State v. Hale

• Decision Date: 26 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-028,20-028
• Citation: 256 A.3d 595
• Parties: STATE of Vermont v. Christopher D. HALE
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

256 A.3d 595

STATE of Vermont

v.Christopher D. HALE

No. 20-028

Supreme Court of Vermont.

November Term, 2020

March 26, 2021

Travis W. Weaver, Rutland County Deputy State's Attorney, Rutland, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Allison N. Fulcher of Martin, Delaney & Ricci Law Group, Barre, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Robinson, Eaton, Carroll and Cohen, JJ.

CARROLL, J.

¶ 1. Defendant appeals a trial court decision denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on his charge of possessing brass knuckles with the intent to use them. He argues that although he possessed brass knuckles, the State failed to produce sufficient evidence of his intent to use them. We affirm.

¶ 2. The record indicates the following. In January 2017, defendant was charged by information with one count of possessing marijuana, in violation of 18 V.S.A. § 4230(a)(1), and one count of possessing brass knuckles with the intent to use them, in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 4001. The possession-of-marijuana charge was dismissed in January 2019. A jury trial was held on the brass-knuckles charge in March.

¶ 3. The State introduced the following evidence at trial. On December 31, 2016, two police officers observed defendant parked in his vehicle in the driveway of an apartment complex appearing to smoke marijuana. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officers noticed defendant in the driver seat and another person in the passenger seat. When one of the officers asked the occupants what they were doing, defendant responded that they were just smoking a bowl.

¶ 4. The officer asked defendant for consent to search his vehicle, which defendant eventually provided. Upon searching the vehicle, the officer discovered a backpack with a Mason jar that contained approximately one-and-a-half ounces of marijuana, which at the time had a street value of a couple hundred dollars. Defendant was placed under arrest for possession of marijuana and transported to the police department for processing. There, the officer discovered brass knuckles in defendant's front left pocket, which the officer described as a weapon "used to go over the knuckles of your hand to punch somebody, obviously to cause or inflict injury to an individual." When asked why he had the brass knuckles, defendant told the officer he had them for protection.

¶ 5. Following the close of the State's evidence, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. He argued that the State failed to produce any evidence demonstrating that at the time the officer discovered the brass knuckles, he had "a present and specific intent" to use them.

¶ 6. The court denied the motion, explaining, based on 13 V.S.A. § 4001 ’s plain language, that the statute prohibited the possession of brass knuckles with the intent to use them, which included future intent to use. By including the intent-to-use element, the trial court explained, the Legislature intended to distinguish between those who merely possess brass knuckles—such as collectors and mail carriers delivering them somewhere—and those who possess with the intent to use them "for the intended purpose of causing damage and harm." But the court noted that intent to use did not have an immediacy element and that requiring one would defeat the purpose of the statute, which was to "reduce the risk of violence and reduce the risk of someone being harmed" by brass knuckles. Based on this interpretation, the trial court concluded, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, that defendant possessed brass knuckles with the intent to use them "if he needed to."¹ Defendant was later convicted and sentenced to serve one to five years.

¶ 7. On appeal, defendant argues that the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Because there is no dispute that defendant possessed brass knuckles, he focuses on the intent-to-use element, arguing that intent to use requires an imminency component—that is, there must be a present and specific intent to use brass knuckles and not an intent to use at some future point. Under this interpretation of § 4001, defendant submits that his statement that he had the brass knuckles for protection was insufficient to prove intent to use.

¶ 8. "We review the denial of a judgment of acquittal de novo." State v. Berard, 2019 VT 65, ¶ 7, 211 Vt. 39, 220 A.3d 759. "In reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on a claim of insufficient evidence, we apply the identical standard as that employed by the trial court: we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, excluding any modifying evidence, and determine whether it is sufficient to fairly and reasonably convince a trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Stephens, 2020 VT 87, ¶ 10, ––– Vt. ––––, 250 A.3d 601 (quotation omitted). "We examine both the strength and the quality of the evidence; evidence that gives rise to mere suspicion of guilt or leaves guilt uncertain or dependent upon conjecture is insufficient." State v. Discola, 2018 VT 7, ¶ 18, 207 Vt. 216, 184 A.3d 1177 (quotation omitted). However, "[w]e are not triers of fact, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury." State v. Johnson, 2013 VT 116, ¶ 27, 195 Vt. 498, 90 A.3d 874.

