State v. Hurst, 43S03-9705-CR-295

• Decision Date: 30 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. 43S03-9705-CR-295,43S03-9705-CR-295
• Citation: 688 N.E.2d 402
• Parties: STATE of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Stephen R. HURST, Appellee (Defendant Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 402

688 N.E.2d 402

STATE of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Stephen R. HURST, Appellee (Defendant Below).

No. 43S03-9705-CR-295.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 30, 1997.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General, Christopher L. Lafuse, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellant.

Kurt Bentley Grimm, Grimm & Grimm, Auburn, for Appellee.

ON CRIMINAL PETITION FOR TRANSFER

SELBY, Justice.

The State of Indiana is appealing the dismissal of its reckless homicide case against defendant Stephen Hurst ("defendant"). Defendant moved to dismiss in the trial court on the grounds that the reckless homicide charge would violate his double jeopardy rights because he had previously been tried for a traffic violation arising from the same facts. The trial court granted the motion. On appeal by the State, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. State v. Hurst, 674 N.E.2d 622 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). The State petitioned this Court for transfer to address the issue of whether the trial court incorrectly concluded that the reckless homicide charge would subject defendant to double jeopardy and, thus, whether the trial court erred in dismissing the case. Defendant argues that, notwithstanding the double jeopardy issue, the trial court is precluded from further consideration of this case due to Criminal Rule 4(C). We earlier granted transfer and now hold that the trial court erred in its double jeopardy ruling and that defendant has a valid Criminal Rule 4(C) argument.

FACTS

On the morning of October 5, 1994, defendant was traveling north on County Road 300 West ("CR300W") and came to the intersection with County Road 600 North ("CR600N") at around 8:49 a.m. Defendant had a stop sign at this intersection. At the same time, John R. Willard, Sr. was traveling west on CR600N and was also approaching the intersection of CR600N and CR300W. Willard had no stop or yield sign at this intersection. Failing to yield to Willard's oncoming car, defendant entered the intersection and hit Willard's car on its left side. Willard died as the result of this accident.

On October 21, 1994, defendant was found to have violated Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-29, failure to yield the right-of-way, a class C infraction. The court imposed a fine of seven dollars, along with court costs of fifty-four dollars and fifty cents. Defendant paid his fine that same day.

On December 20, 1994, the State charged defendant by information with reckless homicide, a class C felony. On March 22, 1995, defendant filed a motion to dismiss. Defendant argued that the State could not prosecute him for reckless homicide because he had already been prosecuted and fined for failure to yield the right-of-way. On March 20, 1996, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The State appealed.

DISCUSSION

I.

The first and most important issue before this Court is whether the imposition of a fine for failure to yield the right-of-way can be "jeopardy" under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Indiana and United States Constitutions. ¹ The State offers two arguments as to why defendant's double jeopardy rights were not violated, and why, therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the charge. First, the State argues that failure to yield the right-of-way and reckless homicide are not the same offense. Therefore, defendant has not been twice placed in jeopardy for the The Double Jeopardy Clause has been held to protect against three specific abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989); Bryant v. State, 660 N.E.2d 290, 295 (Ind.1995). In order to determine whether a defendant is in danger of having his double jeopardy rights violated, a court must determine whether the defendant will be placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. See Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 784, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1948-49, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994); Bryant, 660 N.E.2d at 295.

same offense. Second, the State argues that, even if the two offenses are the same, the fine for failure to yield the right-of-way was not a "punishment" which would equate to "jeopardy" under the Double Jeopardy Clause. As such, defendant has yet to be put in jeopardy for the actions which led to the death of Willard.

The United States Supreme Court has recently held that "jeopardy" is not limited to criminal punishments and prosecutions; nominally "non-criminal" sanctions can be "punishment" which constitutes "jeopardy" under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767; Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487. In Kurth Ranch, the Court held that a state tax on the storage and possession of dangerous drugs, subsequent to criminal charges for drug possession, was a second punishment and was "the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution that placed the Kurths in jeopardy a second time 'for the same offense.' " Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 784, 114 S.Ct. at 1948. The Court in Halper held that a civil sanction which "bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss" can be a "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-50, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-03.

Determining whether a sanction is civil or criminal is generally a two-step process. First, as the initial question is one of statutory construction, the court must determine whether the legislature intended the proceedings to be civil or criminal. Kansas v. Hendricks, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2081-82, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, ----, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 2147, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2641, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980). If civil was the intent, the court must next determine whether the party challenging the statute has provided "the clearest proof" that the "statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention to deem it civil." Hendricks, --- U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 2082 (quoting from Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49, 100 S.Ct. at 2641-42); Ursery, 518 U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2148. Thus, the determining factor of whether a sanction is criminal or civil is not necessarily the label given it by the legislature; rather a court confronted with a challenge to a nominally civil proceeding and sanction must examine whether the sanction is so punitive in effect that it can no longer be said to serve the remedial purposes of a civil sanction. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2147; Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 778, 114 S.Ct. at 1945; Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02; Ward, 448 U.S. at 248, 100 S.Ct. at 2641; Bryant, 660 N.E.2d at 295. If, after assessing the character and purpose of the sanction in the particular case, the court determines that the sanction serves the purpose of punishment, then the court may conclude that the sanction is the equal of criminal punishment under the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02; Bryant, 660 N.E.2d at 295-96.

The United States Supreme Court has examined various factors to determine whether a nominally civil sanction is so punitive as to be the equal of criminal punishment. For example, the Court in Ursery was confronted with the question of whether a civil forfeiture for drug related activity was "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Ursery, 518 U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2138. The Court first noted that Congress intended these forfeitures to be civil proceedings because they are against property, not people, and because the procedure itself was civil.

                Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2147.   Next, the Court found that the proceedings were not so punitive in nature as to be "punishment."   In so finding, the Court noted that the government is not required to demonstrate scienter, that though there is an element of deterrence, deterrence may serve civil as well as criminal goals, and that these forfeitures served non-punitive goals such as ensuring that people will keep their lands from being used for illegal purposes.  Id. at ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2148-49
                

In Kurth Ranch, the issue before the Court was whether a tax on the possession and storage of drugs was punitive in nature and thus "subject to the constraints of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779, 114 S.Ct. at 1945. The Court began by noting that the high rate of taxation and the obvious deterrent purpose, while not necessarily making the tax a punishment, did factor into the decision. Id. at 780, 114 S.Ct. at 1946. Next, the Court noted that the assessment of the tax was linked to the commission of the crime and was exacted only after an arrest for the same crime. Id. at 781, 114 S.Ct. at 1946-47. Finally, the Court noted that the tax was imposed on goods which the taxpayer neither owned nor possessed since the State had already confiscated them. Id. at 783, 114 S.Ct. at 1948. The Court concluded that "[t]aken as a whole, this drug tax is a concoction of anomalies, too far removed in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to escape characterization as punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis." Id.; see also Bryant, 660 N.E.2d 290 (wherein this Court determined that a tax similar to that in Kurth Ranch was punishment after this Court examined four factors: the tax's deterrent rather than revenue purpose, its high rate, its prerequisite of the commission of a crime, and its difference from a normal excise tax).

A final example is provided by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Halper. The issue before the Court was whether a civil fine was punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis. Halper...