State v. Hubka

• Decision Date: 19 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-1309,90-1309
• Citation: State v. Hubka, 480 N.W.2d 867 (Iowa 1992)
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Patsy Jean HUBKA, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 867

480 N.W.2d 867

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v.Patsy Jean HUBKA, Appellant.

No. 90-1309.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 19, 1992.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia Reynolds Lapointe, Asst. Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., Amy M. Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., and James M. Drew, County Atty., for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and HARRIS, CARTER, LAVORATO, and ANDREASEN, JJ.

McGIVERIN, Chief Justice.

DefendantPatsy Jean Hubka appeals her conviction, following a jury trial, of two counts of vehicular homicide.SeeIowa Code § 707.6A(1)(a)(1989).On this appeal, she challenges certain evidentiary rulings made by the district court.We affirm.

I.Background facts and proceedings.From the evidence presented at trial, a jury could have found the following facts.In the early evening hours of December 22, 1989, Hubka was driving her car south on Highway 65.A few miles north of Hampton, her car crossed the center line and entered the northbound lane.She collided with a northbound vehicle driven by William Knipfel.Two children in Knipfel's car were killed in the crash.

Roughly three hours after the accident, police authorities drew a sample of Hubka's blood and tested it for alcohol content.The test revealed a blood alcohol content at that time of .054 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.

Hubka was charged with two counts of homicide by vehicle.SeeIowa Code § 707.6A(1)(a).Prior to trial, the district court granted the State's motion in limine, Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(2)(g), and excluded Hubka's proposed evidence that the two child victims were not restrained by seat belts or other restraints at the time of the car crash.SeeIowa Code §§ 321.445(2),321.446.The court also overruled in part Hubka's motion in limine and trial objection and refused to exclude evidence about Hubka's blood alcohol content.SeeIowa Code § 321J.2(9).

A jury thereafter found Hubka guilty of two counts of vehicular homicide.SeeIowa Code § 707.6A(1)(a).The district court sentenced Hubka to a term of incarceration not to exceed five years on each count, ¹ the terms to run concurrently.SeeIowa Code §§ 902.3,902.9(4).Hubka was also ordered to make restitution.SeeIowa Code ch. 910.

Hubka has appealed from her convictions and sentence.She challenges the district court's decisions granting the State's motion in limine and overruling in part her motion in limine.We now consider the issues raised.

II.Evidence that children were not restrained.A trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence are discretionary.See, e.g., State v. Alvey, 458 N.W.2d 850, 852(Iowa1990).We will reverse an evidentiary ruling only when a trial court is shown to have abused its discretion in balancing the probative force of the challenged evidence against the danger of undue prejudice or influence.Id.

As stated above, the district court granted the State's pretrial motion in limine and excluded Hubka's proposed evidence that the two child victims were not wearing seat belts or other restraints at the time of the collision.SeeIowa Code §§ 321.445(2),321.446.Hubka contends that the district court erred in its ruling.She also believes that evidence that the children were not wearing seat belts or other restraints is relevant to the issue of whether her conduct was a proximate cause of their deaths.

A.As an initial matter, we note that the State's motion in limine ordinarily does not preserve for our review Hubka's claim that the jury should have been allowed to consider evidence of the failure of the children to wear seat belts or other restraints.SeeState v. Mark, 286 N.W.2d 396, 410(Iowa1979);Yeager v. Durflinger, 280 N.W.2d 1, 5(Iowa1979).This is because review of questions raised by a motion in limine generally is predicated on the record made during trial.State v. Judkins, 242 N.W.2d 266, 269(Iowa1976).

The State's motion in limine merely sought to preclude Hubka from presenting evidence at trial that the children were not wearing seat belts or other restraints at the time of the collision.At trial, however, Hubka's counsel made an offer of proof, outside the presence of the jury, that one of the state troopers who investigated the accident would testify that, in his opinion, the youngest child would have survived the accident if she had been wearing a seat belt or other restraint at the time of the accident.This offer of proof necessarily preserved for our review two evidentiary issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in excluding the state trooper's opinion testimony; and of course (2) whether the trial court erred in granting the State's limine motion and in excluding evidence of the failure of the children to wear seat belts or other restraints.

