in rape cases), which place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties, and decisions such as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (state must provide adequate counsel for indigent criminal defendants in felony cases), which are of such significant magnitude as to necessitate retroactive application as determined by the three-prong test applied in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). 2 Witt, 387 So.2d at 929.

Every change in decisional law, however, may not require retroactive application. As we stated in Witt:

In contrast to these jurisprudential upheavals are evolutionary refinements in the criminal law, affording new or different standards for the admissibility of evidence, for procedural fairness, for proportionality review of capital cases, and for other like matters. Emergent rights in these categories, or the retraction of former rights of this genre, do not compel an abridgement of the finality of judgments. To allow them that impact would, we are convinced, destroy the stability of the law, render punishments uncertain and therefore ineffectual, and burden the judicial machinery of our state, fiscally and intellectually, beyond any tolerable limit.

Id. at 929-30 (footnote omitted).

Balancing the importance of decisional finality against ensuring fairness and uniformity in individual cases is even more fundamental to determining whether a change of decisional law requires retroactive application. The credibility of the criminal justice system depends upon both fairness and finality. Johnson v. State, 536 So.2d 1009 (Fla.1988). Deciding whether a change in decisional law is a major constitutional change or merely an evolutionary

Page 7

refinement is reflective of the balancing process between these two important goals of the criminal justice system.

We begin an analysis of these two competing interests by recognizing that the law's concern for finality of decisions is in no way diminished by the availability and utilization of a collateral remedy such as rule 3.850. Witt, 387 So.2d at 925. Further, as we stated in Witt:

The importance of finality in any justice system, including the criminal justice system, cannot be understated. It has long been recognized that, for several reasons, litigation must, at some point, come to an end. In terms of the availability of judicial resources, cases must eventually become final simply to allow effective appellate review of other cases. There is no evidence that subsequent collateral review is generally better than contemporaneous appellate review for ensuring that a conviction or sentence is just. Moreover, an absence of finality casts a cloud of tentativeness over the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
55 practice notes
  • Asay v. State, No. SC16–223
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • December 22, 2016
    ...be less complete and therefore less (not more) accurate than the proceedings they would replace. As we explained in State v. Glenn , 558 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1990), where we declined to apply retroactively the double jeopardy ruling of Carawan v. State , 515 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1987) :Granting collate......
  • Chandler v. Crosby, No. SC04-518.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • December 9, 2005
    ...of Crawford. The new rule does not present a more compelling objective that outweighs the importance of finality. State v. Glenn, 558 So.2d 4, 7 (Fla.1990). Chandler's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is therefore It is so ordered. PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, QUINCE, CANTERO, an......
  • Weiand v. State, No. 91,925.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • March 11, 1999
    ...So.2d 552, 554 (Fla.1995). This opinion will not, however, apply retroactively to convictions that have become final. See State v. Glenn, 558 So.2d 4, 6 (1990); see generally Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 928-29 (Fla. 1980). The decision of the Second District is It is so ordered. HARDING, ......
  • Hughes v. State, No. SC02-2247.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • April 28, 2005
    ...long utilized the Witt test for determining when important changes in decisional law should be applied retroactively. See State v. Glenn, 558 So.2d 4, 6 (Fla.1990); McCuiston v. State, 534 So.2d 1144, 1146 (Fla.1988). As noted above, however, while we have applied numerous important decisio......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
55 cases
  • Asay v. State, No. SC16–223
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • December 22, 2016
    ...be less complete and therefore less (not more) accurate than the proceedings they would replace. As we explained in State v. Glenn , 558 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1990), where we declined to apply retroactively the double jeopardy ruling of Carawan v. State , 515 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1987) :Granting collate......
  • Chandler v. Crosby, No. SC04-518.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • December 9, 2005
    ...of Crawford. The new rule does not present a more compelling objective that outweighs the importance of finality. State v. Glenn, 558 So.2d 4, 7 (Fla.1990). Chandler's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is therefore It is so ordered. PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, QUINCE, CANTERO, an......
  • Weiand v. State, No. 91,925.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • March 11, 1999
    ...So.2d 552, 554 (Fla.1995). This opinion will not, however, apply retroactively to convictions that have become final. See State v. Glenn, 558 So.2d 4, 6 (1990); see generally Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 928-29 (Fla. 1980). The decision of the Second District is It is so ordered. HARDING, ......
  • Hughes v. State, No. SC02-2247.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • April 28, 2005
    ...long utilized the Witt test for determining when important changes in decisional law should be applied retroactively. See State v. Glenn, 558 So.2d 4, 6 (Fla.1990); McCuiston v. State, 534 So.2d 1144, 1146 (Fla.1988). As noted above, however, while we have applied numerous important decisio......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT