State v. Heddrick

Decision Date10 September 2009
Docket NumberNo. 80841-4.,80841-4.
Citation215 P.3d 201,166 Wn.2d 898
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Steven Ray HEDDRICK, Jr., Petitioner.

Casey Grannis, Nielsen Broman & Koch, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Randi J. Austell, King County Prosecutor's Office, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

OWENS, J.

¶ 1 A defendant's competency is a necessary prerequisite for a fair criminal trial. Chapter 10.77 RCW outlines procedures courts must follow once any reason to doubt a defendant's competency arises before a trial judge. Steven Ray Heddrick, Jr., challenges the trial court's failure to follow statutory procedures in finding him competent to stand trial in felony prosecutions for harassment and custodial assault. Following the statute, the trial court ordered two psychological examinations but did not enter either examination into evidence. Instead, the court found Heddrick competent after counsel in the harassment matter withdrew her challenge to competency.

¶ 2 When the court entered the competency order, Heddrick's counsel for his custodial assault case was absent. Because the order ostensibly applied to both felony prosecutions Heddrick now complains that he was denied counsel in a critical stage of the proceedings.

¶ 3 We affirm the Court of Appeals because Heddrick, through his appointed counsel, waived completion of the statutory competency procedures. In addition, we affirm the Court of Appeals because Heddrick did not suffer a complete denial of counsel during a critical stage in the proceedings.

FACTS

¶ 4 Heddrick's appeal arises out of two separate alleged criminal acts. Clerk's Papers King County Super. Ct. No. 04-1-12703-0(1CP) at 1; Clerk's Papers King County Super. Ct. No. 05-1-08886-5(2CP) at 1. In 2004, Heddrick was charged with felony harassment. While awaiting trial on that charge, Heddrick was allegedly involved in an altercation with jailhouse staff, leading to the subsequent charge of custodial assault.

¶ 5 Concerns about Heddrick's competency arose several times as his cases proceeded. In the felony harassment matter, the issue of Heddrick's competency arose first on September 8, 2004. 1CP at 17. The trial court found Heddrick incompetent and ordered him to Western State Hospital (WSH) for 90 days. In January 2005, the trial court found that Heddrick had been restored to competency. Id. at 6-7.

¶ 6 In July 2005, newly appointed defense counsel Tracy Lapps raised concerns again about Heddrick's competency. Pet. for Review at 3; see 1CP at 38. In response, the trial court orally ordered a new evaluation by Dr. White, an expert retained by the defense. Report of Proceedings (RP) (July 27, 2005) at 6. Also, the court directed that a written report be prepared by a staff psychologist at WSH and circulated to the parties. 1CP at 40.

¶ 7 Near the due date for production of the report, defense counsel informed the court that Dr. White had found Heddrick competent. She further informed the court that she declined production of Dr. White's report due to cost concerns. As a result, the WSH staff psychologist's report was not entered into evidence.1 Counsel thereby withdrew Heddrick's competency motion. After the harassment trial concluded, a jury found Heddrick guilty on October 12, 2005. Id. at 69.

¶ 8 While in custody in the King County jail awaiting trial for felony harassment, Heddrick allegedly assaulted one of the two officers assigned to move him to another cell. The State charged Heddrick with custodial assault. After substituting for a previous attorney, Marcus Naylor began to represent Heddrick in his assault case. Once competency concerns arose in the felony harassment matter, the trial judge in the custodial assault case decided to "track competency procedures with the felony harassment case." State v. Heddrick, noted at 140 Wash.App. 1019, 2007 WL 2411354, at *2, 2CP at 7.

¶ 9 Heddrick's custodial assault case was transferred to Judge Mary Yu, who was presiding over his felony harassment case. When Judge Yu signed the competency order on October 10, 2005, in Heddrick's assault case, she evidently did not enter an equivalent order in the harassment case. 2CP at 8. Moreover, Judge Yu issued the ruling outside of the presence of Heddrick's counsel in the custodial assault case. Id. (lacking signature of Naylor). The only counsel present was Lapps, Heddrick's appointed attorney in the felony harassment case. Lapps declined to sign the order of competency in the custodial assault matter. Id. The court simply found Heddrick competent after his appointed attorney in the felony harassment matter, Lapps, informed the court that Dr. White found Heddrick to be competent. RP (Oct. 11, 2005) at 15. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Heddrick received adequate process. Heddrick, 140 Wash.App. 1019, 2007 WL 2411354, at *4-5. We granted Heddrick's petition for review. 163 Wash.2d 1039, 187 P.3d 270 (2008).

