State v. Hamilton

• Decision Date: 22 November 1949
• Docket Number: No. 10163.,10163.
• Citation: 56 S.E.2d 544
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE. v. HAMILTON.

56 S.E.2d 544

STATE.

v.HAMILTON.

No. 10163.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Sept. 27, 1949.

Decided Nov. 22, 1949.

The State of West Virginia indicted Virgil Howard Hamilton for the crime of reckless driving contrary to statute.

The Circuit Court of Tyler County, sustained the defendant's demurrer and motion to quash the indictment and dismissed the proceeding and discharged the defendant, and the State obtained a writ of error from the Supreme Court of Appeals.

The Supreme Court of Appeals, Haymond, President, held that the statute penalizing reckless driving is constitutional and that the indictment was sufficient and reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the cause for further proceedings in conformity with opinion.

Syllables by the Court.

1. Subsection (i), Section 18, Article 8, Chapter 59, Acts of the Legislature, 1931, Regular Session, as amended, which provides that any person who drives any vehicle upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in wilful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property, shall be guilty of reckless driving, defines an offense with sufficient definiteness and certainty to satisfy the requirement of Article III, Section 14, of the Constitutionof this State that the accused shall be fully and plainly informed of the character and cause of the accusation, and is constitutional.

2. An indictment which charges the statutory offense of reckless driving in the language of the statute and specifies and describes the particular act or acts of the accused in the commission of the alleged offense is sufficient,

3. The provision of subsection (c), Section 18, Article 8, Chapter 59, Acts of the Legislature, 1931, Regular Session, as amended, relating to the specification of the speed at which a defendant charged with violation of Section 18 is alleged to have driven and the speed indicated in such section for the district or location, does not apply to an indictment for the offense of reckless driving.

Ira J. Partlow, Attorney General, Virginia Mae Brown, Special Assistant Attorney General, Henry P. Snyder, Prosecuting Attorney, Tyler County, Sistersville, for plaintiff in error.

P. Douglass Farr, West Union, for defendant in error.

HAYMOND, President.

At the regular March term, 1948, of the Circuit Court of Tyler County, the defendant, Virgil Howard Hamilton, was indicted for the crime of reckless driving under subsection (i), Section 18, Article 8, Chapter 59, Acts of the Legislature, 1931, Regular Session, which was amended and reenacted by Section 18, Article 8, Chapter 142, Acts of the Legislature, 1947, Regular Session, and may be referred to as Code, 1931, 17-8-18(i), as amended. The defendant entered his plea of not guilty at the March term, 1948, of the circuit court. The case was continued from time to time, on motion of the defendant, and at the regular November term, 1948, by leave of court, he withdrew his plea of not guilty and filed his written demurrer and motion to quash the indictment. At the regular March term, 1949, the circuit court sustained the demurrer and the motion to quash and by order entered March 21, 1949, dismissed the proceeding and discharged the defendant. To this final order the State of West Virginia obtained a writ of error from this Court under the provisions of Code, 1931, 58-5-30. See State v. O'Brien, 102 W.Va. 83, 134 S.E. 464.

The questions of law raised by the demurrer and the motion to quash the indictment and presented upon this writ of error involve the constitutionality of subsection (i) of Section 18 of the statute and the sufficiency of the indictment.

The challenged statute, subsection (i) of Section 18, Article 8, Chapter 17 of the Code of 1931, as amended, first incorporated in the law of this State by Chapter 59, Acts of the Legislature, 1931, Regular Session, and reenacted in identical terms by Chapter 142, Acts of the Legislature, 1947, Regular Session, is couched in this language:

"Any person who drives any vehicle upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property, shall be guilty of reckless driving."

Prior to the enactment of this statute the offense of reckless driving, as such, did not exist in this State. See Town of Hartford v. Davis, 107 W.Va. 693, 150 S.E. 141, decided by this Court in 1929.

