State v. Hensley

• Decision Date: 05 January 2010
• Docket Number: No. COA08-1485.,COA08-1485.
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Stevie Charles HENSLEY, Defendant.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

687 S.E.2d 309

STATE of North Carolina v. Stevie Charles HENSLEY, Defendant.

No. COA08-1485.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

January 5, 2010.

Appeal by the State from order entered 31 July 2008 by Judge Abraham Jones in Superior Court, Alamance County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 August 2009.

Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Amy C. Kunstling, for the State.

Paul F. Herzog, Fayetteville, for defendant-appellant.

STROUD, Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the State's appeal from a trial court order allowing Stevie Charles Hensley's ("defendant") motion to suppress statements made on 3 September 2005 to Detective Michael Enoch of the Alamance County Sheriff's Department. The issue presented to this Court for review is whether defendant was, for Miranda purposes, subject to interrogation at the time he made incriminating statements to Detective Enoch. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Background

The State's evidence tended to show the following: In September of 2005, Michael Enoch was a detective with the criminal investigations division of the Alamance County Sheriff's Department. On 2 September 2005, Detective Enoch was conducting an initial investigation of allegations of a sexual offense with a minor and had scheduled a time to talk with defendant about those allegations. Defendant did not show up at the scheduled time. Approximately forty-five minutes to an hour after the scheduled time, Detective Enoch received a call from Central Communications dispatch that defendant was in the emergency room at Alamance Regional Medical Center. Detective Enoch went to the hospital that same day and learned that defendant had attempted to overdose, was in the hospital's intensive care unit, and would remain in the hospital at least overnight. Detective Enoch did have an opportunity to talk briefly to defendant, telling him to take care of this medical issue and they would talk later. Detective Enoch stated that he "couldn't tell if [defendant] was just medicated or what" but defendant was coherent. Detective Enoch told the hospital staff to inform him when defendant was ready to be released. The following afternoon, on 3 September 2005, Detective Enoch received a phone call from the hospital stating that defendant was going to be released.

Defendant's contentions raised in his motion to suppress arise from Detective Enoch's contact and discussions with him at the hospital on 3 September 2005 and upon leaving the hospital. We will review the evidence in regard to these contentions in detail below.

On 4 December 2006, defendant was indicted for first degree statutory sexual offense and taking indecent liberties with a child. On 22 July 2008, defendant moved to suppress statements and responses made by defendant on 3 September 2005 to Detective Michael Enoch. Following a suppression hearing on 28 July 2008, the trial court orally granted defendant's motion and entered a written order on 31 July 2008, making findings of fact and conclusions of law. The State gave oral notice of appeal in open court and filed written notice of appeal on 1 August 2008.

II. Motion to Suppress

When evaluating a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, its findings of fact will be binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence. State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 332, 572 S.E.2d 108, 120-21 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1040, 123 S.Ct. 2087, 155 L.Ed.2d 1074 (2003). The trial court's findings of fact must support the conclusions of law, State v. Tadeja, 191 N.C.App. 439, 443, 664 S.E.2d 402, 406-07 (2008), and the conclusions of law are reviewable de novo. State v. Icard, 363 N.C. 303, 308, 677 S.E.2d 822, 826 (2009) (citation omitted). Our Appellate Courts "accord[] great deference to the trial court in this respect because it is entrusted with the duty to hear testimony, weigh and resolve any conflicts in the evidence, find the facts, and, then based upon those findings, render a legal decision...." State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619-20 (1982).

The State contends that the trial court's findings of fact nine, twelve, fourteen, fifteen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty-one, and twenty-two are not supported by competent evidence in the record. As only some of these findings are relevant to the trial court's ultimate conclusion regarding the defendant's statements to Detective Enoch on 3 September 2005, we will address only those findings. We treat findings of fact which do not add to nor take away from the trial court's ultimate conclusion as mere surplusage. See State v. King, 222 N.C. 137, 141, 22 S.E.2d 241, 244 (1942) (Evidence that "would neither add to nor take from the sufficiency of the proceedings" would be treated as mere surplusage by the appellate court.).

