State v. Henke
| Citation | 196 Wash. 185,82 P.2d 544 |
| Decision Date | 29 August 1938 |
| Docket Number | 27082. |
| Parties | STATE v. HENKE. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Howard M. Findley, Judge.
Ruth Elizabeth Henke was convicted for murder in the first degree and she appeals.
Affirmed.
Paul Lemargie and Carl R. Heussy, both of Seattle, for appellant.
B. Gray Warner and Albert D. Rosellini, both of Seattle, for the State.
An information filed by the prosecuting attorney of King county charged the defendant therein named with the crime of murder in the first degree.
Upon arraignment, in addition to a plea of not guilty, the defendant, through her attorney, entered a plea of insanity to the effect that at the time it was charged the crime was committed she was insane or mentally irresponsible, and the insanity and mental irresponsibility still existed.
The trial by jury resulted in a verdict of guilty as charged in the information, together with a special finding that the death penalty be not inflicted. The court then entered judgment sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. From the judgment and sentence the defendant has appealed.
Appellant's assignments of error are the denial of her motion to withdraw the first degree murder charge from the jury on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence to support the same the refusal of the court to inquire into the appellant's mental condition at the time of her trial and at the time the judgment and sentence were passed upon her, constituted an abuse of discretion, and the denial of her motion for a new trial on the ground of irregularities in the proceedings of the court.
The record discloses the following facts: Appellant and deceased William Henke, were married during the year 1925. William Henke was a stock salesman by occupation, but had not been financially successful for several years just prior to the time of his death. November 19, 1937, he consulted with his friend Otto A. Erdvig relative to a new business venture which would require a trip to California in order to raise necessary funds. Appellant insisted that she should make the trip with her husband, but was told by him that sufficient money could not be obtained to pay to expenses of both. Thereupon discussion of the matter was discontinued. November 19, 1937, with the permission of Mr Erdvig, appellant and her husband went to his room in a Seattle hotel for the avowed purpose of taking a both. After they had been in Mr. Erdvig's hotel room for about an hour, shooting was heard by another guest of the hotel. Investigation disclosed that William Henke had been shot four times, and was found in the hotel hallway near the room occupied by himself and wife. Appellant shot herself above the left breast and was found seated on the floor near the door of the room with a revolver by her side. The revolver had been purchased by appellant several months Before the shooting took place. When the police officers arrived appellant admitted the shooting and gave as her reason that she felt the lives of herself and husband had come to an end, and she had taken this means to rid the world of 'two no accounts.' Several times thereafter she asked for the gun so that she might end her own life. William Henke was taken to a hospital, and just prior to his death November 23, 1937, made a dying declaration in which he stated that he and appellant had gone to the room to take a bath and that they had started arguing over the proposed trip to California, and that when he told appellant she could not go, she pulled a gun and shot him four times.
The evidence relative to appellant's mental condition shows that prior to May 19, 1930, appellant and her husband were happily married. They had a nice home, he was prosperous, and she was a beautiful woman, bright and intelligent, and able to make her own living by engaging in various kinds of work. On that day, May 19, 1930, she and her husband were involved in an automobile accident in which appellant was seriously injured. As a result she was unconscious for seven or ten days, and for a considerable time thereafter was highly excitable and irritable. Her physical defects marred her facial expression, and interfered with her walking and the use of her hands. Her memory was defective and her intellectual capacities were greatly reduced. Her doctors, friends, and relatives described her many eccentricities and the peculiar ideas that she developed after the accident. This evidence showed that appellant's actions, appearance, personality, and outlook on life had completely changed; that she became dull, helpless, and peculiar; and that she did many strange and unusual things. She attempted to take her own life on several occasions, threatened to take the lives of others, and questioned the mentality of her husband and mother. Many of the doctors and other witnesses testified, after reciting the peculiarities and conditions just referred to, that she did not at the time of the shooting know the difference between right and wrong, nor was she able to realize what she was doing. The matrons at the city and county jail watched appellant after the time of the shooting and Before the trial, and testified that appellant was mentally unsound. Dr. A. W. Hackfield, a specialist in neuralgia and psychiatry, beginning in November, 1937, made twelve or more examinations of appellant, and talked with many of her friends and relatives from whom he secured the history of her mental condition. His conclusion was that appellant did not know right from wrong at the time she killed her husband.