ANALYSIS

¶ 10 We granted review to consider two issues arising from Heddrick's prosecutions. First, whether the trial court violated Heddrick's due process rights when it failed to follow the competency determination procedures outlined in RCW 10.77.060 after Heddrick's counsel withdrew the competency challenge and stipulated to his competency. Second, we must determine whether the trial court denied Heddrick the assistance of counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings when it entered an order of competency in the presence of the defendant's counsel in another matter who refused to sign the order.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 The determination of whether a competency examination should (or should not) be ordered rests generally within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Thomas, 75 Wash.2d 516, 517-18, 452 P.2d 256 (1969). Whether a trial court erred in accepting a defendant's withdrawal of a competency challenge and ruling on competency without further proceedings is therefore reviewed for abuse of discretion.

B. Competency Procedures under RCW 10.77.060

¶ 12 Heddrick argues that he was denied due process of law when the trial court failed to execute the procedures in RCW 10.77.060. An accused in a criminal case has a fundamental right not to be tried while incompetent to stand trial. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); In re Pers. Restraint of Fleming, 142 Wash.2d 853, 861, 16 P.3d 610 (2001). "Washington law affords greater protection by providing that `[n]o incompetent person shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity continues.'" Fleming, 142 Wash.2d at 862, 16 P.3d 610 (alteration in original) (quoting RCW 10.77.050). "The failure to observe procedures adequate to protect this right is a denial of due process." State v. O'Neal, 23 Wash.App. 899, 901, 600 P.2d 570 (1979) (citing Drope, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966)). Chapter 10.77 RCW provides such a procedure. The "[p]rocedures of the competency statute ... are mandatory and not merely directory," Fleming, 142 Wash.2d at 863, 16 P.3d 610 (citing State v. Wicklund, 96 Wash.2d 798, 805, 638 P.2d 1241 (1982)), and failure to observe these procedures is a violation of due process. Id. (citing O'Neal, 23 Wash.App. at 901, 600 P.2d 570).

¶ 13 The record is clear that the procedures outlined in RCW 10.77.0602 were not fully followed in either of Heddrick's cases. Both trial judges ordered the issuance of reports from two qualified experts pursuant to RCW 10.77.060(1)(a), but never entered any WSH report into evidence as would be required under RCW 10.77.065(1)(a)(i). Further, Dr. White never memorialized his findings into a report for distribution to the parties and to the court. Instead, the trial court relied on counsel Lapps's stipulations as to Dr. White's opinion when it found Heddrick to be competent. On these facts alone, it would seem that Heddrick did not receive due process under the law.3

¶ 14 However, because Heddrick's counsel withdrew any challenge, the State contends he waived any unrealized statutory procedures. Decisions from the courts in this state reveal a distinction between the substance of competency, which cannot be waived, and the procedures used in its determination, which may be waived in certain circumstances. Compare Fleming, 142 Wash.2d at 864, 16 P.3d 610 ("incompetency cannot be waived"), with State v. Israel, 19 Wash.App. 773, 779, 577 P.2d 631 (1978) (procedures under chapter 10.77 RCW are not mandatory and may be waived by the defendant).4

¶ 15 In Fleming, this court suggested that the condition of competency may not be waived. 142 Wash.2d at 864, 16 P.3d 610. There, the State argued that an entry of an Alford5 plea constituted a waiver of competency. Id. This court rejected this argument, holding that "incompetency cannot be waived," and that "an incompetent person may not enter into any plea agreement." Id. The court found it "apparent" that a person found to be incompetent could not then be tried or enter into a plea agreement of any kind. Id. Underlying the court's concern was our traditional insistence that any waiver of a constitutional right be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Stegall, 124 Wash.2d 719, 724-25, 881 P.2d 979 (1994). It is axiomatic that a person incompetent to stand trial cannot affect a knowing or intelligent waiver. State v. Smith, 88 Wash.2d 639, 642, 564 P.2d 1154 (1977), overruled on other grounds by State v. Jones, 99 Wash.2d 735, 744, 664 P.2d 1216 (1983).

¶ 16 This court has stated that the statutory competency procedures are "mandatory and not merely directory." Wicklund, 96 Wash.2d at 805, 638 P.2d 1241. In Wicklund, the court cited to Israel without disapproving of its waiver provisions. Id. Rather, the court noted that waiver was not at issue in...

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