State v. Quintin Child C.

• Decision Date: 08 August 2019
• Docket Number: No. A-1-CA-37230,A-1-CA-37230
• Citation: 451 P.3d 901
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. QUINTIN C., Child-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

451 P.3d 901

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.QUINTIN C., Child-Appellant.

No. A-1-CA-37230

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: August 8, 2019

Released for Publication November 12, 2019.

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Benjamin L. Lammons, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM for Appellant

DUFFY, Judge.

{1} Child appeals his conviction for violating NMSA 1978, Section 30-20-13(D) (1981), which criminalizes willful interference with the educational process by threatening to commit any act that would disrupt the lawful mission, processes, procedures or functions of the school, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the statute, as applied to his speech in this case, violated his First Amendment rights. Because the record demonstrates that the mens rea element of this offense was evaluated under an incorrect general intent standard, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

{2} Child, age fourteen, and J.E., age eleven, were students at Capitan Middle School and High School. The school followed a four-day school week, and during the school bus ride home for the weekend on a Thursday afternoon, J.E. sat across the aisle from Child. J.E. saw that Child had a camera and asked Child to take his picture; Child did so. J.E. asked Child why he brought his camera to school, and Child responded, "I'm making a kill list."

{3} J.E. was bothered by the statement and moved to a different seat. The next morning, he told his mother what had happened, and when school reconvened the following Monday morning, J.E. arrived at 7:15 a.m. and told the school principal, Patti Nesbitt, what Child had said on the bus. Ms. Nesbitt informed the school counselor, Theresa Kennedy, and the two of them spoke with Child that morning. Ms. Nesbitt informed Child that school officials had received a report about his "hit list"; Child corrected her and said that it was a "kill list."

{4} Child did not bring a weapon to school on Monday and when Ms. Nesbitt searched his camera, laptop, and Kindle, she discovered only four photos, all people Child stated were his friends. The photos did not include a photo of J.E. Ms. Nesbitt contacted Defendant's grandmother and Ms. Kennedy called the police. Ms. Nesbitt further testified that the police investigation took about four hours, which interfered with her normal duties.

{5} On January 31, 2018, the State filed a petition alleging that Child was a delinquent child and asserted two counts against him—Count 1 for attempt to commit aggravated assault with intent to commit a violent felony, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-3 (1977) ("Assault with intent to commit a violent felony consists of any person assaulting another with intent to kill or commit any murder[.]"), and Count 2 for violation of the school interference statute, contrary to Section 30-20-13(D). One day before trial, the State dismissed Count 1, concluding that it did not have sufficient evidence to prove that charge, and the parties proceeded with a bench trial on Count 2. The State called four witnesses: J.E., Ms. Nesbitt, Ms. Kennedy, and the police chief who participated in the investigation on the date of the incident. The defense called no witnesses. The district court found that Child had committed the delinquent act of violating Section 30-20-13(D) and sentenced him to two years' probation.

DISCUSSION

{6} Although Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, his argument fundamentally challenges whether the evidence in this case constitutes the charged offense. See State v. Barragan , 2001-NMCA-086, ¶ 24, 131 N.M. 281, 34 P.3d 1157 ("Although framed as a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, [the d]efendant's argument requires us to engage in statutory interpretation to determine whether the facts of this case, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, are legally sufficient to sustain a conviction[.]"), overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo , 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 n.6, 275 P.3d 110. The parties disagree on the standard required for conviction under Section 30-20-13(D), including what intent is required and whether the statute itself is unconstitutional as applied in this case because it criminally punishes speech. Thus, in order to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence to support Child's conviction, we must first evaluate the statutory standard required to sustain a conviction. "Interpreting the relevant statute[ ] is a question of law, which we review de novo." State v. Herbstman , 1999-NMCA-014, ¶ 16, 126 N.M. 683, 974 P.2d 177. "After reviewing the statutory standard, we apply a substantial evidence standard to review the sufficiency of the evidence at trial." State v. Chavez , 2009-NMSC-035, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891.

