State v. Helms, CASE NO. 14 MA 96
| Decision Date | 28 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 14 MA 96 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. RONNIE HELMS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. |
For Plaintiff-Appellee:
Atty. Paul J. Gains
Mahoning County Prosecutor
Atty. Ralph M. Rivera
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
21 West Boardman St., 6th Floor
Youngstown, Ohio 44503
For Defendant-Appellant:
Mr. Ronnie Helms #632-238
Chillicothe Correctional Inst.
Hon. Carol Ann Robb
Hon. Cheryl L. Waite
Hon. Mary DeGenaro
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Ronnie Helms ("Appellant") appeals the decision of the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court denying the post-sentence motions he filed pro se. He argues that his speedy trial rights were violated and thus counsel should not have allowed him to plead guilty. He claims that a speedy trial violation left the trial court without subject matter jurisdiction. Yet, a speedy trial violation does not involve subject matter jurisdiction, and Appellant's speedy trial rights were not violated.
{¶2} Appellant also states that his rape and kidnapping offenses were allied offenses of similar import that should have been merged. However, this argument is not properly before this court. Appellant did not raise this issue in the motions being appealed. Moreover, any issues that could have been raised upon direct appeal are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. For these and the following reasons, the trial court's decision is upheld.
{¶3} On September 15, 2011, Appellant was indicted for rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) for purposely compelling the victim to submit to sexual conduct by force or threat of force. A sexually violent predator specification cited to a 1993 rape conviction. Appellant was also indicted for kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) for removing the victim from the place she was found or restraining her liberty by force, threat, or deception for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity against her will. Attached to this count was a sexual motivation specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.147.
{¶4} On September 24, 2012, Appellant agreed to plead guilty to rape and kidnapping, and the state agreed to dismiss the two specifications. With the specifications dismissed, each of the two first-degree felonies carried a maximumsentence of eleven years. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(1). The parties entered into an agreed sentencing recommendation of 13 years in prison.1
{¶5} The court accepted the plea and immediately proceeded to sentencing. In a September 27, 2012 entry, Appellant was sentenced to ten years for rape and three years for kidnapping to run consecutive for a total of 13 years, as jointly recommended by the parties. Defendant was labeled a Tier III sex offender. No appeal was filed.
{¶6} On January 30, 2014, Appellant filed Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued that counsel's ineffectiveness resulted in a miscounseled decision to plead, stating that counsel should have filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds.2 The state filed a memorandum in opposition arguing: Appellant's plea withdrawal motion was not timely; the defendant articulated no legitimate basis for plea withdrawal; and he was represented by competent lawyers who zealously represented his interests in multiple plea negotiations.
{¶7} On May 16, 2014, Appellant filed a motion asking the court to immediately release him due to the alleged speedy trial violation, adding that the court lacked jurisdiction. He explained that his confinement in the local jail began on September 8, 2011 and that he was still incarcerated on December 8, 2011, the date on which he believed his speedy trial time expired. He asserted that no request for a continuance was made prior to that date. He also claimed that he did not become aware of the triple time provision for defendants held in jail in lieu of bail until he was incarcerated and generally stated that he used due diligence in filing the motion.
{¶8} On June 23, 2014, the trial court denied Appellant's motions. The within timely appeal followed.
{¶9} Pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1: "A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifestinjustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea." The post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reserved for extraordinary circumstances. State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977). The defendant has the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice. State v. Caraballo, 17 Ohio St.3d 66, 67, 47 N.E.2d 627 (1985); Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d at 264.
{¶10} The trial court's decision is generally a discretionary one and often involves the court's resolution of the credibility and the weight of the claims. Id. Although Crim.R. 32.1 contains no strict time requirement, "undue delay between the occurrence of the alleged cause for withdrawal and the filing of the motion is a factor adversely affecting the credibility of the movant and militating against the granting of the motion." State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235, 2002-Ohio-5643, 773 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 14 (), quoting Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d at 264.
{¶11} Manifest injustice to support withdrawal of a guilty plea can take the form of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Dalton, 153 Ohio App.3d 286, 2003-Ohio-3813, 793 N.E.2d 509 ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). See also State v. Howard, 7th Dist. No. 12MA41, 2012-Ohio-1437. In seeking to invalidate a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency, i.e. a reasonable probability that he would not have agreed to plead guilty but for counsel's deficiency. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992) (), applying Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) () and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) ().
{¶12} Appellant's first assignment of error provides:
"The Appellant contends that the trial court violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law under the 6th and 14thamendments to the United States Constitutions when the court convicted and sentenced appellant without having subject matter jurisdiction over the case due to a clear fast and speedy trial violation."
{¶13} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a speedy trial. This guarantee is implemented in R.C. 2945.71, which provides the specific time limits within which a person must be brought to trial. State v. Blackburn, 118 Ohio St.3d 163, 2008-Ohio-1823, 887 N.E.2d 319, ¶ 10. The trial time tolling provisions are set forth in R.C. 2945.72.
{¶14} If a defendant demonstrates that his speedy trial right has been violated, he may seek dismissal of the criminal charges. R.C. 2945.73. This statute specifies: "Upon motion made at or prior to the commencement of trial, a person charged with an offense shall be discharged if he is not brought to trial within the time required by sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 of the Revised Code." Id. Consequently, the right is not self-executing but must be timely asserted. State v. Trummer, 114 Ohio App.3d 456, 470-471, 685 N.E.2d 1318 (7th Dist.1996).
{¶15} Appellant initially frames his speedy trial allegation as a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which he claims would void his plea. That is, when subject matter is lacking it can be raised at any time, it is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and it renders a judgment void as opposed to voidable. See State v. Lomax, 96 Ohio St.3d 318, 2002-Ohio-4453, 774 N.E.2d 249, ¶ 17; State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 45, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995), fn. 6. See also State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraphs six and nine of the syllabus.
{¶16} However, speedy trial issues do not eliminate a criminal court's subject matter jurisdiction and do not result in void proceedings. State v. Moore, 7th Dist. No. 12MA197, 2013-Ohio-4000, ¶14-18 (); State v. Weaver, 7th Dist. No. 12BE21, 2013-Ohio-430, ¶15 (). The argument contained in the text of Appellant's assignment of error is without merit.
{¶17} Appellant also states that counsel should not have allowed him to plead guilty if he could have been discharged for a speedy trial violation. Some initial (and alternative) observations are warranted prior to disposing of the merits of the speedy trial argument. The state points out that a defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to allege a statutory speedy trial violation on appeal. State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 130, 566 N.E.2d 658 (1991); Montpelier v. Greeno, 25 Ohio St.3d 170, 172, 495 N.E.2d 581 (1986). Still, if the issue is framed as one of ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure to file a speedy trial motion resulting in a plea that was not knowing and intelligent, then the matter can still be presented in that context on appeal. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d at 130.
{¶18} However, this is not a direct appeal of the conviction. Rather, this is an appeal from the denial of a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed sixteen months after the sentence. As for his delay, Appellant merely claims...
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