The trial court in its order made the following relevant findings contested on appeal:

15. After a considerable amount of time waiting for the hospital to discharge the Defendant, Detective Enoch eventually took Defendant into custody, arrested him, and placed him into the patrol car. The Defendant was taken from the hospital in a wheelchair and the detective acknowledged that he needed to assist the Defendant out of the wheelchair and help him into the back seat of the patrol car. Detective Enoch was not sure whether the Defendant was still groggy mentally from the suicide attempts and medications he received or if he was just very stiff from having been laying in bed on his back for more than twenty-four hours.

. . . .

18. Detective Michael Enoch acknowledged that sometime during that conversation he did say something to the effect to the Defendant that what he had to say was not going to be on the record and that he would hope that the Defendant would continue to cooperate even though he had been arrested; and, the detective inquired whether or not the Defendant would agree to speak with him the next day which would have been Sunday, September 4, 2005, if Detective Enoch came in to work overtime to get a statement from him.

19. Detective Enoch indicated that he knew the Defendant from prior dealings when he investigated an alleged child molestation case involving a Michael Thompson against the same victim, K.G. the year before; and that the Defendant was alert and oriented during that investigation; that he spoke with the Defendant on or about July 12, 2005 and the Defendant appeared to be in a sober state and alert and not disoriented at that conversation but when he contacted the Defendant on September 2, 2005 the Defendant was very disoriented and talking like he was on medication; and, that on September 3, 2005 the Defendant was not talking as clearly as he had on those other previous contacts that the officer had with him but that he was responsive to his general statements and comments to the Defendant.

. . . .

22. That the Defendant allegedly made the statement, `Mike I do not want you to think that I am a bad person, but I do not find anything sexual about children, but I was drinking very heavily and smoking pot and I guess the combination of the two will make a guy do something he normally would not do[.]'

After a thorough review of the record, we hold that the findings of fact relevant to the trial court's conclusions are supported by competent evidence in the record.

Detective Enoch testified that he knew defendant from a previous case and had interviewed defendant on two prior occasions. As a result, Detective Enoch had established a rapport with defendant.

On 3 September 2005, when Detective Enoch went to the hospital to serve arrest warrants on defendant and take him into custody, he had to wait for defendant to be released from the hospital. At the hospital, Detective Enoch spoke to defendant, telling him that he "was really concerned about his health, [and] ... there was no problem [defendant] could have that would be worth trying to take his own life." Detective Enoch then told defendant that he was going to be charged with the offenses on the arrest warrant, first degree statutory sexual offense and sex offense in a parental role. Defendant asked Detective Enoch to explain the situation to his parents, and Detective Enoch did so. When defendant was ready to be released from the hospital, Detective Enoch took defendant into custody. Detective Enoch testified that defendant seemed "a little weak" and "a little medicated," enough so that Detective Enoch had to help defendant into his patrol car. Detective Enoch did not advise defendant of his Miranda rights when he took him into custody. Detective Enoch transported defendant to the Sheriff's Department. While waiting for defendant to be released from the hospital and on the way to the Sheriff's Department, Detective Enoch and defendant had "[a] lot of casual conversation." Detective Enoch told the defendant he "was glad he was feeling better" and "was glad he didn't succeed in trying to kill himself." Detective Enoch admitted that on the drive to the Sheriff's Department, defendant still seemed "a little medicated" but still "very coherent" and "understood what was going on." Detective Enoch explained to defendant that he wanted to talk with defendant, but due to his family obligations, he could not that day. Detective Enoch told defendant that he was not even going to advise defendant of his rights; "did not want to talk to [defendant] about anything[;]" "did not want to go on the record with anything[;]" they were not talking about the case; but were just going to take care of the paperwork. Detective Enoch then told defendant "that [he] was in trouble with [his] wife for having to come in to work [on] a Saturday afternoon." Detective Enoch explained that "I would sometimes use the I should be at home with my family but I'm here having to talk to you to build the rapport[,] to let them know that I felt like talking to them was important." Defendant "at some point actually apologized one time for [Detective Enoch]...