State v. Statewright
| Decision Date | 15 May 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 44047,44047 |
| Citation | 300 So.2d 674 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Jesse STATEWRIGHT, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and A. S. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender and Richard S. Power and Edward H. Fine, Asst. Public Defenders, for respondent.
We issued a writ of certiorari in this cause, and heard oral argument, based upon an asserted conflict between the decision sought to be reviewed and State v. Craig, 237 So.2d 737 (Fla.1970).
In the case sub judice, reported at 278 So.2d 652, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed on two grounds appellee's conviction of first degree murder. One of these grounds was that the admission into evidence of oral and written statements made by the appellee was error, since the pre-interrogation warnings given the appellee were insufficient to clearly inform him of his right to counsel during interrogation. The decision of the District Court on this point was based upon the Miranda v. Arizona, supra at 471--472, 86 S.Ct. at 1626.' (Emphasis supplied.)
following statement of law quoted from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966):
At the interrogation of respondent he was advised that he did not have to say anything; that anything he said could be used against him in a court of law; that he would not be mistreated in any way or promised anything to get him to make a statement; and that he had a right to an attorney and if he did not have one, the State would furnish him with one at no cost to him. There was no specific warning that respondent could have counsel present During interrogation as a literal reading of Miranda would require, and this was the basis for the district court's reversal.
The trouble with the district court's holding is that the above-outlined interrogation of the respondent occurred PRIOR to Miranda. No matter what the subsequent requirements may be, the ruling in Miranda has been expressly held NOT to be retroactive. Johnson v. N.J., 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966); Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 89 S.Ct. 1677, 23 L.Ed.2d 253 (1969).
Conflict accordingly appears with earlier Pre-Miranda holdings which did not require the specific warning of availability of counsel during interrogation upon which the district opinion was based. We recognize that State v. Craig, Supra, might be distinguished because of possibly differing circumstances but the legion of cases not requiring warning 1 before this decision in Miranda give the basis for conflict and, together with the above-cited U.S. Supreme Court holdings, require that the district's opinion be quashed.
The district court opinion is accordingly quashed and the cause is remanded for reinstatement of the trial court's judgment of conviction and sentence.
It is so ordered.
Rehearing in this cause was requested pursuant to F.A.R. 6.17 and F.A.R. 3.14, asserting that, since the trial occurred subsequent to the decision of Miranda, the Miranda Rule applied so as to require the exclusion of certain oral and written statements made by the defendant and received into evidence. We have granted the rehearing without argument in light of the subsequent U.S. Supreme Court holding on the Miranda point involved in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182, Opinion filed June 10, 1974, and upon the further point of evidence hereafter discussed.
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that although Miranda was applicable in view of the trial occurring subsequent to that holding, exclusion of this evidence was not required nor was error committed. As noted in our earlier opinion, Mr. Statewright was interrogated prior to Miranda, and was advised of his rights. He was specifically advised Inter alia that he had a right to an attorney, and that one would be furnished for him without cost if he did not have one, but he was not specifically advised that this right to counsel included the continuing right to have counsel present during interrogation. Mr. Statewright then waived his rights and gave a statement, which was admitted into evidence against him.
As we noted in our opinion, Miranda is not to be applied retroactively; however, we could have added that a certain limited retroactivity is applied to the Miranda ruling, in that where the interrogation took place prior to the decision of Miranda, but the trial began after the date of the decision, the Miranda Rule applies. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966). Hence, Miranda is applicable in this cause to this one extent. This does not mean, however, that the conviction must be reversed solely because of the insufficient warnings given to Mr. Statewright; Miranda itself stated that these safeguards were not intended to 'create a constitutional straightjacker.' 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1772. As the United States Supreme Court noted in its recent decision in Michigan v. Tucker, Supra, a distinction must be made in cases where the interrogation occurred prior to the Miranda decision but the Trial began after Miranda was handed down. This difference lies in a violation of the defendant's substantive constitutional rights as distinguished from an inadvertent violation of the procedural safeguards designed to protect those rights.
In Michigan v. Tucker, Supra, the police, in complete good faith, failed to warn the accused of his right to appointed counsel in the course of informing him of his other rights as required; the accused 'waived his rights' and made a statement which led to the discovery of a witness whose testimony served to discredit the accused and was used at trial. In holding that this testimony was not required to be excluded as 'fruit of the poisonous tree' obtained in violation of the Miranda ruling, the Supreme Court noted that the police conduct in question 'did not deprive respondent of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as such, but rather failed to make available to him the full measure of procedural safeguards associated with that right since Miranda.'
The question posed in Tucker was 'how sweeping the judicially imposed consequences of this disregard (of Miranda warnings) shall be.' It was noted that the Accused's statements were exclused from the evidence, the questioned evidence being that of a third party not subjected to custodial...
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