State v. Harris, 13888

• Decision Date: 29 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. 13888,13888
• Citation: 575 A.2d 223,215 Conn. 189
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Richard M. HARRIS.

Page 223

575 A.2d 223

215 Conn. 189

STATE of Connecticut v. Richard M. HARRIS.

No. 13888.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 12, 1990.

Decided May 29, 1990.

Judith Rossi, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Donald B. Caldwell, State's Atty., Nina N. Rosen, Asst. State's Atty., and Eric Higgins, Legal Intern, for appellant (state).

Arthur P. Meisler, with whom were John E. Nimlo, Certified Law Student Intern, and, on the brief, Joseph D. Courtney, for appellee (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

The defendant, Richard M. Harris, was charged in a summons and complaint with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a. ¹ He subsequently filed a motion in limine requesting that the trial court exclude "any and all statements" made by him until the state had produced "material and substantial corroborative evidence" of the corpus delicti of the crime with which he was charged.

The trial court, after reviewing police reports, the statement of a witness, and memoranda filed by the state and the defendant, determined that there existed insufficient extrinsic evidence of operating under the influence to permit the introduction into evidence, at trial, of the defendant's inculpatory statements. ² Conceding that it had no other extrinsic evidence and that it would be unable to obtain a conviction without the use of the defendant's statements, the state moved the trial court to dismiss the charge against the defendant with prejudice. See State v. Ross, 189 Conn. 42, 49, 454 A.2d 266 (1983). The trial court granted the state's motion and also granted the state permission to appeal its ruling on the defendant's motion in limine. See General Statutes § 54-96. ³ We find error.

The evidence available to the trial court for its review disclosed that in the early morning hours of June 4, 1988, at approximately 2:13 a.m., Scott Greenwood was driving on Daly Road in Coventry. At that time, at a point on Daly Road a short distance from his home, he observed a red Jeep lying on its side in the roadway. Apparently the Jeep had struck a large tree and rolled over. A man, later identified as the defendant, was standing in the road alongside the Jeep and flagged down Greenwood. After Greenwood stopped, he observed that the defendant had blood on his hands and face. Greenwood also perceived that the defendant appeared "out of it, like he was drunk." It was Greenwood's impression that the accident had occurred just moments before his arrival because the defendant inspected the damage to the Jeep as if seeing it for the first time.

While at the scene Greenwood refused the defendant's request to assist him in righting the Jeep. Instead, with the defendant's acquiescence, Greenwood proceeded to his home and called the Coventry police. When Officer Nancy Gillon arrived minutes later she observed that the weather was dry, that the defendant had blood on his hands and face from minor cuts, that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot and that there was a strong odor of an intoxicating liquor emanating from his person. The officer also determined from the vehicle's registration that the defendant was the owner of the Jeep. There is no mention in any of the police reports or other documents of any pedestrians or persons in the area of the accident prior to Greenwood's arrival. ⁴

While at the scene of the accident the defendant made statements to both Greenwood and Gillon in which he said that he was the only person in the Jeep and that he was its operator at the time of the accident. He also admitted, in response to Gillon's questions while she was preparing the alcohol influence report, that he had been operating the Jeep and that he had been drinking prior thereto. It is these statements to Gillon and Greenwood that the trial court ruled were to be excluded at trial unless the state, independent of the defendant's statements, produced further evidence of the corpus delicti of the crime, i.e., that the defendant was actually operating the Jeep while under the influence of intoxicating liquor prior to the accident.

" 'It is a well-settled general rule that a naked extrajudicial confession of guilt by one accused of crime is not sufficient to sustain a conviction when unsupported by any corroborative evidence.' (Emphasis added.) State v. Grant, 177 Conn. 140, 144, 411 A.2d 917 (1979)." State v. Arnold, 201 Conn. 276, 286, 514 A.2d 330 (1986). Properly, the corroborative evidence of the corpus delicti should be presented, and the court satisfied of its material character and adequacy to render any inculpatory statements admissible before they are allowed into evidence. State v. DelVecchio, 191 Conn. 412, 426-27, 464 A.2d 813 (1983). This corroborating evidence, however, may be circumstantial in nature. State v. Arnold, supra, at 286, 514 A.2d 330.

