State v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 19 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2011–0818.,2011–0818.
• Citation: 4 N.E.3d 989,138 Ohio St.3d 108
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. GRIFFIN, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

138 Ohio St.3d 108
4 N.E.3d 989

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant,
v.
GRIFFIN, Appellee.

No. 2011–0818.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 22, 2013.
Decided Dec. 19, 2013.

[4 N.E.3d 990]

Jason W. Given, Coshocton County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association.

KENNEDY, J.

{¶ 1} At issue in this case is whether the sentence that Sandra Griffin, appellee, has served for the past 24 years is based on a final, appealable order that gave the Fifth District Court of Appeals subject-matter jurisdiction over her direct appeal in 1990. The state of Ohio argues that res judicata bars a defendant from using a resentencing entry issued pursuant to State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, to relitigate a matter that was raised or could have been raised on direct appeal. The state further argues that in capital cases, a final, appealable order consists of a guilt-phase entry and a sentencing opinion pursuant to State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9.

{¶ 2} We recognize that this court granted the state's appeal to review the application of Ketterer to the final, appealable order in this case. Upon further review, we have determined that the issues presented on this appeal should be decided on different grounds. However, we are not bound by any inferences that may have been drawn from our previous decision to review this appeal on the basis of Ketterer. See State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 9–12.

{¶ 3} Res judicata bars relitigation of a matter that was raised or could have been raised on direct appeal when a final, appealable order was issued in accordance with the law at the time. Because the sentencing entry issued in 1990 was a final, appealable order, the 2009 resentencing entry issued pursuant to Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, was a nullity. We do not reach the state's second proposition of law regarding Ketterer.

{¶ 4} The cause is now before this court following our acceptance of the state's discretionary appeal. The state of Ohio presents two propositions of law:

I. Res Judicata precludes a litigant from using a resentencing entry issued pursuant to State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330 [893 N.E.2d 163], to relitigate an issue when that defendant has already litigated the same issue on direct appeal.

II. In cases in which R.C. 2929.03(F) requires the court or panel to file a sentencing opinion, a final, appealable order consists of both the sentencing opinion filed pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F) and the judgment of conviction filed pursuant to Crim.R. 32(C).

{¶ 5} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the court of appeals with instructions to dismiss Griffin's appeal.

CASE BACKGROUND

{¶ 6} On January 4, 1989, James Steurer Sr. was murdered in Coshocton County, Ohio. The next month, Griffin was indicted for complicity to commit aggravated murder with an accompanying felony-murder

[4 N.E.3d 991]

death-penalty specification under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) and a firearm specification.¹

{¶ 7} Griffin waived her right to be tried by a jury and by a three-judge panel. In exchange, the state agreed not to pursue the death penalty, but it did not dismiss the death-penalty specification.

{¶ 8} In a trial before a single judge, Griffin was found guilty of aggravated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility in 30 years. The trial court filed two separate judgment entries. On December 21, 1989, the trial court filed a judgment entry announcing the guilt-phase findings. On January 25, 1990, a sentencing hearing was conducted. In mitigation, the defense called Dr. James Reardon, a licensed psychologist, and three other witnesses. Dr. Reardon provided comprehensive testimony about Griffin's chaotic family and marital history, mental disorders, and substance abuse. Directly thereafter, Griffin presented a short mitigation statement. After counsel's summation, the trial court permitted the presentation of victim-impact statements and allowed Griffin to allocute pursuant to Crim.R. 32. The trial court issued a sentencing entry without including the findings made on the record. A sentencing opinion pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F) was never filed.

{¶ 9} On February 1, 1990, Griffin filed a notice of appeal that included the following assignment of error: “The trial court erred in the sentencing of the appellant by not following the mandates of R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04, as well as allowing victim impact evidence in violation of Evid.R. 404, the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ Nine, Ten, and Sixteen of the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Griffin, 73 Ohio App.3d 546, 550–551, 597 N.E.2d 1178 (5th Dist.1992). Then, as now, R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04 applied when “death may be imposed as a penalty for aggravated murder.” Former R.C. 2929.03(D)(1), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 1, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 10. See also former R.C. 2929.03(F), id. at 13–14.

