State v. Hunt
| Decision Date | 28 July 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 15560-5-II,15560-5-II |
| Citation | 75 Wn.App. 795,880 P.2d 96 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Jerry Nathan HUNT, Appellant. |
Robert D. Welden, Washington State Bar Assoc., Seattle, for amicus curiae.
Pamela B. Loginsky, Deputy Pros. Atty., Port Orchard, for respondent.
Jerry Nathan Hunt appeals his convictions of 12 counts of unlawful practice of law, three counts of unlicensed operation as a collection agency, and one count of theft in the second degree. We affirm.
Hunt called himself a paralegal and operated a business called Strategic Services. He had no formal or academic The 12 unlawful practice of law counts fall into the following categories. In eight of the counts, Hunt represented people injured in car accidents who had negligence claims against insured drivers. Hunt drafted and had each client sign a limited power of attorney authorizing Hunt to settle the liability claim with the insurer and to collect the settlement amount. He then negotiated with the insurer's adjuster, telling the adjuster he was a "negotiator" or "mediation counsel" retained by the injured party.
paralegal training but had learned something about the law while working with an attorney in Spokane for approximately 2 years.
Pursuant to these negotiations, Hunt prepared settlement liens in favor of car rental agencies, medical providers, and drug stores. In one case, he mailed a request for discovery and a request for admissions, although he had not yet filed suit. Hunt sometimes threatened that his client would file suit. He represented to the adjusters that he had researched appropriate amounts for the injuries and made settlement demands. He collected settlement checks and had his clients sign releases. He also signed documents for his clients.
In two cases, Hunt helped prepare and file dissolution forms. The forms indicated the client was proceeding pro se. In one of these cases, Hunt interceded as a "friend of the court" during a hearing at which a superior court judge entered the decree. He later billed the client for this intervention. In another case, Hunt drafted pleadings in response to a motion to modify support. Finally, in one case, Hunt's clients asked him to research some Washington statutes and respond to a letter from the attorney for a well-drilling company with whom they had a dispute. Hunt wrote a letter, based in part on the clients' summary of the facts.
The three unlicensed collection counts were based on debts Hunt either collected or tried to collect for three businesses. In two of the counts, Hunt had the business owner assign him the debt; he then filed a pro se lawsuit seeking payment. In some of the pleadings, however, he listed the original creditor as a plaintiff. In another case, he hounded a The theft count was based on Hunt's representation of two of his personal injury clients, Joe Scott and Pierrette Guimond. As with his other clients, Hunt prepared and had the two sign limited powers of attorney. After settling the cases, he cashed the two settlement checks and had the bank issue seven cashier's checks. One went to each client, several went to doctors, and one went to Hunt's landlord to pay his rent of $445. The remainder, $683.50, was disbursed to Hunt in cash. The total award was $10,200.
drug store customer about covering a bad check; the drug store apparently did not assign the debt to Hunt. The clients testified to hiring Hunt to collect their debts; they did not view the transaction as a sale of the debt. In one of the "assignment" cases, Hunt continued to bill his client for various court costs.
The clients became concerned that the amounts of the checks were incorrect, and, after contacting the insurance company to learn the amount of the settlement, requested an accounting, which Hunt did not initially provide. Eventually, he provided an inaccurate accounting. In addition, he told the clients that he believed they had agreed that he would get 7 percent of the settlement for each client, not simply 7 percent of the settlement. He did not list the rent check on the accounting, but did charge the two clients for the $5 fee to issue that check.
Eventually, Hunt agreed to remit an additional $400 to his clients, but he did not do so until the State filed unlawful practice of law charges. The State filed the theft charges some months after Hunt paid the additional $400, even though the clients, by that time, had signed a release indicating they had received full satisfaction from Hunt.
At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Hunt had poorly represented some of his clients, did not always act in his clients' best interests, and acted unethically or incompetently. Among other things, the State witnesses indicated Hunt did not keep his clients informed of his activities, did not inform clients of the full amount of settlements, reached settlements without consulting with his clients, settled claims Hunt testified that he did not represent to anyone that he was a lawyer or could act as one. He also told his clients he could not go to court for them. The defense elicited from several of Hunt's clients that they knew Hunt was acting as a paralegal and not as an attorney.
of minors without proper safeguards, fought with one of his clients in front of an insurance adjuster, and filed incomplete or improper documents in court. Three lawyers testified: two substantive witnesses who described Hunt's actions representing clients, and Robert Welden, the general counsel to the Washington State Bar Association. Over Hunt's objection, all three lawyers testified as experts as to the definition of the "practice of law."
The jury convicted Hunt on all counts. On appeal, Hunt claims that the law prohibiting unlawful practice of law is unconstitutionally vague, that the evidence was insufficient to convict on the theft and collection agency counts, and that the jury instructions related to the unlawful practice of law charges were erroneous.
The unlawful practice of law, a misdemeanor, is defined in RCW 2.48.180. The statute provides, in relevant part:
Any person who, not being an active member of the state bar, ... as by this chapter provided, shall practice law, or hold himself out as entitled to practice law, shall, except as provided in RCW 19.154.100, be guilty of a misdemeanor[.]
RCW 2.48.180.
Hunt argues that the statutory phrase "practice law" is unconstitutionally vague under the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and under the Washington State Constitution, article 1, section 3. He does not contend, however, that the Washington Constitution provides different or broader protection than the federal constitution.
