State v. Kelley, 89-2048

• Decision Date: 30 January 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-2048,89-2048
• Citation: 57 Ohio St.3d 127,566 N.E.2d 658
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. KELLEY, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 127

57 Ohio St.3d 127

566 N.E.2d 658

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. KELLEY, Appellee.

No. 89-2048.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Nov. 28, 1990.

Decided Jan. 30, 1991.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A plea of guilty waives a defendant's right to challenge his or her conviction on statutory speedy trial grounds pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(B)(2). (Montpelier v. Greeno [1986], 25 Ohio St.3d 170, 25 OBR 212, 495 N.E.2d 581, applied and followed.)

2. A plea of guilty following a trial and prior to sentencing effectively waives all appealable errors which may have occurred at trial, unless such errors are shown to have precluded the defendant from voluntarily entering into his or her plea pursuant to the dictates of Crim.R. 11 and Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274

On December 28, 1987, defendant-appellee, George Kelley, was indicted by the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury on aggravated murder with gun and aggravated felony specifications. Appellee was accused of murdering Abline Abram on November 7, 1984. Appellee was tried from April 19 to 22, 1988. On April 22, 1988, appellee was convicted by a jury of murder with a three-year gun specification.

Prior to sentencing the plaintiff-appellant, state of Ohio, and appellee entered into negotiations for a plea bargain agreement which was apparently intended to avoid an appeal by appellee from his conviction. On April 26, 1988, before appellee was sentenced for the murder of Abram, the parties stipulated to a plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter that would delete the gun specification from the indictment. Included in the plea negotiation was appellee's agreement not to appeal his conviction. The trial judge reviewed the plea with appellee and counsel for both parties and decided that appellee understood his constitutional rights, and voluntarily and willingly waived those rights before entering a plea to voluntary manslaughter. Thus, the trial judge accepted appellee's guilty plea and proceeded to sentence appellee to five to twenty-five years' imprisonment.

The court of appeals vacated appellee's guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter and reversed his conviction. Furthermore, the court remanded the case for sentencing on the jury verdict of guilty of murder with a firearm specification.

The state has appealed the decision of the court of appeals, asserting that appellee's plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into and the appellate court went dehors the record in reversing appellee's voluntary manslaughter conviction.

The cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.

Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Pros. Atty., and Carmen M. Marino, Cleveland, for appellant.

Dennis P. Levin, Beachwood, for appellee.

HOLMES, Justice.

The central issue presented in this case is whether appellee knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights when he entered his plea of guilty to the offense of voluntary manslaughter. For the reasons which follow, we answer this query in the affirmative.

When a trial court or appellate court is reviewing a plea submitted by a defendant, its focus should be on whether the dictates of Crim.R. 11 have been followed. Crim.R. 11 provides in pertinent part:

"C. Pleas of guilty and no contest in felony cases.

" * * *

"(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and:

"(a) Determining that he is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that he is not eligible for probation.

"(b) Informing him of and determining that he understands the effect of his plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court upon acceptance of the plea may proceed with judgment and sentence.

"(c) Informing him and determining that he understands that by his plea he is waiving his rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be compelled to testify against himself."

Furthermore, in reviewing the record on appeal, the appellate court should inquire as to whether the defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his constitutional rights. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 the defendant's rights include: (1) the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, (2) the right to trial by jury, and (3) the right to confront one's accusers. Accord State v. Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 107, 564 N.E.2d 474, 475.

In the case sub judice, the record reflects that the trial court explained all the constitutional rights appellee was entitled to, in the absence of a plea bargain, pursuant to Crim.R. 11. Further, the court inquired as to any promises, threats, or inducements that appellee, defense attorney, prosecutor, or the court might have made in order to cause appellee to enter a plea of guilty. The court held: "Let the record show that the Court finds that the defendant understands his constitutional rights and voluntarily and willingly waives those rights and enters a plea of guilty to the charge of voluntary manslaughter.

"The Court will accept the defendant's plea."

In reviewing the colloquy between the trial court and appellee, and the statements made by the court as to appellee's understanding of his rights, we find that appellee was informed of his constitutional rights pursuant to Crim.R. 11. However, this does not end our inquiry since the court of appeals went beyond the sentencing hearing and looked to appellee's prior trial to find coercive conduct on the part of the prosecution in obtaining appellee's plea bargain agreement.

The court of appeals went beyond appellee's assignments of error in order to determine that there was inducement concerning his guilty plea. The appellate court found it was plain error for the trial court to accept appellee's plea following appellee's conviction of murder. Specifically, the court decided that the guilty plea was conceivably induced by the jury's verdict of murder. Moreover, the court of appeals concluded that although appellee received a more favorable conviction as a result of the guilty plea, he unknowingly waived valid appealable rights. The court of appeals held: "It can be concluded that the trial court's overruling of appell[ee's] motions at trial, or the fact that the jury had found him guilty of murder, or a combination of both, induced...