In re Blaise

• Decision Date: 03 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 10–0414.,10–0414.
• Parties: In re the DETENTION OF Paul Michael BLAISE. Paul Michael Blaise, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

830 N.W.2d 310

In re the DETENTION OF Paul Michael BLAISE. Paul Michael Blaise, Appellant.

No. 10–0414.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 3, 2013.

Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant, and Paul Blaise, Cherokee, pro se.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Elisabeth S. Reynoldson, Susan R. Krisko, and John B. McCormally, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

HECHT, Justice.

A respondent in Iowa Code chapter 229A proceedings alleges his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that the respondent's speedy trial rights were violated and that his trial should have been bifurcated. He also contends the district court inappropriately allowed the State to misrepresent the evidence at trial. Because we conclude the respondent has not established he was prejudiced by his attorney's actions, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

As S.E. walked through River View Park in Fort Madison in October 2005, Paul Blaise, who was collecting cans in the park, approached her and began asking her questions. He asked her if she was married, if she was sexually active, and if she would engage in anal sex. He wondered if she had ever been the victim of a violent crime, if she would use lubrication to have anal sex, if she would take her clothes off or have sex if someone asked her or threatened to hurt her. Although S.E. grew increasingly uncomfortable and quickened her pace, Blaise kept up with her while continuing to ask “hypothetical” questions. S.E. tried repeatedly to change the conversation and eventually ran away from Blaise and asked another pedestrian to walk her to her car. After warning another female pedestrian that “there was someone in the park talking about rape and guns and all kinds of sexual stuff,” S.E. called the police. Officers located Blaise in the park and discovered he was carrying a gun. Blaise ultimately pled guilty to first-degree harassment and received a two-year sentence.

While Blaise was incarcerated for the harassment offense, the State sought to have him committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Iowa Code chapter 229A. After a trial in January 2007, a jury found Blaise was an SVP and he was ordered committed for treatment. Blaise appealed. In December 2007, Blaise sought a stay of his appeal and filed a motion for a new trial in the district court, alleging the doctor who had testified for the State in his SVP trial was an “admitted mentally ill pedophile with serious difficulty controlling his behavior.” On February 28, 2008, we granted the stay and issued a limited remand which provided:

The motion for limited remand is granted for a period of sixty days to allow the district court to address the respondent's motion for new trial and the State's resistance. Counsel for the parties shall promptly inform the district court about this order.

The clerk of district court shall transmit a certified, file-stamped copy of the district court's remand ruling to the clerk of the supreme court. Within fourteen days of the date of the district court's remand ruling, the parties shall file statements with the supreme court addressing the status of this appeal.

Further appellate proceedings in this case are stayed during the above-stated limited remand period. This court retains jurisdiction.

On remand, the district court granted Blaise's motion and set a new trial date for August. The State appealed from the district court's grant of new trial. On July 14, Blaise executed a speedy trial waiver, which was filed with the district court on July 28. On July 31, we combined the two appeals, stayed the proceedings in the district court, and transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals issued its decision on April 22, 2009, affirming the district court's grant of a new trial.¹ Procedendo issued on May 21.

On the day the new trial commenced, Blaise's counsel moved to bifurcate the trial, basing his argument on the potential for “jury confusion.” The motion was denied.

During the trial, the State offered extensive testimony from Blaise about his prior misconduct. The testimony included a wide range of past bad acts starting with behavior when he was a child, including setting a vehicle on fire, shooting another child in the face with a BB gun, and sexually assaulting a roommate while institutionalized. The State questioned Blaise about his sexual fantasies, such as exposing himself to women, anal intercourse, sexual intercourse with virgins, and assaulting female prison staff members.