In State v. Tillman, 152 Conn. 15, 20, 202 A.2d 494 (1964), we adopted Wigmore's definition that limits the required showing of the corpus delicti to the specific kind of loss or injury embraced in the crime charged. 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) § 2072. In Tillman, which involved a manslaughter prosecution, we held that, "in a homicide case, the corpus delicti is the fact of the death, whether or not feloniously caused, of the person whom the accused is charged with having killed or murdered." State v. Tillman, supra. Tillman, however, did not decide the applicability of its corpus delicti rule to a crime that is conduct oriented rather than harm or injury oriented. In this case, for instance, § 14-227a, the statute allegedly violated by the defendant, does not prohibit any particular harmful result but rather proscribes the conduct of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Because there is no harmful result or injury embraced in the statute it is nearly impossible to apply the Tillman corpus delicti rule to such a crime. See State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 232-33, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985).

Therefore, when the crime charged prohibits certain conduct but does not encompass a specific harm, loss or injury, a different approach to the corpus delicti rule, other than that enunciated in Tillman, is required. We conclude that the most reasonable approach is that stated in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93, 75 S.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954), wherein the court said: "[W]e think the better rule to be that the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti. It is [only] necessary, therefore, to require the Government to introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the [defendant's] statement."

"The federal courts are nearly unanimous in approving [this] trustworthiness version of corroboration.... Also, the corroboration rule focusing on the sufficiency of independent evidence tending to demonstrate the trustworthiness of the defendant's confession has found favor with [an increasing] number of state courts." (Citations omitted.) State v. Parker, supra, at 235-36, 337 S.E.2d 487; Bremerton v. Corbett, 106 Wash.2d 569, 578, 723 P.2d 1135 (1986); see also 4 F. Wharton, Criminal Evidence (14th Ed.1987), Confessions and Admissions § 648.

Under this formulation of the corroboration rule, proof of the elements of the crime charged, independent of the defendant's statements, is not required before the statements may be admitted, as long as there is sufficient corroborating evidence to demonstrate the reliability of those statements. "The government must introduce sufficient independent evidence that tends to establish that a defendant's admission is trustworthy." United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1279, reh. denied, 884 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir.1989). "[I]t is sufficient if the corroboration merely fortifies the truth of the confession without independently establishing the crime charged." Fallada v. Dugger, 819 F.2d 1564, 1570 (11th Cir.1987). "But such corroborative evidence need not be in and of itself sufficient to establish, independent of the admission, the corpus delicti; '[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth.' " United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir.1978), quoting Opper v. United States, supra, at 93, 75 S.Ct. at 164. "Logically therefore, there need be only sufficient corroboration to indicate that the confession or admission is trustworthy. This does not require proof of the crime by evidence independent of the confession or admission. It does require substantial independent evidence indicating that the admission of the defendant is true." State v. George, 109 N.H. 531, 533, 257 A.2d 19 (1969); see also United States v. Marshall, 863 F.2d 1285, 1287 (6th Cir.1988); United States v. Grizales, 859 F.2d 442, 445 (7th Cir.1988); United States v. Trombley, 733 F.2d 35, 37-38 (6th Cir.1984); State v. Yoshida, 44 Haw. 352, 357, 354 P.2d 986 (1960); State v. Zysk, 123 N.H. 481, 487, 465 A.2d 480 (1983); State v. Hanley, 116 N.H. 235, 237, 356 A.2d 687 (1976); State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 56, 152 A.2d 50 (1959); State v. Parker, supra, at 236, 337 S.E.2d 487.

If, therefore, there is substantial extrinsic evidence tending to demonstrate that the statements of the accused are "true," i.e., trustworthy, the statements are admissible. United States v. Seckler, 431 F.2d 642, 643 (5th Cir.1970). The corpus delicti of the crime may then be established by the statements of the accused and the extrinsic evidence considered together. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156, 75 S.Ct. 194, 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954); United States v. Miller, supra, at 1280; United States v. Grizales, supra; United...