State v. Goode

• Citation: 756 P.2d 578,1988 NMCA 44,107 N.M. 298
• Decision Date: 05 May 1988
• Docket Number: No. 10087,10087
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward GOODE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

Page 578

756 P.2d 578

107 N.M. 298

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward GOODE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10087.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

May 5, 1988.

Certiorari Denied June 13, 1988.

[107 N.M. 300] Hal Stratton, Atty. Gen., Katherine Zinn, Charles H. Rennick, Asst. Attys. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.

Jacquelyn Robins, Chief Public Defender, Deborah A. Moll, Bruce R. Rogoff, Assistant Appellate Defenders, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant.

OPINION

APODACA, Judge.

Defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated battery, raising two issues. He first contends his constitutional rights were violated by the state's peremptory challenge of the only member of his race who was on the panel of potential jurors. In addition, he argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him. We disagree with defendant's contentions and affirm his conviction.

I. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE ISSUE

Defendant is black. The crime for which he was convicted involved a white victim. The jury panel assembled for defendant's trial included only one black person, a Ms. Harty. During voir dire, defense counsel asked the jury panel if any of its members had previously sat on a jury. Several of them answered affirmatively, and counsel proceeded to ask follow-up questions. Ms. Harty had sat on a criminal jury that had not reached a verdict; a Mr. Godfrey, a white man, had also sat on a hung jury. The other panel members who had previously served as jurors had sat on juries that had reached a verdict. During jury selection in the judge's chambers, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged Ms. Harty. After the jury had been selected and counsel returned to open court, defendant informed his counsel that Ms. Harty was black, after which counsel objected to the peremptory challenge of the only black on the jury panel. From the record, it appears that neither the trial judge, the prosecutor, nor defense counsel realized Ms. Harty was black until after the jury selection process had been completed.

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the state's power to use peremptory challenges in criminal trials is limited by the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. This court followed that decision in State v. Sandoval, 105 N.M. 696, 736 P.2d 501 (Ct.App.1987). Thus, the state may not use its peremptory challenges in a racially-discriminatory manner to exclude members of a cognizable racial group from a jury simply because of such membership. Batson v. Kentucky; State v. Sandoval. The state's discriminatory use of its peremptory challenges violates a defendant's right to equal protection of the laws. Id.; U.S. Const. amend XIV; N.M. Const. art. II, Sec. 18.

Batson and Sandoval provide us with a framework for analyzing defendant's constitutional claim in this appeal. Under those cases, a claim of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges must be examined under a two-step process. First, a defendant raising the issue must establish a prima facie case tending to show that the state's challenges were exercised in a discriminatory manner. Once the defendant has made the requisite showing, the burden then shifts to the state to come forward with racially-neutral explanations for its challenges. State v. Sandoval.

A. Establishment of Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case, defendant must show that: (1) he is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) the state has exercised its peremptory challenges to remove members of that group from the jury panel; (3) these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the state used its challenges to exclude members of the panel solely on account of their race. State v. Sandoval. It is undisputed that defendant met the first two requirements: he is black, and the state used a peremptory challenge to remove a black woman from the jury panel. Thus, we are left to examine whether the third requirement is present here to establish a prima facie case.

We must initially decide what factors should be considered in determining whether a prima facie case of discriminatory challenges has been made. At least one court has held that the prosecutor's reasons for the challenges should be considered at this initial stage as well as at the later stage when determining whether the prima facie case has been overcome. See State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51 (Mo.1987) (En Banc). Another court, however, rejected that approach and reasoned that the prosecutor's justifications for the challenges should not be considered when determining whether a prima facie case has been established, but only when determining whether that prima facie case has been rebutted. See People v. Granillo, 197 Cal.App.3d 110, 242 Cal.Rptr. 639 (1987). We believe that analysis of the state's justifications is properly left exclusively for the second stage of the Batson-Sandoval process, and we thus adopt the approach taken by the court in Granillo.

