State v. Hutchison

• Citation: 721 N.W.2d 776
• Decision Date: 22 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-0561.,05-0561.
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Charlotte HUTCHISON, Frank Cordaro, Josh Plank, Rita Hohenshell, and Edward Bloomer, Appellants.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

721 N.W.2d 776

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Charlotte HUTCHISON, Frank Cordaro, Josh Plank, Rita Hohenshell, and Edward Bloomer, Appellants.

No. 05-0561.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

September 22, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Sally Frank, Drake Legal Clinic, Des Moines, for appellants.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel L. Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Justin Allen, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

TERNUS, Justice.

Appellants, Charlotte Hutchison, Frank Cordaro, Josh Plank, Rita Hohenshell, and Edward Bloomer, appeal their convictions for simple misdemeanor trespass. These convictions arose from the defendants' participation in a protest near N.W. 78th Avenue in Polk County in the vicinity of the STARC Armory. The defendants were arrested when they crossed a painted line within the boundary of land leased to the State of Iowa Army National Guard by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. Because this line was within the right of way for N.W. 78th Avenue, the defendants claimed they were on public land and therefore could not be charged with criminal trespass. The jury rejected this claim and convicted the defendants. On appeal, the defendants assert there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that they trespassed on private land. Because we find the evidence adequate to support the jury's verdict, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Sometime before November 16, 2003, the Iowa Army National Guard ("Guard") became aware that demonstrators planned an anti-war protest on property owned by the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") across the road — N.W. 78th Avenue — from a gate to the STARC Armory. Prior to the anticipated demonstration, Lt. Col. Matthew Pitstick, chief training site manager for the armory, used spray paint to mark the Guard's property line.

A lease introduced at trial showed the Guard had leased a parcel of land in the Saylorville Lake Flood Control Project from the Corps in 1989 for the purpose of constructing an armory. Included in the lease was a 2850 foot, federally owned strip of land called N.W. 78th Avenue, which connected Corps property near the Saylorville Dam and the armory to N.W. Beaver Drive. Under the terms of the lease, this roadway — N.W. 78th Avenue — was to be used for access to the Saylorville Lake Project, and the Guard agreed to "assume total responsibility for the operation, maintenance, repair and replacement" of the roadway, including "maintain[ing] the road in good condition and . . . preserv[ing] a smooth surface." The agreement specifies that the right of way for N.W. 78th Avenue extends fifty feet in each direction from the center of the roadway. The paved road itself is twenty-two feet wide. The line spray-painted by Lt. Col. Pitstick was forty-five feet from the center of the road.

On November 16, 2003, the defendants were members of a group that peaceably assembled on the Corps property across from the armory. The group was repeatedly informed by a Guard member that the Guard would not allow a public gathering on its property, that the painted line demarcated that property, and that crossing the line for such a gathering would result in arrest. Notwithstanding these admonitions, following a short statement, the defendants grasped hands and intentionally crossed the painted line. As warned, they were arrested and charged with criminal trespass, in violation of Iowa Code section 716.7(2)(b) (2003), a simple misdemeanor.

The cases against the defendants proceeded to a joint jury trial. At the conclusion of the State's evidence, the defendants moved for a judgment of acquittal, asserting the State had failed to establish the offense of trespass. They cited an Iowa Code provision that states a trespass cannot take place "upon the right-of-way of a public road or highway." Iowa Code § 716.7(4). The court denied the motion, and after evidence from the defendants, the case was submitted to the jury. The jury was instructed that the State had to prove the defendants "entered upon the property of the Iowa National Guard." They were also told that "[t]he term `trespass' does not mean the entering upon the right-of-way of a public road or highway." The jury returned verdicts finding each defendant guilty of simple misdemeanor trespass. The defendants were sentenced to time served, which amounted to one or two nights in jail for each defendant.

The defendants appealed their convictions to the district court. The issue, the district court noted, was whether N.W. 78th Avenue was a "public road" and therefore exempt from trespass. The defendants argued to the court that N.W. 78th Avenue was a public road under the doctrines of prescription or dedication. The court concluded the evidence was insufficient to establish a public road under either theory and so affirmed the jury's verdicts.