The charge of the offense alleged in the indictment returned by the grand jury of Tyler County, the validity of which is challenged in this proceeding, is that the defendant, on a designated day in November, 1947, in Tyler County, within one year next preceding the finding of the indictment, drove an automobile "in a westerly direction upon W.Va. State Rt. No. 23, then and there a public highway, at or near the residence property of one Roy Murphy, in the following manner, to-wit: (1) by then and there operating such motor vehicle at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable and prudent, having due regard to the traffic then and there on such high-way, the contours, surface, width and physical condition of such highway; (2) by, upon meeting a certain motor vehicle coming from the opposite direction and driven by one Howard Swiger, he, the said Virgil Howard Hamilton, failing and neglecting to turn to his right of the center of such highway so as to pass such Howard Swiger's motor vehicle without interference but by then and there driving such motor vehicle he was then operating upon his left of the center of such highway; (3) by then and there failing to have his said motor vehicle under proper control; (4) by then and there failing to keep a proper outlook for the safety of other persons using such highway; and (5) by then and there operating his said motor vehicle without adequate brakes as required by law; by and as a result of the joint and several effects of all of which he, the said Virgil Howard Hamilton, did unlawfully drive his aforementioned motor vehicle carelessly and heedlessly, in wilful and wanton disregard of the rights and safety of others, and without due caution and circumspection and at a speed in a manner so as to endanger and to be likely to endanger the person and property of another, to-wit, Howard Swiger, against the peace and dignity of the State."

The defendant contends that the language of the statute which creates and describes the offense of reckless driving is too vague and too indefinite to satisfy the constitutional requirement that the accused shall be fully and plainly informed of the character and the cause of the accusation and that, for that reason, the statute is violative of Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution of this State.

The identical contention now urged by the defendant against the validity of this same statute was presented to and rejected by this Court in State v. Mangus, 120 W. Va. 415, ' 198 S.E. 872, 874. In discussing and sustaining the constitutionality of the statute as sufficiently precise to define the offense, this Court said:

"We distinguish this case from State v. Lantz, 90 W.Va. 738, 111 S.E. 766, 26 A. L.R. 894. Therein we held: 'An act of the Legislature * * * making it a crime to operate an automobile around a curve on a public road without having the same under control, or without reducing the speed thereof to a reasonable and proper rate, is violative of sections 10 and 14 of article 3 of the Constitution of this State, and is void for uncertainty and indefiniteness.' Clearly, as stated in that case, there is no criterion to determine whether an automobile was under control when rounding a curve, or whether the speed at which it was operated was reasonable and proper. The terms are purely and essentially relative. In that enactment the evil interdicted was too indefinite of characterization and evanescent of description to afford a basis for plainly informing the accused of the accusation he was called on to meet. Under the subsection at bar, however, reckless driving which endangers other persons or other property is the conduct forbidden. No one need entertain difficulty of understanding what is meant thereby.

"We therefore hold that the discussed statutory provision is not unconstitutional."

Statutes creating and defining the crime of reckless driving similar in form to that of the statute now under consideration have been sustained in many other states and are recognized as valid by the decided weight of authority. Among other numerous cases which uphold such statutes, in addition to those cited in the opinion in the Mangus case, are: People v. Smith, 36 Cal.App.2d Supp. 748, 92 P.2d 1039; People v. Green, 368 111. 242, 13 N.E.2d 278, 115 A.L.R. 348; Gallaher v. State, 193 Ind. 629, 141 N.E. 347, 29 A.L.R. 1059; Commonwealth v. Gurney, 261 Mass. 309, 158 N.E. 832; State v. Derry, 118 Me. 431, 108 A. 568; State v. Miller, 119 Or. 409, 243 P. 72; State v. Welford, 29 R.I. 450, 72 A. 396; Barkley v. State, 165 Tenn. 309, 54 S.W.2d 944; State v. Randall, 107 Wash. 695, 182 P. 575; Maxon v. State, 177 Wis. 379, 187 N.W. 753, 21 A. L.R. 1484. See also 5 Am.Jur, Automobiles, Section 807; 61 C.J.S, Motor Vehicles, § 609; III Michie, Law of Automobiles, Virginia and West Virginia, paragraph 296.

It is unnecessary to discuss at length the question of the validity of the...