State v. Harrison, 90-KA-0984
| Decision Date | 21 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-KA-0984,90-KA-0984 |
| Citation | 648 So.2d 66 |
| Parties | STATE of Mississippi v. Henry Lee HARRISON. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Charles G. Burdick, Asst. Dist. Atty., Pascagoula, for appellant.
Ross Parker Simons, Pascagoula, for appellee.
En Banc.
BANKS, Justice, for the court:
Harrison, a capital murder indictee, was discharged by the Jackson County Circuit Court following his motion for dismissal with prejudice on the basis that the State failed to provide Harrison a timely trial in compliance with Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-17-1 (Supp.1994). We choose this occasion to revisit the question of the appropriate construction of that statute and reverse and remand this matter for further consideration.
I.
Harrison was indicted for the capital murder of April Turner by a Jackson County Grand Jury on September 12, 1989. Three days later, Harrison was arraigned on this charge, entering a plea of not guilty. On June 7, 1990, Harrison was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. That matter is currently pending before this Court.
Harrison was also indicted by a Jackson County Grand Jury for the capital murder of Felisha Smith on October 6, 1989. At his October 27, 1989, arraignment on this charge, Harrison pled not guilty. Following arraignment, no motions for continuance were made by counsel and no sua sponte orders of continuance were issued.
On August 9, 1990, Harrison filed a motion to dismiss the capital indictment in the Felisha Smith case on the ground that the State failed to comply with the statutory guarantee of being brought to trial within 270 days of arraignment under Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-17-1. The motion noted that, as of August 9, 1990, 286 days had elapsed since arraignment.
The circuit court heard argument on the motion on August 9, September 7 and September 10, 1990. Harrison contended he was entitled to discharge under four cases: Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1375-76 (Miss.1988) (); Turner v. State, 383 So.2d 489, 491 (Miss.1980) (); Payne v. State, 363 So.2d 278, 279 (Miss.1978) (); and an unpublished opinion, McJunkins v. State, 557 So.2d 560 (1990) (). 1
The State argued Harrison was not entitled to discharge under Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-17-1 as (1) Harrison never moved for a speedy trial and (2) a speedy trial in the Felisha Smith case would have prejudiced the appellee. Also, as no trial date was ever set for the Felisha Smith indictment, the State contended it had no duty to move for a continuance.
Harrison responded that he has no duty to move the trial court for a speedy trial, as the criminal defendant is under no obligation to compel prosecution against himself. Furthermore, Harrison offered that the State's position that he would have been more prejudiced had he stood trial on the Felisha Smith charge was particularly puzzling, as Harrison argued to the contrary in the April Turner case. 2 Finally, Harrison informed the trial court that scheduling the Felisha Smith trial during the 270-day period following his October 27, 1989, arraignment would not have prejudiced him, so long as the State complied with his motions for discovery.
Regarding the State's contention that it was unnecessary to continue an action which has not been set for trial, Judge Maples noted, and the State concurred, that the prosecutor's office customarily prepares the trial docket for the Jackson County Circuit Court. Therefore, if no trial date was set for the Felisha Smith case, it was not set because the district attorney failed to place the case on the docket.
II.
The state brings this appeal from the circuit court order of dismissal. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal by the State from a dismissal with prejudice under the 270-day rule under Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-35-103(a). State v. Sistrunk, 404 So.2d 564, 564 (Miss.1981); State v. Davis, 382 So.2d 1095, 1096 (Miss.1980).
While federal and state constitutional rights to speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 3, Sec. 26 of the Mississippi Constitution attach at the time the defendant is formally accused, United State v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-21, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463-64, 30 L.Ed.2d 468, 479 (1971); Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss.1989); Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 198 (Miss.1982), the statutory right to speedy trial attaches at arraignment. Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 167 (Miss.1991).
The accused is under no duty to bring himself to trial. Reed v. State, 506 So.2d 277, 281 (Miss.1987). In cases where the defendant raises his statutory right to speedy trial and the record is silent regarding reasons for delay, the State has the burden to show good cause existed for the delay. Ford v. State, 589 So.2d 1261, 1262 (Miss.1991).
Harrison did not invoke his constitutional right to speedy trial in his motion for dismissal, nor does he raise it in response to the State's appellant's brief. The disposition of this case rests on one question of law: Was Harrison's statutory right to speedy trial violated such that he is entitled to dismissal with prejudice? 3
III.
Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-17-1 was amended in 1976 to provide:
Unless good cause shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has been arraigned.
This language has remained unchanged to the present date.
The Court first applied the statute as it currently exists in Payne v. State, 363 So.2d 278, 279 (Miss.1978). Finding the language of the statute to be "plain and unambiguous," the Payne Court held that the statute is violated, if the defendant is not tried within 270 days, unless the trial delay "comes within the framework of the exceptions in the statute." Id. Put another way, "[t]he State bears the burden of bringing to trial one charged with crime within the time prescribed by statute or showing good reason for failure to comply with the statute." Turner v. State, 383 So.2d 489, 491 (Miss.1980).
In Turner, the appellant was tried more than 270 days after arraignment. Turner, 383 So.2d at 490-91. No motion for continuance, nor order for continuance, was of record. Id. This Court vacated Turner's conviction and discharged him. Turner, 383 So.2d at 491.
Since Turner, however, this Court has found a handful of circumstances where the 270-day provision was not violated even though no written order of continuance appears in the record. Arnett v. State, 532 So.2d 1003, 1010-11 (Miss.1988) (); Reed v. State, 506 So.2d 277, 280-81 (Miss.1987) (); Durham v. State, 377 So.2d 909, 909-10 (Miss.1979) ().
Of the three exceptions nominated in the preceding paragraph, none applies to the instant case.
The State argued before the trial court and on appeal that the trial docket was crowded and, implicitly, that Harrison could not have been brought to trial on the Felisha Smith charge within 270 days of indictment. 4 On the other hand, the State admitted it did not seek a continuance in the Felisha Smith case, nor was a continuance ever granted in the Smith case. Furthermore, the State admitted that the Smith case was never scheduled for trial even though the District Attorney's office for the 19th Judicial District customarily prepares its own docket, submitting it to the appropriate court administrator for approval.
Arguably, the State could rely on three cases which treated crowded dockets as "good cause" under Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-17-1: Folk v. State, 576 So.2d 1243, 1246 (Miss.1991); Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 877 (Miss.1987); and Kinzey v. State, 498 So.2d 814, 816 (Miss.1986). In Folk and Kinzey, however, this Court found crowded dockets justified delay in trial only if the trial court granted a continuance for this reason. 5 In Williamson, it is uncertain whether a continuance was ever ordered. Williamson, 512 So.2d at 877 (Miss.1987). Assuming, arguendo, that no order of continuance was granted, Williamson and the facts of the instant case are initially found in the same posture.
In Williamson, the defendant was not tried in Yalobusha County Circuit Court until 278 days after indictment. Id. at 877. The Yalobusha County court convened two terms every year: January and July. Id. As it was impossible for the defendant to stand trial in the January term because of docket congestion, the case was moved back to the July term--pushing the trial date beyond the 270-day restriction. Id. Holding the actions of the circuit judge did not violate the defendant's right to a speedy trial, this Court wrote: Id.
Unlike the situation in Williamson, Harrison could have been tried for the Smith murder within the 270-day time frame. The prosecution chose to try him for the Turner murder. In fact,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Brewer v. State, 95-DP-00915-SCT.
...resulted from Brewer defending against this charge. Nor was there any oppressive conduct engaged in by the State. See State v. Harrison, 648 So.2d 66, 71 (Miss.1994) (explaining that a dismissal with prejudice is not required by the statute unless the state upon finding a violation fails to......
-
Kolberg v. State
...The remaining one was a proposed agreed continuance from September 9, 1990, until December 3, 1990. This Court, in State v. Harrison, 648 So.2d 66, 69 (Miss.1994), Since Turner, however, this Court has found a handful of circumstances where the 270-day provision was not violated even though......
-
Jasso v. State
...defendant's ability to defend against the charge and that the State did not deliberately engage in oppressive conduct." State v. Harrison, 648 So.2d 66, 71 (Miss.1994). If the trial court determines prejudice is present from the delay, the court shall dismiss with prejudice the entire proce......
-
Mcbride v. State
...At least as recently as 1991, the statute was applied in this clear, straightforward manner.20 Then, the Court began to stray. ¶ 71. In State v. Harrison,21 decided in 1994, this Court, with no authority whatsoever to do so, decided that a violation of the statute did not really require dis......