State v. Hoben

• Decision Date: 21 August 1959
• Docket Number: No. 37703,37703
• Citation: 98 N.W.2d 813,256 Minn. 436
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Michael G. HOBEN, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 813

98 N.W.2d 813

256 Minn. 436

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Michael G. HOBEN, Appellant.

No. 37703.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 21, 1959.

Syllabus by the Court.

Where a municipality enacts an ordinance defining punishment and offense of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, pursuant to M.S.A. §§ 169.121 and 169.03, it must utilize state criminal procedure in prosecutions for violations of such ordinance.

Ben R. Toensing, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Walter C. Gustafson, Minneapolis, Miles Lord, Atty. Gen., George M. Scott, County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.

MURPHY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Hennepin County by which the defendant was adjudged guilty of driving an automobile while intoxicated, in violation of an ordinance of the village of Edina. On trial in municipal court of Edina without a jury, the defendant was found guilty of having driven an automobile under the influence of liquor in violation of Edina Ordinance No. 191, § 303. ¹ A 30-day workhouse sentence was imposed. The defendant appealed to the district court on questions of law and fact and thence to this court.

This case requires a discussion of certain provisions of the statutes relating to drivers of motor vehicles under the influence of liquor and punishment therefor in relation to the ordinance of the village of Edina covering the same subject. M.S.A. c. 169, relates to the general subject of highway traffic regulation. By § 169.121 it is provided among other things that it shall be unlawful for a person to drive or operate a motor vehicle under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or narcotic drug. ² By § 169.03 it is provided that the provisions of the chapter shall be 'applicable and uniform throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this chapter unless expressly authorized herein.' (Italics supplied.) This section of the statute further provides: 'Local authorities may adopt traffic regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter; provided, that when any local ordinance regulating traffic covers the same subject for which a penalty is provided for in this chapter, then the penalty provided for violation of said local ordinance shall be identical with the penalty provided for in this chapter for the same offense.' These statutes are to be compared with Edina Ordinance No. 191, § 303.1, which covers the same subject for which penalty is provided by § 169.121. While the penalties provided by the Edina ordinance are not 'identical' with those provided by statute, it is unnecessary for us, in view of the disposition of this case, to discuss the issue as to whether or not the ordinance is so inconsistent with the state law as to be invalid.

The issue with which we are solely concerned here relates to an alleged denial of due process by procedures followed in the prosecution of the defendant under the ordinance. The defendant asserts that he was convicted of a crime by proceedings civil in nature as a result of which he was denied the right of trial by jury as provided by Minn.Const. art. 1, §§ 4, 6, M.S.A. He further asserts that in the prosecution he was denied the presumption of innocence and the village was permitted to establish proof of guilt by a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of § 611.02. He further asserts that as a result of the conviction in municipal court he is now exposed to double prosecution for the same offense in violation of Minn.Const. art. 1, § 7.

The narrow question presented is this: Where a municipality has adopted an ordinance relating to the subject of motor vehicle drivers under the influence of drugs or alcoholics, which the legislature says must carry sanctions identical with those provided by state law, may it by prosecution under such ordinances deny to the defendant the same constitutional and statutory safeguards which would surround him had he been prosecuted for the same act under state law? It is conceded that had the defendant been prosecuted by state authorities under § 169.03 he would have been entitled to a jury trial; he would have had the benefit of the presumption of innocence; the state would have had the burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and he would not be exposed to the risk of double jeopardy.

The village concedes that by Minn.Const. art. 1, §§ 4, 6, the defendant is guaranteed the right of trial by jury, but asserts that these provisions of the constitution were not intended to apply to petty offenses arising under municipal ordinances. They point to M.S.A. § 488.09 which provides:

'* * * all cases arising under the charter, ordinances, or bylaws of such city or village shall be tried by the court without a jury.'