One circumstance that will always raise an inference of racial discrimination is a showing by defendant that his racial group is substantially underrepresented on the jury, in comparison to that group's share of the general population. State v. Sandoval. Another indicator supporting such an inference is the susceptibility of the case to racial discrimination, i.e., where the victim is one race and defendant another, or all of defendant's witnesses are of a different race than the state's. Chew v. State, 71 Md.App. 681, 527 A.2d 332 (1987). Finally, a showing that the state's challenges have caused the jury to contain no members of defendant's race should raise such an inference. United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir.1987).

Defendant in this appeal has shown that the state's peremptory challenge prevented the only black panel member from serving on the jury. Additionally, the victim was white, both of the state's witnesses were white, and the case involved overtones of an intimate interracial relationship. For these reasons, we believe the case was susceptible to discrimination, and the state had motivation to exercise its challenges in a discriminatory fashion. Defendant did not attempt to show that his race was substantially underrepresented on the jury. We hold nevertheless that defendant established the requisite prima facie case of discriminatory use of the state's peremptory challenges.

B. Racially-Neutral Explanation

We necessarily reach the second step of our analysis: Did the state meet its burden of showing its peremptory challenge was racially neutral? Under this phase, the state must justify its peremptory challenge by explaining what racially-neutral considerations led to the challenge. The state's explanations need not rise to the level justifying removal of the juror for cause. State v. Sandoval. They must, however, be clear and reasonably specific reasons that are related to the case to be tried. State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986). The prosecutor may not rebut defendant's prima facie case by merely stating that he challenged such jurors because he believed they would be partial to defendant because of their shared race. Batson v. Kentucky. Likewise, the prosecutor may not rebut by denying a discriminatory motive. Id. Instead, the prosecutor must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case, giving a clear, concise, reasonably specific legitimate explanation for excusing those jurors. Id. Further, the trial court may not merely accept the state's proffered explanations, but has the duty to examine them and decide whether they are genuine and reasonable. State v. Gilmore; People v. Turner, 42 Cal.3d 711, 230 Cal.Rptr. 656, 726 P.2d 102 (1986) (In Bank). A trial court's determination in this connection, like its determination of whether defendant has established a prima facie case, is a factual determination, not a question of law, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence. Batson v. Kentucky; United States v. Woods, 812 F.2d 1483 (4th Cir.1987) (trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous, so will not be reversed); Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 357 S.E.2d 792 (1987) (same); cf. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Niccum, 102 N.M. 330, 695 P.2d 480 (1985) (equating "clearly erroneous" standard of review with "substantial evidence" standard).

Neither Batson nor Sandoval provide guidance to us with respect to the factors to be considered in assessing the state's explanations for its challenges, because in neither case did the state offer any reasons for its challenges. Other cases decided since Batson, however, have addressed this question. An analysis of those cases establishes definite guidelines that courts should consider when called upon to determine whether the state's justification for exercising a peremptory challenge is pretextual or genuine.

By far the most common factor noted by courts holding a state's explanations to be pretextual is a varying treatment of white and nonwhite panel members. See, e.g., Gamble v. State (black juror struck because relative or friend had alcohol or drug abuse problem; white jurors who also had relatives or friends with such problems not struck; also, black struck because of allegedly low intelligence, but illiterate whites not struck); Floyd v. State, 511 So.2d 762 (Fla.App.1987) (black student challenged because prosecutor did not like to have students on his jury, but white student not challenged); People v. Turner (black juror made mistakes in answering long, extremely formal voir dire question; white jurors who also made mistakes not challenged); cf. People v. Hall, 35 Cal.3d 161, 197 Cal.Rptr. 71, 672 P.2d 854 (1983) (In Bank) (pre-Batson case decided under California interpretation of its constitution; black juror removed because she had a son about defendant's age, but white jurors who also had sons about same age not removed). Varying...