State v. Moseng
| Decision Date | 06 February 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 37476,37476 |
| Citation | 254 Minn. 263,95 N.W.2d 6 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Emmett A. MOSENG, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The legislature has given the commissioner of highways the exclusive authority to issue and to suspend and revoke drivers' licenses.
2. The municipal court is, under M.S.A. c. 171, without authority to suspend any form of driver's license, restricted or not. It may recommend to the commissioner, but it cannot suspend or revoke a driver's license.
3. Where commissioner imposes restrictions on driver's license pursuant to his authority under § 171.09, it is elementary that the restrictions imposed must be clear and positive by way of expression so that the licensee may understand what he can do and what he cannot do. Purely statutory offenses cannot be established by implication, and acts otherwise either innocent or lawful do not become crimes, unless there is a clear and positive expression of the legislative intent to make them criminal.
4. Where a statute contains remedial and penal provisions, the former are to be construed liberally and the latter strictly.
5. A license to operate an automobile, once acquired, is a right and privilege of real value and may not be suspended or revoked arbitrarily and taken away capriciously.
6. Finding the defendant guilty was unwarranted upon the record submitted.
Tracy, Sinclair & Rowland, Gordon I. Sinclair, St. Paul, for appellant.
Miles Lord, Atty. Gen., Marshall F. Hurley, Corp. Counsel, Donald L. Lais, Asst. Corp. Counsel, St. Paul, for respondent.
This appeal involves an alleged violation of a restricted driver's license issued pursuant to the authority of the commissioner of highways under M.S.A. § 171.09, which provides as follows:
'The commissioner shall have the authority, when good cause appears, to impose restrictions suitable to the licensee's driving ability Or such other restrictions applicable to the licensee as the commissioner may determine to be appropriate to assure that safe operation of a motor vehicle by the licensee. The commissioner may, upon receiving satisfactory evidence of any violation of the restrictions of such license, suspend or revoke the same, But the licensee shall be entitled to a hearing, as provided herein.
'It shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle in any manner in violation of the restrictions imposed in a restricted license issued to him.' (Italics supplied.)
The restriction imposed upon defendant's driver's license allowed him to drive his motor vehicle 'to and from and as required by employment Monday thru Saturday.' (Italics supplied.)
No transcript has been made of what transpired in the court below. The record is limited to a stipulation as to facts entered into between counsel together with the complaint, the judgment and sentence of the court below, stipulation of settled case, and notice of appeal. The stipulation as to facts reads in part as follows:
'Appellant was issued a motor vehicle drivers license, which was in effect at all times mentioned herein, restricted as follows: 'Driving only to and from and as required by employment Monday thru Saturday.'
The complaint upon which the proceeding appears to have been tried was in the following form:
'The undersigned, being duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and says: On the 6th day of December, 1957, at 1:10 o'clock a.m. Emmett A. Moseng, 677 Dayton, St. Paul, birth date 10--28--30, driver's license No. D131618, sex M, wt. 175, ht. 5, 10 1/2, did unlawfully operate vehicle, make Olds, body type 4-door, color green, upon a public highway, namely at Selby and St. Albans located in the city, county and State aforesaid, and did then and there commit the following offense; vio restricted dl (driving only as required by employ) in violation of the (statute) (ordinance) in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Minnesota.
'The undersigned further states that he has just and reasonable grounds to believe, and does believe, that the person named above committed the offense herein set forth, contrary to law, and prays that the said offender may be arrested and dealt with according to law.'
The issues involved are: (1) Whether a municipal court has the authority to suspend a driver's license for violation of a restriction therein; (2) whether the restrictions imposed on defendant's driver's license allowing him to drive his motor vehicle 'to and from and as required by employment Monday thru Saturday' were sufficiently clear; (3) whether defendant's actions constitute a violation of the restriction imposed by the commissioner on his driver's license.
1. The prosecution against the defendant has been instituted under a state statute and he has been charged with an offense against the state. M.S.A. § 171.24 governs as to the result of a violation of the provisions of § 171.09. Its provisions do not lend themselves to enforcement through the enactment of ordinances by any city or municipal subdivision. Section 169.02, subd. 2, of the Highway Traffic Regulation Act provides when a violation of the provisions of c. 169 shall constitute a misdemeanor, and § 171.24 provides, with certain exceptions, when violations of any of the provisions of c. 171 shall constitute a misdemeanor. Interpreting §§ 171.09 and 171.24 together, it is clear that it was the legislative intent to make it a misdemeanor for any person to operate a vehicle in any manner in violation of the restrictions imposed in a restricted license. Section 610.19 provides for punishment of misdemeanors when not fixed by statute.
The court below imposed upon defendant a year's suspension of his driver's license and also a 15-day workhouse sentence on the ground that he was guilty of a misdemeanor. Of course it is clear that if both of these penalties are imposed it will for all practical purposes make it impossible for defendant to continue on the job that he now has. No doubt the reason for the issuance of the restricted license, as the state agrees, was for the very purpose of permitting defendant to earn a living on a job wherein it was necessary for him to drive to and from his employment Because no public transportation was available for that purpose.
A careful reading of the provisions of c. 171 governing the issuance of drivers' licenses leads to the conclusion that the legislature gave the commissioner of highways the exclusive authority to issue and to suspend and revoke driver's licenses. Section 171.16 states that district, municipal, and justice of the peace courts having jurisdiction over offenses committed under any law regulating the operation of motor vehicles shall forward within 10 days a record of the conviction or plea of guilty or forfeiture of bail of any person in the court for a violation of any such laws and May recommend the suspension of the driver's license of the person so convicted. The commissioner is authorized to suspend such license as recommended by such court without a hearing as provided in c. 171. Section 171.18 gives the commissioner the authority to suspend the license of any driver without preliminary hearing upon showing by department records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee has violated certain state laws. In Martinka v. Hoffmann, 214 Minn. 346, 9 N.W.2d 13, this court indicated under what circumstances the commissioner of highways may revoke the license of a driver without the necessity of a recommendation by the court before whom the conviction was obtained and the circumstances under which the court may recommend the suspension of the driver's license in case of traffic violations, except parking. There is a clear distinction between revocation and suspension of driver's license under the authority and the power which the legislature has placed in the commissioner's hands. It seems clear that it was the intention of the legislature to give to the courts the power to recommend suspension in certain cases of minor traffic violations where there are aggravated circumstances, but under § 171.17 it provides for revocation of the driver's license on the first conviction without recommendation from the court where the conviction was obtained for a serious offense, such as driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor as defined by the statute. 1
2. Clearly, the municipal court was without authority to suspend any form of...
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