State v. Hamer
Decision Date | 11 June 2021 |
Docket Number | No. 279A20,279A20 |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Demon HAMER |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Robert C. Ennis, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellee.
W. Michael Spivey, for defendant-appellant.
¶ 1 On November 29, 2018, defendant was found guilty in a bench trial of speeding 94 miles per hour in a 65 mile-per-hour zone. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals determined that even though the trial court failed to follow the procedure set forth in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1201 for waiver of defendant's right to a jury trial, defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's noncompliance. Defendant appeals.
¶ 2 On the afternoon of January 12, 2018, Trooper Tracy Hussey with the North Carolina State Highway Patrol observed a black 2017 Jeep traveling westbound on I-40 in Orange County. Using a handheld LIDAR device for speed detection, Trooper Hussey determined that the vehicle was traveling 94 miles per hour. The speed limit on this section of I-40 is 65 miles per hour.
¶ 3 Trooper Hussey relayed information about the 2017 black Jeep to Trooper Michael Dodson with the North Carolina State Highway Patrol, who then initiated a traffic stop. Trooper Dodson identified the driver of the Jeep as defendant. Trooper Dodson issued a citation to defendant for speeding 94 miles per hour in a 65 mile-per-hour zone in violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-141(j1) and for reckless driving in violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-140(b).
¶ 4 On July 26, 2018, defendant pleaded guilty in Orange County District Court to speeding 94 miles per hour in a 65 mile-per-hour zone, and he was ordered to pay a $50.00 fine and costs. The State dismissed the reckless driving charge. Defendant filed written notice of appeal for trial de novo in Orange County Superior Court. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty, and he was appointed a public defender for the traffic charges.
¶ 5 When the matter came on for trial, defense counsel announced that defendant wanted his case to be tried in a bench trial. The State consented to this request. The following exchange occurred on the record in open court:
¶ 6 After the State rested its case-in-chief, the trial court revisited defendant's waiver of jury trial in the following exchange:
¶ 7 Defendant was subsequently found guilty of speeding 94 miles per hour in a 65 mile-per-hour zone and was ordered to pay court costs. Defendant appealed and was assigned an appellate defender. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in conducting a bench trial because defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial.
¶ 8 In a published opinion filed on June 16, 2020, the Court of Appeals held that despite the trial court's initial noncompliance with N.C.G.S. § 15A-1201, the trial court remedied the initial error, thus satisfying N.C.G.S. § 15A-1201, and that defendant was not prejudiced by the error. State v. Hamer , 272 N.C. App. 116, 127, 845 S.E.2d 846, 853 (2020). The dissenting judge argued that the failure of the trial court to engage in a colloquy at the outset constituted structural error, requiring a new trial. Id. at 155, 845 S.E.2d at 870 (McGee, C.J., dissenting). Defendant appeals.
¶ 9 On appeal, defendant argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his constitutional right to a jury trial. We disagree.
¶ 10 In 2014, the people of North Carolina amended our State constitution to allow criminal defendants to waive their right to trial by jury in favor of a bench trial. See N.C. Const. art. I, § 24 ( ); see also N.C.G.S. § 15A-1201(a) (2019) ( ).
¶ 11 A defendant in a noncapital case may "knowingly and voluntarily, in writing or on the record in the court and with the consent of the trial judge, waive the right to trial by jury." N.C.G.S. § 15A-1201(b). The defendant must provide notice of the waiver by either (1) a stipulation signed by the State and the defendant; (2) the filing of a written notice of intent with the court; or (3) providing notice in open court by the time of the arraignment or the calling of the calendar, whichever is earlier. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1201(c). Once the defendant provides notice, the court must then:
¶ 12 Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court committed structural error through its noncompliance with N.C.G.S. § 15A-1201(d)(1).
¶ 13 The Supreme Court of the United States has previously defined structural error as "defect[s which] affect[ ] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). In other words, structural error is a defect in which "[t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is obviously affected." Id. at 309–10, 111 S.Ct. 1246. The Supreme Court has noted six instances where structural error had been found: (1) "total deprivation of the right to counsel"; (2) "lack of an impartial trial judge"; (3) "unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of defendant's race"; (4) violation of "the right to self-representation at trial"; (5) violation of "the right to a public trial"; and (6) "erroneous reasonable-doubt instruction to jury." Johnson v. United States , 520 U.S. 461, 468–69, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997).
¶ 14 This Court has previously applied the Supreme Court's structural error interpretation in Fulminante and the six exceptions outlined in Johnson . See State v. Anderson , 355 N.C. 136, 142, 558 S.E.2d 87, 92 (2002) ( ); State v. Garcia , 358 N.C. 382, 410, 597 S.E.2d 724, 745 (2004) ().
¶ 15 In support of his structural error argument, defendant cites to several cases in which our Court found the trial court committed "a form of structural error known as error per se" because the trial court violated a defendant's constitutional right to be tried by twelve jurors. State v. Lawrence , 365 N.C. 506, 514, 723 S.E.2d 326, 331 (2012) ( ). See State v. Poindexter , 353 N.C. 440, 444, 545 S.E.2d 414, 416 (2001) ( ); State v. Bunning ...
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