State v. Henry County Dist. Ct.

• Decision Date: 23 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-1226.,07-1226.
• Citation: 759 N.W.2d 793
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR HENRY COUNTY, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

759 N.W.2d 793

STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR HENRY COUNTY, Defendant.

No. 07-1226.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

January 23, 2009.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mark Hunacek and Forrest Guddall, Assistant Attorneys General, for plaintiff.

Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for defendant.

TERNUS, Chief Justice.

Inmate Denny Propp brought a postconviction relief action challenging a determination by the department of corrections (DOC) that he was ineligible to receive earned-time credits after he was removed from a sex offender treatment program for misconduct. See generally Iowa Code § 903A.2 (2005) (providing for reduction in sentence for good conduct and satisfactory participation in specified programs). Propp claimed this application of the governing statute, as amended in 2001 and 2005, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because the offense for which Propp was incarcerated was committed prior to the amendments. The district court held the DOC's application of amended section 903A.2 to Propp violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. The State brought this original certiorari action to challenge the legality of the district court's decision. Because we conclude the district court's ruling was correct, we annul the writ of certiorari.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Propp is currently incarcerated at the Mount Pleasant Correctional Facility on a twenty-five-year sentence for his 1997 conviction of third-degree sexual abuse.¹ At the time of his sentencing, section 903A.2 allowed Propp to reduce his sentence through good-time credits. See Iowa Code § 903A.2 (Supp.1997).² Pursuant to the 1997 statute, Propp was eligible for a sentence reduction of one day for each day of good conduct and, in addition, could earn a further reduction of up to five days per month for satisfactory participation in a variety of activities and programs, including treatment programs established by the director of the DOC. Id. The director of the DOC was authorized to establish rules specifying what constituted "satisfactory participation" in employment, treatment, and other programs for purposes of sentence reduction. Id. § 903A.4 (1997).

In 2000, while Propp was still serving his sentence, the legislature amended section 903A.2.2000 Iowa Acts. ch. 1173, § 4. Under the new statute, "[a]n inmate ... serving a category "A" sentence is eligible for a reduction of sentence equal to one and two-tenths days for each day the inmate demonstrates good conduct and satisfactorily participates in any program or placement status identified by the director to earn the reduction." Iowa Code § 903A.2(1)(a) (2001) (emphasis added). Thus, effective January 1, 2001, inmates like Propp with category "A" sentences were eligible to earn a reduction in their sentence only by demonstrating good conduct and satisfactorily participating in any program identified by the director. Id. In other words, good conduct alone was no longer enough to qualify an inmate for a reduction in sentence under amended section 903A.2; earned-time credits, as they were now labeled, were also contingent on satisfactory participation in programming.

In 2005, the statute was amended once again, this time with respect to sex offenders. See 2005 Iowa Acts ch. 158, § 32. This amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added the following provision to section 903A.2: "However, an inmate required to participate in a sex offender treatment program shall not be eligible for a reduction of sentence unless the inmate participates in and completes a sex offender treatment program established by the director."³ Iowa Code § 903A.2 (Supp 2005). To implement this legislation, the DOC adopted a policy providing that inmates required to participate in sex offender treatment programs (SOTP) who refused treatment, were removed from treatment, or failed program completion criteria would not be eligible for earned-time credits.

Based upon his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse, Propp was required to participate in the SOTP. Propp began the treatment program, but was removed from the SOTP for misconduct in April 2006. Although Propp did not lose credits he had already earned, he was deemed ineligible to receive further earned-time credits until he was reinstated to the program. Prior to his removal from the SOTP, his tentative date of discharge was January 27, 2009; after his removal, his new tentative discharge date was June 12, 2012. In October 2006, Propp was reinstated to the SOTP, resulting in a new tentative date for discharge of May 20, 2009. Thus, Propp's time in prison was extended by approximately four months due to his temporary ineligibility to accumulate earned-time credits.

After exhausting his administrative remedies, Propp filed a postconviction relief action, claiming his loss of earned-time eligibility violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions.⁴ Propp requested that his original tentative discharge date of January 27, 2009, be reinstated. After hearing, the district court ruled application of the amended version of section 903A.2 to Propp violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The court ordered the DOC to reinstate Propp's original tentative discharge date. The court rejected Propp's contention that his due process rights had been violated.

The State then filed this certiorari action. Because we agree with the well-reasoned decision of the district court, we annul the writ of certiorari.

II. Scope of Review.

The issue in this case involves a constitutional provision, the Ex Post Facto Clause. Therefore, "we review the case de novo in light of the totality of the circumstances and record upon which the postconviction court ruling was made." Rushing v. State, 382 N.W.2d 141, 143 (Iowa 1986). Because neither party suggests a basis to distinguish the Federal Ex Post Facto Clause from the Iowa ex post facto clause, we will limit our discussion to the federal provision with the understanding that our analysis applies equally to the state provision.

III. Governing Legal Principles.

The United States Constitution provides: "No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law...." U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. For constitutional purposes, an ex post facto law is

any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done, which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed....

Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169, 46 S.Ct. 68, 68, 70 L.Ed. 216, 217 (1925); accord Schreiber v. State, 666 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Iowa 2003). It is the second type of law—one that makes the punishment for a crime more burdensome after its commitment—that is of concern here.

The purpose of the prohibition against ex post facto laws is "to assure legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17, 23 (1981). This prohibition also "restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id. at 29, 101 S.Ct. at 964, 67 L.Ed.2d at 23. In Weaver, the Court stated that "two critical elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it." Id. An offender is disadvantaged when the law "makes more onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment."⁵ Id. at 36, 101 S.Ct. at 968, 67 L.Ed.2d at 27.

In Weaver, the issue was "whether a Florida statute altering the availability of ... `gain time for good conduct' [was] unconstitutional as an ex post facto law when applied to [Weaver], whose crime was committed before the statute's enactment." Id. at 25, 101 S.Ct. at 962, 67 L.Ed.2d at 20-21. The state statute in place at the time of Weaver's offense and sentencing provided a formula for deducting gain-time credits from the sentences of prisoners who had no disciplinary infractions and who satisfactorily performed "`the work, duties and tasks assigned to him.'" Id. at 26, 101 S.Ct. at 962-63, 67 L.Ed.2d at 21 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 944.27(1) (1975)). Gain-time credits were calculated every month and at an increasing rate: five days per month for the first two years of sentence, ten days per month for the third and fourth years, and fifteen days per month for the fifth and subsequent years of sentence. Id. at 26, 101 S.Ct. at 963, 67 L.Ed.2d at 21.

In 1978, after Weaver's crime and sentencing, the Florida legislature enacted a new formula for monthly gain-time credits: three days per month for the first two years, six days per month for the third and fourth years, and nine days per month for the fifth and subsequent years. Id. at 26, 101 S.Ct. at 963, 67 L.Ed.2d at 21. Weaver objected to the application of the new formula to him, claiming the reduced accumulation of monthly gain-time credits under the new statute extended his time in prison by over two years in violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Id. at 27, 101 S.Ct. at 963, 67 L.Ed.2d at 22.

In determining whether the new statute was retrospective, the Court stated "[t]he critical question is whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date." Id. at 31, 101 S.Ct. at 965, 67 L.Ed.2d at 24. For purposes of Weaver's claim, the Court recast this question to ask whether the Florida statute "applies to prisoners convicted for acts committed before the provision's effective date." Id. Because the State conceded it was using the new statute to calculate gain time available to Weaver, whose crime was committed before the new statute was...