B.As to the latter evidentiary issue, we conclude that Hubka is not entitled to relief because she was in no way prejudiced by the district court's limine ruling.More specifically, despite the court's ruling, Hubka's trial counsel presented to the jury, without objection by the State, evidence that the children were not wearing seat belts or other restraints at the time of the collision.While cross-examining the State's witness Knipfel, Hubka's counsel asked Knipfel whether the children were wearing seat belts or restraints, to which he replied that they were not.Because this evidence was presented to the jury despite the district court's limine ruling, Hubka cannot now validly claim prejudice as a result of that ruling.

C. Hubka's other evidentiary issue is whether the district court erred in precluding the state trooper's opinion testimony that one of the children would have survived the accident if she had been wearing a seat belt or other restraint.More specifically, Hubka asserts that the district court should have left to the jury's determination the question of whether the failure of the children to wear seat belts or other restraints was a superseding cause of their deaths, thereby precluding the imposition of criminal liability upon Hubka.We disagree.

It is well-established that the definition of "proximate cause" in criminal cases is identical to its definition in civil cases.State v. Caldwell, 385 N.W.2d 553, 556(Iowa1986);State v. McFadden, 320 N.W.2d 608, 613(Iowa1982);State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 584-86(Iowa1980);State v. Wullner, 401 N.W.2d 214, 219(Iowa App.1986).The general rule is that a defendant's conduct is the proximate cause of injury or death to another if (1) her conduct is a "substantial factor" in bringing about the harm and (2) there is no other rule of law relieving the defendant of liability because of the manner in which her conduct resulted in the harm.Kelly v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 476 N.W.2d 341, 349(Iowa1991).

When conduct or forces occur after a defendant's conduct, the defendant may be relieved of criminal responsibility if a court finds that the intervening events are such as to break the chain of causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the victim's death.Id.;40 Am.Jur.2dHomicide§ 17, at 307-08(1968).However, a defendant cannot escape criminal responsibility for homicide merely because factors other than his acts contributed to the death, provided such other factors are not the sole proximate cause of death.AccordMcFadden, 320 N.W.2d at 611(fact that deceased motorist voluntarily participated in drag race did not of itself bar defendant, the other racer, from being convicted for involuntary manslaughter for the motorist's death);State v. Shimon, 182 N.W.2d 113, 115-16(Iowa1970)(same).See generally40 Am.Jur.2dHomicide§§ 13, 15, at 304-07(1968).Indeed, we have specifically stated that the alleged contributory negligence of a homicide victim may not be used as a defense in a subsequent homicide prosecution.State v Williams, 238 Iowa 838, 843, 28 N.W.2d 514, 518(1947).

Based upon the foregoing principles, we conclude that Hubka cannot be relieved of criminal responsibility due to the mere fact that the children were not wearing seat belts or other restraints at the time of the collision.More specifically, the failure of the children to wear seat belts or other restraints was not a "superseding cause" of their deaths so as to preclude the imposition of criminal responsibility upon Hubka.Even assuming the lack of seat belts or other restraints was a proximate cause of the victims' deaths, i.e., that this was a "substantial factor" contributing to their deaths, it certainly was not the sole proximate cause thereof.There is substantial evidence in the record to support a reasonable juror's conclusion that the collision with Hubka's vehicle also was a "substantial factor" causing the children's deaths.However, the mere fact that this may not have been the sole proximate cause of their deaths is not sufficient to relieve Hubka of criminal responsibility.AccordMeyer v. City of Des Moines, 475 N.W.2d 181, 186(Iowa1991)(evidence of nonuse of helmet or seat belt has no relevancy to issue of civil liability);Iowa Code § 321.445(4)(b)(failure to wear seat belt shall not be considered evidence of comparative fault under section 668.3(1));Iowa Code § 321.446(6)(failure to use a child restraint system does not constitute negligence nor is the failure admissible as evidence in civil action).

Our conclusion is supported by numerous cases from other jurisdictions holding that the failure of a victim to wear a seat belt or other restraint is not so substantial an act as to constitute a superseding cause which absolves a defendant of criminal responsibility for negligent or vehicular homicide.See, e.g., Panther v. State, 780 P.2d 386(Alaska1989)(trial court did not err in refusing to instruct that victim's failure to use seat belt could be considered in determining whether defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of victim's death);Frazier v. State, 559 So.2d 1121(Fla.1...