We have held that the denial of the right to trial by jury in prosecutions for violation of ordinances is founded upon considerations of expendiency. ³ It was pointed out in City of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 65, 30 N.W. 305, 307, that:

'Prosecutions for offenses against municipal by-laws * * * must necessarily be summary to be effective * * *'

We have held in numerous cases that in prosecutions involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, unlike a violation of a state statute, proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt need not be established. See, State v. H. J. Minar Co., 249 Minn. 116, 81 N.W.2d 268; State v. Maxwell, 249 Minn. 277, 81 N.W.2d 855; State v. Gardin, 251 Minn. 157, 86 N.W.2d 711; State v. Ketterer, 248 Minn. 173, 79 N.W.2d 136; State v. End, 232 Minn. 266, 45 N.W.2d 378. Instead the rule is that proof of guilt by a fair preponderance of the evidence will support the verdict of conviction. State v. Wilson, 244 Minn. 382, 69 N.W.2d 905.

We have held that a defendant may be convicted both under statute and an ordinance covering the same subject. This apparent disregard of Minn.Const. art. 1, § 7, which is designed to protect the citizen from double punishment for the same offense, seems to find support in the doubtful theory that the municipality and the state are in a sense independent and sovereign units of government analogous to the state and Federal relationship. State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445, 13 N.W. 913; State v. Oleson, 26 Minn. 507, 5 N.W. 959; State v. Cavett, 171 Minn. 505, 214 N.W. 479; State v. Stevens, 247 Minn. 67, 75 N.W.2d 903; Note, 36 Minn.L.Rev. 143.

There is little difficulty in applying the foregoing authorities to prosecutions for violation of regulatory, licensing, zoning, and other ordinances which relate to matters of local concern. ⁴ However, when ordinances carry more serious sanctions, adequate protection for the accused must become a significant concern of the court. Accordingly, a more difficult problem arises where ordinances denounce and punish acts which are the subject of state law and which reach beyond the limits of purely local problems. From an examination of our authorities, both statutory and decisional, it is apparent that we have not achieved a satisfactory accommodation between prosecutions under municipal ordinances and state prosecutions so as to assure to a defendant uniformity of treatment in terms of penalties and procedures and protection from subsequent punishment for the same offense.

The municipality urges that we follow State ex rel. Connolly v. Parks, 199 Minn 622, 273 N.W. 233. The defendant there was charged with having operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The offense was denounced and punishable both by state law and municipal ordinance. The prosecution was under the ordinance. The defendant contended that since the subject of the violation was covered by state law he was entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right. We held there that although the offense was punishable by a fine of not exceeding $100 or imprisonment of not more than 90 days and by revocation of license the offense was nevertheless a 'petty offense' for which there was no right to a jury trial. The revocation of the license was considered as an incidental consequence and not as a part of the punishment of the offense. In discussing the offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, we there said (199 Minn. 625, 273 N.W. 234):

'* * * It neither involves such moral turpitude as would remove it from that class of cases in which there is no right to a jury trial, nor is it of such a serious nature that it should be given the character of a common-law crime or major offense.'

We think that in the light of present-day realities this point of view should be reexamined. In the recent case of City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 174, 323 P.2d 614, 617, it was said:

'* * * Label the judicial process as one will, no resort to subtlety can refute the fact that the power to imprison is a criminal sanction. To view otherwise is self-delusion. Courts should not, ostrichlike, bury their heads in the sand.'

It should be accepted without argument that under present-day conditions driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is an offense of a serious nature. The punishment which must be uniformly applied under M.S.A. § 169.121 for the first offense is not less than 10 nor more than 90 days or a fine of not less than $10 nor more than $100 and revocation of driver's license for a period of not less than 30 days. For a subsequent violation within a period of 3 years of a previous conviction, provision is made for imprisonment of not less than 10 nor more than 90 days and revocation of license for not less than 90 days. In addition to the penal provisions the sanctions relating to revocation of license may have grave consequences. In State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 271, 95 N.W.2d 6, 12, we said:

'* * * Much has been said...