We note initially that the federal courts have refused to find similar statutes impermissibly vague under the federal constitution. In 1967, the United States Supreme Court dismissed an appeal of an Arizona decision for want of a substantial federal question; the petitioner had challenged a similar As we explained in State v. Russell, 69 Wash.App. 237, 245, 848 P.2d 743, review denied, 122 Wash.2d 1003, 859 P.2d 603 (1993), when a criminal statute does not define words alleged to be unconstitutionally vague, the reviewing court may "look to existing law, ordinary usage, and the general purpose of the statute" to determine whether "the statute meets constitutional requirements of clarity." We must presume that a statute is constitutional; the burden is on the challenger to prove otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Coria, 120 Wash.2d 156, 163, 839 P.2d 890 (1992).
Arizona statute as unconstitutionally vague. Hackin v. State, 102 Ariz. 218, 427 P.2d 910, 912, appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 143, 88 S.Ct. 325, 19 L.Ed.2d. 347 (1967). Since then, other federal courts have followed this binding precedent. Wright v. Lane Cy. Dist. Court, 647 F.2d 940, 941 (9th Cir.1981); Monroe v. Horwitch, 820 F.Supp. 682, 686 (D.Conn.1993), aff'd, 19 F.3d 9 (1994).
Unless the challenger claims a violation of First Amendment rights, we evaluate the statute by looking to the facts of the particular case. Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d 171, 182, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). The challenged law
is tested for unconstitutional vagueness by inspecting the actual conduct of the party who challenges the ordinance and not by examining hypothetical situations at the periphery of the ordinance's scope.
Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 182-183, 795 P.2d 693. Hunt does not claim implication of his First Amendment rights. Thus, we evaluate the statute as applied to Hunt's alleged conduct. See Russell, 69 Wash.App. at 245, 848 P.2d 743.
A statute violates Fourteenth Amendment due process protections if it fails to provide a fair warning of proscribed conduct. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 178, 795 P.2d 693. Although some uncertainty is constitutionally permissible, a statute is unconstitutionally vague if:
(1) ... [it] does not define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed, or (2) ... [it] does not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement.
Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 178-179, 795 P.2d 693.
As Hunt concedes, several Washington cases provide a definition for "practice of law". According to those cases, a person preparing legal forms is practicing law. In re Droker and Mulholland, 59 Wash.2d 707, 719, 370 P.2d 242 (1962); accord Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wash.2d 581, 586, 675 P.2d 193 (1983). The Droker court held
the term "practice of law" includes not only the doing or performing of services in a court of justice, in any matter depending therein, throughout its various stages, and in conformity with the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Williams
...general purpose of the statute' to determine whether 'the statute meets constitutional requirements of clarity.'" State v. Hunt, 75 Wash.App. 795, 801, 880 P.2d 96 (1994) (quoting State v. Russell, 69 Wash.App. 237, 245, 848 P.2d 743 (1993)). ¶ 44 A statute violates the due process clause i......
-
State v. Yishmael
...general purpose of the statute’ to determine whether ‘the statute meets constitutional requirements of clarity.’ " State v. Hunt , 75 Wash. App. 795, 801, 880 P.2d 96 (1994) (quoting State v. Russell , 69 Wash. App. 237, 245, 848 P.2d 743 (1993) ). In Hunt , the Court of Appeals rejected th......
-
State v. Rogers
...is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant who drafted complaints, summonses, motions and orders); State v. Hunt, 75 Wash.App. 795, 880 P.2d 96, 100-101 (Div. 2), review denied, 125 Wash.2d 1009, 889 P.2d 498 (1994) (statute prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law was not ......
-
State v. Pastrana, 22467-4-II
...law, ordinary usage, and the general purpose of the statute to determine whether the statute is sufficiently clear. State v. Hunt, 75 Wash.App. 795, 801, 880 P.2d 96 (1994) (citation And a statute fails to provide ascertainable standards of guilt if it proscribes conduct by resort to inhere......
-
Table of Cases
...v. Humphries, 181 Wn.2d 708, 336 P.3d 1121 (2014): 21.3(2) State v. Hunsaker, 74 Wn. App. 38, 873 P.2d 540 (1994): 12.6 State v. Hunt, 75 Wn. App. 795, 880 P.2d 96, review denied, 125 Wn.2d 1009 (1994): 8.4(5) State v. James, 48 Wn. App. 353, 739 P.2d 1161 (1987): 4.4(1), 7.8(1) [Page TC-10......
-
Table of Cases
...Green, 91 Wn.2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979): 18.4(9) State v. Hunsaker, 74 Wn. App. 38, 873 P.2d 540 (1994): 17.3(1)(c)(iv) State v. Hunt, 75 Wn. App. 795, 880 P.2d 96 (1994): 18.4(9) State v. Moor, 7 Wash. 173, 34 P. 461 (1893): 15.4 State v. Pink, 144 Wn. App. 945, 185 P.3d 634 (2008): 5.4,......
-
Table of Cases
...756, 757; 7–89 n.768; 7–94 n.806; 7–95; 7–95 nn.812, 813; 7–99 n.846; 7–101 n.865; 7–102 n.869; 7–104 nn.886, 887 State v. Hunt, 75 Wn.App. 795, 880 P.2d 96, review denied, 125 Wn.2d 1009 (1994): 2–4 n.13; 2–35 n.256; 2–37 nn.267, 269; 2–57 n.413 State v. Hunter, 100 Wn.App. 198, 997 P.2d 3......
-
§2.1 State Admission to Practice
...Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 91 Wn.2d 48, 56, 586 P.2d 870 (1978); Americus v. McGinnis, 128 Wash. 28, 221 P. 987 (1924); State v. Hunt, 75 Wn.App. 795, 880 P.2d 96, review denied, 125 Wn.2d 1009 14.Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975); see also......