The State also offered Blaise's testimony about his conviction for sexual abuse of a nine-year-old girl, and burglary and criminal mischief charges. The details of each of these crimes were revealed to the jury, including how he forced himself on and held down the nine-year-old and digitally penetrated her vagina with enough force to cause scarring, and how he damaged the burglary victim's car because she refused to have sex with him. The State also elicited testimony about his arrest for lifting a girl's skirt on the street, as well as charges of identity theft and theft in the fifth degree.

In addition, the State elicited his testimony about threats he had made to staff while he was in jail for sexual abuse and read from an extremely violent and vicious letter he wrote to a female staff member, which threatened to torture her unless she had sex with him. The State's questioning of Blaise covered dozens of institutional infractions, including harassing female staff members, defecating on the floor, exposing himself, threatening to rape women, throwing semen at staff, masturbating in the presence of staff, and filing a lawsuit against a staff member requesting she wear different clothes so he could “see her butt.”

Regarding his conversation with S.E. in the park, Blaise testified he was “looking for a date” when he first began talking to her, but that as soon as he found out she did not have sex “on the side” he was no longer interested in her sexually.

The State's expert, Dr. Amy Phenix, testified that the conduct resulting in Blaise's harassment conviction was sexually motivated. She also testified that Blaise suffered from various mental abnormalities and that he will more likely than not commit sexually violent offenses if he is not confined. Blaise's expert, Dr. Stephen Hart, testified that he could not be sure that Blaise's interaction with S.E. was sexually motivated. Dr. Hart's opinion relied on the fact that there was no evidence that Blaise was sexually aroused during the conversation and on the notion that Blaise's bad behavior and sexual acting out was a way for Blaise to express anger and frustration rather than a way to seek sexual gratification.

The jury again concluded Blaise was an SVP, and Blaise was again ordered committed. Blaise appealed. He argues he was denied a speedy trial, his trial should have been bifurcated, and the prosecution misstated the evidence during trial.

II. Scope of Review.

Normally our review of a claim of a speedy trial violation is for correction of errors at law. State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001). Our review of district court rulings on motions to bifurcate is usually for abuse of discretion. Beeman v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Comp. Fund, 496 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Iowa 1993). However, because Blaise's bifurcation claim and speedy trial claim are both raised in the context of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, our review is de novo. See Everett v. State, 789 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Iowa 2010). A district court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Hubka, 480 N.W.2d 867, 868 (Iowa 1992).

III. Discussion.

A. Speedy Trial. A person subject to civil commitment pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 229A is entitled to a trial for the determination of whether the respondent is an SVP within ninety days after the probable cause hearing. Iowa Code § 229A.7(3) (2007); In re Det. of Fowler, 784 N.W.2d 184, 190 (Iowa 2010). Similar to criminal cases, if the respondent's speedy trial rights are violated, he is entitled to have his case dismissed. In re Det. of Fowler, 784 N.W.2d at 190–91. Blaise contends his speedy trial rights were violated because his new trial was held more than ninety days after procedendo issued after his first appeal.² Because his attorney did not raise the speedy trial argument in the district court, Blaise contends his trial counsel was ineffective.

Although Blaise executed and filed a waiver of speedy trial while the case was on remand in the district court after his motion for new trial was granted, he contends his waiver was ineffective or invalid because the district court did not have jurisdiction. He asserts that our limited remand only gave the district court the authority to hear and rule on the motion for a new trial—not the authority to set a new trial date or accept Blaise's waiver. He contends that when procedendo issued after the conclusion of the appeal, the speedy trial clock began running again, and without the execution of another waiver, his speedy trial rights were violated because his trial was not held within ninety days.

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,³ Blaise must establish that his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that prejudice resulted. See In re Det. of Crane, 704 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Iowa 2005). Blaise must establish both prongs by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006). Blaise asserts his trial counsel was ineffective first for letting him sign a speedy trial waiver after the district court ruled on his motion for a new trial when he contends the district court did not have jurisdiction. He further argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for dismissal when the trial had not occurred within ninety days of procedendo.

Blaise asserts our caselaw demonstrates that on a limited...