The state's evidence, secured from the police officers who handled the case, was to the effect that appellant gave to them an intelligent account leading up to the occurrence at the hotel, explained to them her reasons for her acts, and that she knew what had happened. These men had a long experience in dealing with persons accused of crime. It was their opinion that appellant was sane when she committed the acts charged in the information.
Dr. S. N. Berens, a specialist in brain surgery, who attended appellant after her automobile accident testified to her mental condition much to the same effect as other witnesses, that she was not in possession of her normal faculties, but said that at times she was able to distinguish between right and wrong, but could not do so at other times.
Dr. Edward D. Hoedemaker, a specialist in mental and nervous diseases, testified he examined appellant November 23, 1937, and two different times thereafter in the jail, and that she gave him a history of her life including the automobile accident and the events leading up to the shooting. The doctor said she answered questions readily when they were unrelated to the wounding and death of her husband, and---- The conclusion of the witness was that on the night of November 19, 1937, appellant could tell the difference between right and wrong.
The ability to distinguish between right and wrong test of sanity or insanity was first announced in M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200.
This court has approved that test of insanity with respect to one's mental condition as of the time of the commission of a crime. State v. Craig, 52 Wash. 66, 100 P. 167, and State v. Schafter, 156 Wash. 240, 286 P. 833. See, also: 1 Wharton, Criminal Law (12th Ed.) 72, § 52; 16 C.J. 100,§ 75.
In State v. Craig, supra, we stated (100 P. page 169): '* * * insanity being a question of fact, whenever it appeared from all the evidence bearing on the question that a person charged with crime did not have the mental power to choose between right and wrong with reference to the particular act charged, he was of unsound mind, and if such affection was the efficient cause of the act, and if he would not have committed the act but for that affection, he should be acquitted; for one with such mind is non compos mentis, and entitled to the protection of the law.'
There was sufficient evidence, if believed by the jury, to warrant its verdict which, in effect, decided that appellant was legally sane at the time she killed her husband.
It is next urged that the trial court abused its discretion in the manner in which it inquired into the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the trial, and when judgment and sentence was imposed.
Attorneys for appellant contend in this regard that she was insane during the trial and at the time sentence was pronounced, and that the insanity consisted of her mental incompetency to make a rational defense. They urged that the court committed error in not submitting the question of present insanity to the jury, and, second, it abused its discretion by failing to appoint a commission to determine the appellant's present sanity, and in using the wrong rule to ascertain appellant's mental condition.
The court properly instructed the jury relative to the defense of insanity or mental incompetency at the time the act was committed.
Instruction No. 22, given in accordance with the provisions of Rem.Rev.Stat. § 2175, was in part as...
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State v. Rice
...wrong" prong of the M'Naghten test is applicable only to determining sanity at the time of the crime's commission. State v. Henke, 196 Wash. 185, 193, 82 P.2d 544 (1938). When the issue is a defendant's sanity at the time of trial, sentencing, or punishment, the test is "whether one is capa......
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State v. Canaday
...of whether the accused was mentally competent to stand trial. State v. Gwaltney, 77 Wash.2d 906, 468 P.2d 433 (1970); State v. Henke, 196 Wash. 185, 82 P.2d 544 (1938); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). Moreover, where there is little or no basis in e......
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State v. Harris
...as it does at the time of trial." State v. Rice, 110 Wash.2d 577, 621, 757 P.2d 889 (1988), (quoting and citing State v. Henke, 196 Wash. 185, 193, 82 P.2d 544 (1938) and State v. Ortiz, 104 Wash.2d 479, 482, 706 P.2d 1069 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1144, 106 S.Ct. 2255, 90 L.Ed.2d 700 ......
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State v. Davis
...by the jury in case they found appellant guilty as charged. This question has been determined against appellant's contention in State v. Henke, supra. present mental condition as to sanity or insanity is not presented on this appeal. Of course a person found guilty of the crime of first deg......