¶ 9. We begin by examining what intent to use means under § 4001.² "In construing a statute, our paramount goal is to discern and implement the intent of the Legislature." Berard, 2019 VT 65, ¶ 12, 211 Vt. 39, 220 A.3d 759 (quotation omitted). "[T]o discern legislative intent, we first look to the plain language of the statute." State v. Doe, 2020 VT 78, ¶ 10, 213 Vt. ––––, 249 A.3d 658 (quotation omitted). "If the intent of the Legislature is apparent on the face of the statute because the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we implement the statute according to that plain language." Berard, 2019 VT 65, ¶ 12, 211 Vt. 39, 220 A.3d 759 (quotation omitted). "Conversely, if the statute is ambiguous, we ascertain legislative intent through consideration of the entire statute, including its subject matter, effects and consequences, as well as the reason and spirit of the law." Id. (quotation omitted).

¶ 10. We cannot agree with the trial court that intent to use has a plain and unambiguous meaning. Because intent is generally defined as the "state of mind accompanying an act," the statute is necessarily silent on what kind of intent is required. Intent, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Nevertheless, other statutes dealing with possession of weapons, in coordination with § 4001 ’s language and structure, provide a clear indication of the meaning of the phrase intent to use.

¶ 11. Section 4001 deals with a category of weapons—slung shots, blackjacks, brass knuckles, and similar weapons—designed to be held in the hand and increase the damage that a strike from the fist can cause. State v. Brunner, 2014 VT 62, ¶ 12, 196 Vt. 571, 99 A.3d 1019 (describing brass knuckles in core form as "a device designed to be gripped in a clenched fist, that fits over the knuckles, and that is designed to increase the damage caused from a strike of the fist"); Blackjack, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ blackjack [https://perma.cc/4KQ3-MH2D] (defining blackjack as "a hand weapon typically consisting of a piece of leather-enclosed metal with a strap or springy shaft for a handle"); Slungshot, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ slungshot [https://perma.cc/TU4P-AXV6] ("[A] striking weapon consisting of a small mass of metal or stone fixed on a flexible handle or strap."). Concerned with the specific dangers posed by this category of weapons, the Legislature prohibited (1) using these weapons against another person, (2) attempting to use them against another person, and (3) possessing them with the intent to use. 13 V.S.A. § 4001.

¶ 12. Here, we are concerned with the third prohibition: possession with intent to use. For other categories of weapons, the Legislature has simply prohibited the act of possession. See, e.g., 13 V.S.A. § 1604 (prohibiting possession of destructive or hoax device)³ ; id. § 4013 (prohibiting possession of "a weapon commonly known as a ‘zip’ gun, or a weapon commonly known as a switchblade knife," which has a blade of three or more inches). Section 4001 reflects a different approach. Unlike other weapons that the Legislature has determined are inherently dangerous—such as zip guns, switchblades knives, and hoax devices—the Legislature has concluded that the category of weapons enumerated in § 4001—slung shots, blackjacks, brass knuckles, and similar weapons—only pose a danger worthy of criminal prohibition when a person possesses them with the intent to use.

¶ 13. But similar to other possession statutes, the language and structure of § 4001 indicate that in prohibiting possession with intent to use, the Legislature was not concerned with how imminently a person intends to use the weapons enumerated in § 4001. Rather, the Legislature determined that when brass knuckles and similar weapons are possessed with the intent to use them, the weapons pose a danger, like other inherently dangerous weapons, significant enough to warrant a criminal prohibition.

¶ 14. First, as the trial court noted, intent to use does not have an immediacy element. Section 4001 requires only intent to use, not imminent or immediate intent to use. It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that we will not read words into a statute that are not there, "unless it is necessary in order to make [the statute] effective." State v. Fuller, 163 Vt. 523, 528, 660 A.2d 302, 305 (1995) (quotation omitted). The Legislature's omission of an immediacy element indicates that it intended to prohibit possession of a category of dangerous weapons—slung shots, blackjacks, brass knuckles, and similar items—if someone intends to use...