State v. Hurst

• Decision Date: 26 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 85549–8.,85549–8.
• Citation: 269 P.3d 1023,173 Wash.2d 597
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. John Robert HURST, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

173 Wash.2d 597

269 P.3d 1023

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.John Robert HURST, Petitioner.

No. 85549–8.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Jan. 26, 2012.

Mindy Michelle Carr, Mindy Carr Criminal Defense, Nancy P. Collins, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Donna Lynn Wise, King County Prosecutor's Office, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

OWENS, J.

[173 Wash.2d 599] ¶ 1 John Hurst was charged with a felony, but the criminal proceedings against him were stayed because the trial court determined that he was not competent to stand trial. Hurst's lack of competence twice resulted in his commitment to a 90–day mental health treatment and restoration period. As Hurst failed to regain competency during either of these periods, the State sought a third and final mental health treatment and restoration period of up to 180 days. This case concerns the standard of proof required to commit an incompetent criminal defendant charged with a felony to a third mental health treatment and restoration period. Hurst alleges that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Due Process Clause), U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, requires that the standard of proof be clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. We disagree; the legislature's selected preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

¶ 2 On March 11, 2008, Hurst, while in the emergency room, allegedly punched and threw a shoe at an on-duty nurse. As a result, the State charged Hurst with assault in the third degree, a class C felony. RCW 9A.36.031(1)(i), (2). At some point, the issue of Hurst's competency to stand trial was raised, and, on March 31, King County Superior Court entered an order committing Hurst to Western State Hospital for an examination relating to his competency. A report was submitted to the court on April 30 and, on May 12, the court found Hurst incompetent to stand trial and ordered him committed to Western State Hospital for up to 90 days to restore his competency. On August 20, the court again found Hurst incompetent to stand trial and ordered him committed for a second period of up to 90 days. On January 23, 2009, the court determined that Hurst had not yet regained competency to stand trial.

¶ 3 A jury trial relating to Hurst's continued commitment was held beginning on February 3, 2009. The jury was asked to determine whether the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Hurst presented a substantial danger to others or presented a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security and whether there was a substantial probability that Hurst would regain competency within a reasonable period of time. The jury found that Hurst did not present a substantial danger to other persons but that there was a substantial likelihood that he would commit criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security and that there was a substantial probability that he would regain competency within a reasonable period of time. Based on the jury's verdict, the court entered an order committing Hurst to an additional 180–day period of mental health treatment and restoration. On August 3, 2009, the superior court found that Hurst remained incompetent to stand trial and dismissed the criminal charges.¹

¶ 4 Hurst sought review of the superior court's imposition of the final 180–day commitment period on several grounds, including a challenge to the standard of proof imposed on the State. The Court of Appeals granted discretionary review and held that RCW 10.77.086(4) requires proof by only a preponderance of the evidence and that this standard does not violate the Due Process Clause. State v. Hurst, 158 Wash.App. 803, 808–09, 812, 244 P.3d 954 (2010). We granted Hurst's petition for review. State v. Hurst, 171 Wash.2d 1016, 253 P.3d 392 (2011).

ISSUE

¶ 5 Does the Due Process Clause require proof of dangerousness by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to detain an incompetent criminal defendant for purposes of competency restoration beyond 180 days?

ANALYSIS

I. Analytical Framework for Due Process Clause Challenges

¶ 6 The first issue in dispute is whether this case is governed by the analytical framework set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), or the framework set out in Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992). This issue is, at least theoretically, a significant one because the Medina framework is “far less intrusive than that approved in Mathews.” Id. at 446, 112 S.Ct. 2572.

