State v. Green

• Decision Date: 13 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. SD 31170.,SD 31170.
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Melvin M. GREEN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

389 S.W.3d 684

STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Melvin M. GREEN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. SD 31170.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division One.

Aug. 13, 2012.

Emmett D. Queener, Columbia, MO, for Appellant.

Chris Koster, Attorney General, and, Timothy A. Blackwell, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.

DON E. BURRELL, Presiding Judge.

Melvin M. Green (“Defendant”) challenges his convictions and resulting consecutive life sentences for attempted forcible rape, two counts of forcible sodomy, and three counts of first-degree robbery. See sections 564.011, 566.030, 566.060, and 569.020.¹ Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions or assert that any reversible error occurred during his trial; rather, Defendant claims the charges against him should have been dismissed because he was denied his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial.²

The State concedes that “[t]he delay of nineteen months from the date of arrest to the beginning of trial is presumptively prejudicial” but asserts that other factors support the trial court's denial of Defendant's “motion to dismiss for violation of Defendant's right to speedy trial” (“the speedy-trial motion”).³ Because Defendant's defense strategy was not impaired by the delay—the most important factor to be considered—and the trial court was not required to believe Defendant's testimony about other consequences he claimed to have suffered—the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the case.

Applicable Law

The protections of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution “provide equivalent protection for a defendant's right to a speedy trial.” State v. Taylor, 298 S.W.3d 482, 504 (Mo. banc 2009). The United States Supreme Court described as follows the difficulty of determining when such a violation has occurred.

[T]he right to speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights. It is, for example, impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied. We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate. As a consequence, there is no fixed point in the criminal process when the State can put the defendant to the choice of either exercising or waiving the right to a speedy trial.

....

[A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case: “The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice.” [ Beavers v. Haubert,] 198 U.S. [77] at 87, 25 S.Ct. [573] at 576, 49 L.Ed. 950 [ (1905) ]. The amorphous quality of the right also leads to the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment when the right has been deprived. This is indeed a serious consequence because it means that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free, without having been tried. Such a remedy is more serious than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the only possible remedy.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521–22, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (footnotes omitted).

In determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated, “courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.” Id. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182. That balancing process involves the consideration of four factors: “(1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Taylor, 298 S.W.3d at 504;see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. “[T]he pertinent time period begins at arrest or indictment; that is, when a suspect officially becomes an accused.”State v. Scott, 348 S.W.3d 788, 794 (Mo.App. S.D.2011).

The right to a speedy trial does not apply to pending complaints that represent only the possibility that a criminal indictment or information will be filed. [Dillard v. State, 931 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Mo.App. W.D.1996).] A mere complaint places no actual restraints on a defendant, nor does its filing require him to begin to protect his interests. Id. The filing of a criminal complaint does not make a defendant an “accused.”

State v. Williams, 120 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo.App. W.D.2003).

Standard of Review

Although Defendant's brief includes a section entitled “Standard of Review,” it does not identify a particular type of error alleged to have been committed by the trial court, such as abusing its discretion, ruling without sufficient evidence, ruling against the weight of the evidence, or erroneously declaring or applying the law. Cf. State v. Knox, 697 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Mo.App. W.D.1985) (order dismissing for speedy trial violation under section 545.780 reviewable as lacking substantial evidence to support it, being against the weight of the evidence, and erroneously declaring or applying the law). Instead, Defendant's “[s]tandard of [r]eview” simply presents the Barker factors as the means for determining whether Defendant's speedy trial right was violated, including Barker's recognition that the factors involve a “difficult and sensitive balancing process.” 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182.

The State's brief points out that “the appellate courts have applied the various factors in the speedy trial analysis without setting forth any standard of review.” See, e.g., Taylor, 298 S.W.3d at 504;State v. Atchison, 258 S.W.3d 914, 919–20 (Mo.App. S.D.2008).

In the absence of a specific assertion by Defendant as to the nature of the error he alleges was committed by the trial court or an assertion that our review should be purely de novo, and because the trial court is called upon to first make and then balance various factual determinations (as guided by the Barker factors) to instruct its ultimate legal conclusion as to whether a constitutional violation has occurred, we will review its ruling as we would a ruling on a motion to suppress. In other words, the trial court's ruling must be supported by substantial evidence; it must not represent an abuse of discretion; we view the facts and the reasonable inferences favorably to the ruling; and we review de novo whether the Sixth Amendment has been violated. Cf. State v. Johnson, 354 S.W.3d 627, 631–32 (Mo. banc 2011) (describing the review process regarding a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence raising Fourth Amendment issues); Scott, 348 S.W.3d at 794 (order denying dismissal for Fifth Amendment speedy trial violation reviewed for an abuse of discretion); United States v. Porchay, 651 F.3d 930, 935 (8th Cir.2011), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1610, 182 L.Ed.2d 173 (2012) (in the context of federal speedy trial statute, the trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and the final decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion); United States v. Summage, 575 F.3d 864, 873–74 (8th Cir.2009), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1161, 175 L.Ed.2d 988 (2010) (trial court ruling on dismissal without prejudice for violation of statutory right to a speedy trial reviewed for abuse of discretion).

A trial court has abused its discretion if its ruling is

clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before it and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration; if reasonable persons can differ about the propriety of the trial court's action, it cannot be said that the court abused its discretion.

State v. Roller, 31 S.W.3d 152, 158 (Mo.App. S.D.2000).

Facts and Procedural Background

The underlying crimes were committed in Greene County in 1995. The police utilized a number of investigative techniques to attempt to solve the case, but they were unsuccessful in identifying the perpetrator until they received notification of a “hit” in July 2006 from a national DNA indexing system. The hit indicated that the unknown DNA profile developed from evidence seized at the scene was associated with another DNA profile that had recently been entered into the system.

This information led a Springfield Police detective to serve a search warrant on Defendant while he was in custody in Illinois awaiting trial on other charges. The warrant was used to obtain a buccal swab from Defendant for further DNA analysis. Defendant was also interviewed by the Springfield detective and a Joliet, Illinois detective in August 2006. The Springfield detective did not arrest Defendant when she met with him in August 2006 as there was still work to be done on the buccal swab she had obtained from him.

Near the end of August 2006, the detective received a telephone call informing her that the buccal swab analysis had produced a “confirmation[.]” She received a letter to that effect a few weeks later. The DNA analysis revealed that Defendant could not be eliminated as a match when his DNA profile was compared to the DNA profile from shorts and a bed sheet obtained from the Greene County crime scene. The frequency in the population of the DNA profile developed from the shorts and sheet was “approximately one in 468 quintillion in the Caucasian population and approximately one in 8 quintillion in the black population.” One of the Greene County victims recalled that the perpetrator “was black[.]”

The State filed a felony complaint on December 27, 2006. The complaint alleged that there was probable cause to believe that Defendant had committed the following crimes in Greene County: first-degree burglary, three counts of first-degree robbery, two counts of forcible sodomy, and two counts of attempted forcible rape. A warrant for Defendant's arrest was issued on January 1, 2007.⁴ On September 27, 2007, before Defendant was arrested on the Greene County wa...