State v. Hanson

• Decision Date: 23 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 3928,3928
• Citation: 529 A.2d 720,12 Conn.App. 32
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Gary L. HANSON.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

Page 720

529 A.2d 720

12 Conn.App. 32

STATE of Connecticut v. Gary L. HANSON.

No. 3928.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 31, 1987.

Decided Aug. 11, 1987.

Certification Granted Sept. 23, 1987.

Vincent J. Giedraitis, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Harry Weller, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Donald B. Caldwell, State's Atty., for appellee (State).

Before DUPONT , C.J., and DALY and BIELUCH, JJ.

DUPONT, Chief Judge.

The defendant appeals, after a trial to the court, from his conviction of arson in the first degree, ¹ in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111. ² The defendant claims that the court erred (1) in the burden of proof used, (2) in the findings made and (3) in the conclusions drawn as to the affirmative defense provided by General Statutes § 53a-13. ³ The defendant also claims error in the court's determination that it had no discretion to release the defendant from incarceration pursuant to General Statutes § 17-251.

The trial court rendered a lengthy and detailed decision in open court at the conclusion of the trial, stating its factual findings and legal conclusions. The finding of guilty was rendered by the court on September 11, 1984. The defendant was examined prior to sentencing to determine his mental condition in accordance with General Statutes § 17-244. ⁴ The court sentenced the defendant on January 9, 1985, to a term of fifteen years, but, in light of the report on his mental condition, ordered that the defendant be committed to the Whiting Forensic Institute for treatment. General Statutes § 17-245. ⁵ On January 7, 1986, the court held a hearing after a reexamination of the defendant as provided in General Statutes § 17-250, ⁶ and transferred him to the custody of the commissioner of correction to serve the remainder of his sentence. General Statutes § 17-251. ⁷ The defendant's first claim of error is that the court erred in applying a higher standard of proof than the fair preponderance of the evidence to the defendant's affirmative defense, and asks this court to determine that the defendant had met the fair preponderance standard. General Statutes § 53a-12(b). ⁸

The defendant's claim that the trial court applied an erroneous standard of proof rests upon several comments made by the court at the time the defendant was sentenced. At the sentencing hearing, which was held several months after the rendering of the verdict of guilty, the court stated: "You are to be sentenced, confined to the Whiting Institute for custody, care and treatment. You are entitled to a hearing, and that is of course what we are here about this time. Now, based upon the testimony which I have heard at this hearing, it appears to this Court that, although the Court is not fully convinced that you are not now suffering from a mental illness, the Court certainly was not fully convinced that you were suffering from a mental illness which means you are dangerous to yourself or to others at the time of the crime; that the court is not fully convinced that you are suffering from such illness at this time. There is, however, in the Court's mind some doubt."

The defendant contends that these statements demonstrate that the court applied, to the affirmative defense pleaded by the defendant, a higher standard than the requisite fair preponderance of the evidence. These statements were not, however, related to the court's determination of guilt or innocence, but rather to the imposition of a sentence. The statements related to the trial court's choice of whether to confine the defendant for psychiatric care, or to order him committed to the custody of the commissioner of correction.

The trial court's remarks at the time the judgment of guilty was rendered, four months earlier, belie this claim of error. When rendering its verdict, the court stated prior to its summary of the evidence, that the affirmative defense had to be "proven by the defendant by a fair preponderance of the evidence." Subsequent to its review of the evidence, the court concluded that "the defense has failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant lacked capacity as a result of mental illness either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of law." The court had also noted that the question of the effect of the mental disease or defect was one of degree, and that while the defendant was probably suffering from some degree of mental illness or emotional upset, "[t]he general and professional evidence points to the conclusion that he did appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time he committed the acts...." The transcript of the proceedings at which the defendant was found guilty makes clear that the court applied the proper burden of proof to the evidence presented at trial. ⁹

The defendant also seeks to have us determine that he had established his affirmative defense by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The evidence presented by the defendant was the testimony of several psychiatric experts. Their testimony included the opinions they held about the mental condition of the defendant at the time that he ignited the fire for which he was convicted of arson. In rebuttal, the state presented testimony by fire department personnel who spoke to the defendant at the scene of the fire, the police detective who interviewed the defendant after the fire, and the defendant's wife and mother-in-law. "[O]ur review of the conclusions of the trier of fact, whether it be a judge, a panel of judges or a jury is limited." State v. Evans, 203 Conn. 212, 238, 523 A.2d 1306 (1987). We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's judgment. The conclusion of the trier of fact must be affirmed if it is reasonably supported by the evidence and logical inferences drawn from the evidence. Id.

The state presented no expert testimony on the defendant's mental disease, defect, or lack thereof, but has no obligation to do so in order to refute evidence of the affirmative defense of insanity. State v. Evans, supra, 238-39, 523 A.2d 1306; State v. Ontra, 178 Conn. 480, 485-86, 423 A.2d 134 (1979). The trier was presented with conflicting evidence about the defendant's mental condition, and was entitled to weigh that evidence in considering the defendant's mental condition. State v. Evans, supra, 239, 523 A.2d 1306. The state extensively cross-examined the psychiatric witnesses, and presented testimony relevant to the defendant's history and his conduct at the scene of the crime. The defendant's psychiatric witnesses did not testify to an unshakable conviction that it was the defendant's mental condition, absent the ingestion of alcohol, which was the cause of his criminal behavior. The court is not compelled to accept the testimony of a psychiatric expert as conclusive on the issue of the defendant's mental condition as it relates to his guilt of the crime with which he is charged. State v. Evans, supra, 238-39, 523 A.2d 1306. The trial court's duty is to weigh the evidence and conclude whether the defendant has established his affirmative defense. State v. Evans, supra; State v. Ontra, supra; see also In re Juvenile Appeal, 184 Conn. 157, 170-71, 439 A.2d 958 (1981). In this case, the court did perform that duty, and specifically found, as to the affirmative defense of insanity, that "[t]he opinions of the psychiatrists are contrary to the weight of the evidence before the court.... [T]he defense has failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that at the time he committed the crime he lacked substantial capacity as a result of his mental illness to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act to control his conduct within the requirements of the law." The evidence at trial, which was conflicting, supports the finding that the defendant had not borne his burden of proof on the affirmative defense, and our review of the record does not lead us to conclude that the court erred in arriving at its finding of guilt.

The defendant also contends that the court erred by assigning to him the burden of proving that the ingestion of alcohol did not cause the mental disease or defect which impaired his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. The affirmative defense of insanity is not available when the mental disease or defect has been proximately caused by the voluntary ingestion of intoxicating liquor. General Statutes § 53a-13(b). The defendant asserts that the court's finding that "there is no credible evidence that the defendant would have committed the crime of arson in the first degree if he had not let down the bars by drinking alcoholic beverages before the incident" erroneously placed on him the burden of proving that alcohol did not contribute to such conduct.

A reading of the plain language of the statute makes it clear that the affirmative defense is unavailable where the voluntary ingestion of intoxicating liquor has caused the disease or defect which has rendered the defendant substantially incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct or of conforming his conduct to the law. The state may offer evidence that intoxicating liquor was voluntarily ingested so as to cause the disease or defect, to refute the evidence that insanity absolves the defendant of criminal responsibility.

The defendant's argument is that the court found that the defect from which the defendant suffered was so severe that he lacked the capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, but failed to find that this defect was caused by his voluntary ingestion of alcohol. If the trial court's decision is interpreted to hold that the mental disease or defect was present, but was caused by the voluntary ingestion of alcohol, the state in this case...