I. Section 30-20-13(D)

{7} The Legislature enacted Section 30-20-13 in 1970, a time when states across the country were adopting similar statutory provisions in response to organized disturbances on college campuses. See In re Jason W. , 378 Md. 596, 837 A.2d 168, 172-73 (2003) ("The broadening and focused application of trespass, disorderly conduct, or school disturbance laws was then a national phenomenon."); id. at 173 ("The focus in 1970 ... was on riots and organized demonstrations and disturbances that actually impeded the schools from carrying out their administrative and educational functions."); see also Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Participation of Student in Demonstration on or Near Campus as Warranting Imposition of Criminal Liability for Breach of Peace, Disorderly Conduct, Trespass, Unlawful Assembly, or Similar Offense , 32 A.L.R. 3d 551 (1970). The statute originally focused on interference occurring in or at public buildings. See State v. Silva , 1974-NMCA-072, ¶¶ 2-3, 86 N.M. 543, 525 P.2d 903 (addressing the constitutionality of a prior version of Section 30-20-13(C) following a sit-in at the Eastern New Mexico University president's office, where police arrested the defendant after the university president repeatedly requested that those present leave). But in 1981, the Legislature added Subsection (D), which provides:

No person shall willfully interfere with the educational process of any public or private school by committing, threatening to commit or inciting others to commit any act which would disrupt, impair, interfere with or obstruct the lawful mission, processes, procedures or functions of a public or private school.

Section 30-20-13(D). A violation of Subsection (D) is a petty misdemeanor. Section 30-20-13(F).

{8} In its nearly forty-year history, Subsection (D) has not been construed by an appellate court in New Mexico. Federal courts, however, have evaluated the provision in several recent cases when considering whether arresting officers had probable cause to arrest children for actions undertaken at school that interfered with school or educational functions. See, e.g. , Scott v. City of Albuquerque , 711 F. App'x 871, 873-74 (10th Cir. 2017) (discussing a middle school student's underlying arrest after leaving class early); A.M. v. Holmes , 830 F.3d 1123, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016) (discussing a middle school student's underlying arrest for "repeatedly fake-burping, laughing, and (later) leaning into the classroom"); Castaneda v. City of Albuquerque , 276 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1158 (D.N.M. 2016) (discussing a student's underlying arrest, which occurred after student had forgotten about his in-school suspension and reported to his regularly scheduled class, after which a detective allegedly came to student's classroom, searched his backpack and pockets, handcuffed student with zip ties, and transported him to the juvenile detention center); G.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Casalduc , 982 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240 (D.N.M. 2013) (discussing a middle school student's underlying arrest after refusing multiple requests to stop texting in class).

{9} Our evaluation and interpretation of our school interference statute presents a question of law that we review de novo. See Chavez , 2009-NMSC-035, ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891 ; see also State v. Granillo , 2016-NMCA-094, ¶ 13, 384 P.3d 1121 (stating that defining the mens rea applicable to the crime is a question of law that we review de novo). We are guided in our analysis by the longstanding, fundamental principle that "[a] criminal statute must be strictly construed and may not be applied beyond its intended scope for it is a fundamental rule of constitutional law that crimes must be defined with appropriate definiteness." State v. Stephenson , 2017-NMSC-002, ¶ 12, 389 P.3d 272 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). "Therefore, we will not read a criminal statute to apply to particular conduct unless the legislative proscription is plain." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A. Mens Rea

{10} We begin our statutory analysis by examining what mental state is required for conviction. Section 30-20-13(D) requires proof that a person "willfully interfere[d]" with the educational process by committing one of three acts set forth in the statute: (1) "committing," (2) "threatening to commit," or (3) "inciting others to commit any act which would disrupt, impair, interfere with or obstruct the lawful mission, processes, procedures or functions of a public or private school." Defendant argues that the statute, by inclusion of the word "willfully," requires proof that he intended that his statement would create a disruption at school. The State argues that only general intent is necessary—that Defendant was aware of what he was doing when he made the threat and that there was no just cause or lawful excuse for making it. See 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 113 (2019) (footnote omitted) ("To prove general intent, the state is not obligated to prove an intent to violate a particular statu...