{¶ 10} On February 12, 1992, the court of appeals affirmed Griffin's convictions and sentences. In overruling this assignment of error, the court held:

First, although this is a “capital offense,” it is no longer a case within the ambit of the sentencing provisions of R.C. 2929.03 et seq. By pretrial agreement the appellant waived her right to jury trial in return for the agreement of the state not to request the death penalty. The case was tried to a single judge, sitting without a jury. At minimum the death penalty option was extinguished the moment appellant was placed in jeopardy in the trial.

Id. at 553, 597 N.E.2d 1178. The court added, “The only way a defendant may be held to the death penalty is if he or she is tried to a jury or a three-judge panel. R.C. 2945.06 [three-judge court required if jury is waived and defendant is charged with offense ‘punishable with death’].” Id. at fn. 1. In other words, the court held that the capital sentencing procedures of R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04 were not required, because the death penalty was not an option.

[4 N.E.3d 992]

{¶ 11} We declined to accept Griffin's direct appeal. 64 Ohio St.3d 1428, 594 N.E.2d 970 (1992).

COLLATERAL ATTACKS

{¶ 12} For more than 15 years, Griffin has collaterally attacked her conviction and sentence, without success. On April 22, 1997, Griffin filed her first federal habeas corpus petition, claiming that her waiver of a trial by jury or a three-judge panel, as allowed under Ohio law, was neither knowing nor intelligent and that the trial court's failure to follow “mandatory statutory requirements of a proceeding” violated her due-process and equal-protection rights. The district court held that these arguments were procedurally defaulted because they had not been raised in state court. Griffin v. Rogers, S.D.Ohio No. 2:97–cv–00444 (Sept. 30, 1998).

{¶ 13} Griffin then filed a delayed application to reopen her appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B). Griffin's application was denied, and this court declined to accept her appeal. State v. Griffin, 86 Ohio St.3d 1489, 716 N.E.2d 721 (1999).

{¶ 14} On October 15, 1999, Griffin filed her second petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, claiming that her agreement to waive a three-judge panel and a jury was void. This petition was dismissed as barred by the one-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1).

{¶ 15} On October 18, 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded the case for consideration of whether Griffin was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Griffin v. Rogers, 308 F.3d 647 (6th Cir.2002). The district court held on remand that Griffin was not entitled to equitable tolling and again dismissed the habeas petition as time-barred. On March 3, 2005, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. Griffin v. Rogers, 399 F.3d 626 (6th Cir.2005).

{¶ 16} On August 22, 2006, the district court issued a final judgment dismissing Griffin's habeas petition. Griffin v. Andrews, S.D.Ohio No. 2:99–cv–1127, 2006 WL 2422590 (Aug. 22, 2006). On October 23, 2006, the district court denied Griffin's request for a certificate of appealability. Griffin v. Andrews, S.D.Ohio No. 2:99–cv–1127, 2006 WL 3041072 (Oct. 23, 2006).

{¶ 17} On August 4, 2009, Griffin filed a motion in the trial court for a final, appealable order pursuant to Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, which construed Crim.R. 32(C) to require the judgment of conviction to be a “single document.” ²Id. at ¶ 1. Griffin argued that a final, appealable order never issued because the trial court failed to include the court's guilt-phase findings in the original judgment entry of sentence, and therefore, Baker 's one-document rule was violated. The state agreed and submitted a proposed one-document judgment entry.

{¶ 18} On August 27, 2009, the trial court filed a new, one-document judgment entry and again sentenced Griffin to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 30 years plus the 3 years for the firearm specification.

{¶ 19} Griffin appealed her convictions and sentences anew on the basis that in 1990, the appellate court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over her case.

[4 N.E.3d 993]

The court of appeals agreed, holding that Griffin's original sentence was not a final, appealable order and that the court had lacked jurisdiction to hear her original appeal. State v. Griffin, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 09CA21, 2010-Ohio-3517, 2010 WL 2961516, ¶ 25. The court reversed her convictions and remanded for a new...