Williams v. Dollison, 79-1144
| Decision Date | 11 June 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-1144,79-1144 |
| Parties | , 16 O.O.3d 350 WILLIAMS, Appellee, v. DOLLISON, Registrar, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
James D. Hapner, Hillsboro, for appellee.
William J. Brown, Atty. Gen., and B. Douglas Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
The major issue involved herein is whether appellee is entitled to a post-suspension hearing before the registrar, in addition to his right to appeal the registrar's suspension in the Court of Common Pleas. Appellee claims no right to any pre-suspension hearing by the registrar, and such claim is not before this court.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a driver's license is a substantial right of which a citizen may not be deprived without due process of law. Bell v. Burson (1971), 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90; Dixon v. Love (1977), 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172.
Appellee contends that R.C. 119.06 and 119.07 require, upon reasonable request, a post-suspension hearing by the Registrar of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles.
R.C. 119.06 states, in pertinent part:
R.C. 119.07 states, in pertinent part:
When a statute specifically permits the suspension of a license without a prior hearing, notice of the agency's order shall be sent to the party by registered mail * * * and (shall) state that the party will be afforded a hearing if he requests it * * *."
However, R.C. 119.062 provides, as follows:
"Notwithstanding section 119.06 of the Revised Code, the registrar of motor vehicles is not required to hold any hearing in connection with an order revoking or suspending a motor vehicle operator's license pursuant to section 4507.161, 4509.24, 4509.291, 4509.31, 4509.33, 4509.37, 4509.39, 4509.42, or 4509.66 of the Revised Code." (Emphasis added.)
Appellee apparently agrees that the language of R.C. 119.062, if constitutional, relieves the registrar of a duty solely to provide hearings which would otherwise be required by R.C. 119.06, upon suspension of a motor vehicle operator's license.
R.C. 119.06 specifically states that revocation of a license shall be effective without a hearing, where such revocation is required by statute pursuant to a court judgment. However, this section further mandates that, "(w)hen a statute permits the suspension of a license without a prior hearing, any agency issuing an order pursuant to such statute shall afford the person to whom the order is issued a hearing upon request." (Emphasis added.) This wording, standing alone, would support appellee's statutory contention that appellant is required to provide a post-suspension hearing. However, R.C. 119.062 specifically states that, notwithstanding R.C. 119.06, the registrar is not required to hold any hearing in connection with a revocation or suspension of a motor vehicle operator's license pursuant to, inter alia, R.C. 4509.31. This court interprets the plain meaning of the words "any hearing" in R.C. 119.062 to preclude either a prior- or post-suspension hearing. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that R.C. 119.06 addresses itself to both prior- and post-suspension or revocation hearings.
R.C. 119.07 in part addresses itself to those required procedural and administrative aspects incident to prior or post license suspension or revocation hearings. If a hearing in such a matter is not required, R.C. 119.07 would not apply as to any hearing procedures. Consequently, R.C. 119.07 becomes moot as to that segment of appellee's contention regarding a post-suspension hearing.
Having determined that a post-suspension or revocation hearing by the registrar is not required by statute, we must now examine the constitutionality of such procedure.
Due process of law implies, in its most comprehensive sense, the right of...
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