¶ 7 Due Process Clause challenges arising in the context of competency hearings in criminal proceedings are governed by the analytical framework set forth in Medina. State v. Heddrick, 166 Wash.2d 898, 904 n. 3, 215 P.3d 201 (2009). Indeed, Medina itself concerned the dictates of the Due Process Clause in precisely such a context. In Medina, a criminal defendant was charged with multiple felonies, including first degree murder. 505 U.S. at 440, 112 S.Ct. 2572. Prior to trial, Medina's counsel requested a hearing to determine whether Medina was competent to stand trial. Id. Under California statute, the party asserting a lack of competence bore the burden of establishing incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Medina argued that the statute violated the Due Process Clause by placing the burden of proof on him to demonstrate his incompetence. Id. at 442, 112 S.Ct. 2572. The United States Supreme Court specifically rejected the Mathews test because the challenge arose in the criminal law context. Id. at 443, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (“In our view, the Mathews balancing test does not provide the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules which, like the one at bar, are part of the criminal process.”).

¶ 8 As in Medina, the competency hearing at issue in the present case arose in the context of criminal proceedings. The United States Supreme Court decision in Medina is therefore dispositive of the fact that the present case, in which Hurst relies exclusively on the federal constitution, is not governed by Mathews.

¶ 9 Hurst's arguments in favor of the Mathews framework are unavailing. Hurst is correct that in Born v. Thompson, 154 Wash.2d 749, 755–57, 117 P.3d 1098 (2005), which concerned the requirements of the Due Process Clause in competency proceedings that were part of prosecution for commission of a misdemeanor, we applied the Mathews analytical framework. In Born, however, the parties did not brief the applicability of the Medina framework. See Suppl. Br. of Pet'r Born, and Suppl. Br. of Resp'ts, Born v. Thompson, No. 74126–3. Instead, the parties focused on the applicability of Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), which in turn relied upon the Mathews factors, see id. at 425–27, 99 S.Ct. 1804. Accordingly, we decided Born under the framework of Mathews and Addington. Born, 154 Wash.2d at 754–55, 117 P.3d 1098; id. at 778–79, 117 P.3d 1098 (Owens, J., dissenting); see RAP 12.1(a) (“[T]he appellate court will decide a case only on the basis of issues set forth by the parties in their briefs.”); cf. State v. Brousseau, 172 Wash.2d 331, 346 n. 8, 259 P.3d 209 (2011) (“Though the usefulness of the Mathews test in resolving the due process question presented here may be debated, Brousseau relies heavily on the test in his briefing, and the State has not argued for a different test.”). The failure of the parties in Born to raise, as an issue, the appropriate Due Process Clause framework does not compel us to employ the incorrect Mathews framework in this case. This is particularly true given that after our decision in Born we expressly recognized Medina as the controlling framework. Heddrick, 166 Wash.2d at 904 n. 3, 215 P.3d 201.²

II. A Preponderance of the Evidence Standard Satisfies Due Process

¶ 10 Under the Medina analytical framework, a state law governing criminal procedures, “ ‘including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion,’ ” does not violate “ ‘the Due Process Clause unless “it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” ’ ” 505 U.S. at 445, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977)). Both historical and contemporary practice are probative of whether such rules are fundamental. Id. at 446–48, 112 S.Ct. 2572. If the rule is not ranked as fundamental, the court must then determine “whether the rule transgresses any recognized principle of ‘fundamental fairness' in operation.” Id. at 448, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990)).

¶ 11 As a starting point, we must precisely identify Hurst's claim of error and determine, as a matter of statutory construction, the meaning and effect of the statutory scheme. Provisions addressing defendants who are not competent to stand trial are set forth in chapter 10.77 RCW. Cf. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975) (holding that the Due Process Clause prohibits the trial of a person who is incompetent). In brief, if the court finds that a criminal defendant charged with a felony is not competent to stand trial it must stay the criminal proceedings, RCW 10.77.084(1)(a), and may commit the defendant to a “mental health treatment and restoration period,” RCW 10.77.084(1)(c), of up to 90 days. RCW 10.77.086(1). By the conclusion of that 90–day period, the court must hold a hearing, RCW 10.77.086(2), and may commit the defendant to an additional mental health treatment and restoration period of up to 90 days if it or a jury determines that the defendant remains incompetent, RCW 10.77. 086(3)....