This court granted the defendants' petition for discretionary review. In this appeal, the defendants contend the State failed to present sufficient evidence that the roadway in question was a private road. They claim the evidence established that the road became a public roadway under the doctrines of prescription and dedication.¹

II. Scope and Standard of Review.

The defendants claim the trial court erred in refusing to grant their motion for judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence. See generally State v. Allen, 304 N.W.2d 203, 206 (Iowa 1981) ("A motion for judgment of acquittal is a means for challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction . . . ."). "If the jury's verdict is supported by substantial evidence, it is binding on the court." State v. Corsi, 686 N.W.2d 215, 218 (Iowa 2004). Therefore, our review is for correction of errors at law. Id.

In determining the correctness of a ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, we do not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass upon the credibility of witnesses, or weigh the evidence. See State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 28 (Iowa 2005). "[S]uch matters are for the jury." Id. Instead, we ascertain whether the evidence "`could convince a rational jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Corsi, 686 N.W.2d at 218 (citation omitted). Evidence that raises only a suspicion or generates only speculation is not substantial. Id. In evaluating the evidence, we consider all the evidence in the record, and we view it in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Id.

III. Pertinent Statutes.

The statute the defendants were found guilty of violating states that criminal trespass includes

[e]ntering . . . property without justification after being notified or requested to abstain from entering . . . by the owner, lessee, or person in lawful possession, or the agent or employee of the owner, lessee, or person in lawful possession . . . .

Iowa Code § 716.7(2)(b). Of particular significance to the present case, the statute further provides that "[t]he term `trespass' does not mean the entering upon the right-of-way of a public road or highway." Id. § 716.7(4).

The trespass statute does not define "a public road or highway." However Iowa Code chapter 306, entitled "Establishment, Alteration, and Vacation of Highways," offers guidance on the definition of roads and public road rights-of-way. See id. § 306.3 (stating listed definitions apply to chapter 306 and "any chapter of the Code relating to highways"); see also State v. Sims, 173 N.W.2d 127, 128 (Iowa 1969) (applying in criminal prosecution the predecessor definition of the terms now defined in section 306.3(8)). This statute provides the following definitions:

7. "Public road right-of-way" means an area of land, the right of possession of which is secured or reserved by the state or a governmental subdivision for roadway purposes. . . .

8. "Road" or "street" means the entire width between property lines through private property or the designated width through public property of every way or place of whatever nature if any part of such way or place is open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, for purposes of vehicular traffic.

Id. § 306.3(7), (8). Similarly, although not expressly applicable to the trespass statute, chapter 321, entitled "Motor Vehicles and Law of the Road," contains a definition of "private road." Id. § 321.1 (stating defined words have specified meanings "for the purpose of this chapter"). This provision states:

"Private road" or "driveway" means every way or place in private ownership and used for vehicular travel by the owner and those having express or implied permission from the owner but not by other persons.

Id. § 321.1(54).

IV. Discussion.

The element of the State's case challenged on appeal is the status of N.W. 78th Avenue as a private road. We think the evidence, while in some respects conflicting, was clearly sufficient to support the jury's finding that the road was private and not public.

A. Review of evidence. The lease between the Corps and the Guard supported the State's position that the road was owned by the Corps and leased to the Guard. This document also showed the Guard, not the county or state, was responsible for the maintenance of that portion of N.W. 78th Avenue passing through the leased land. Lt. Col. Pitstick's testimony affirmed these facts. Pitstick testified the Guard assumed responsibility for the road: the Guard filled potholes, cleared snow, removed road kill, and mowed the shoulders. He also testified the Guard has the authority to close the road, and did so during the 1993 floods. Although the Guard provides security on the roadway, it has entered into a 28E agreement with the Polk County sheriff's office for law enforcement on N.W. 78th Avenue.

The defendants rely on testimony of Teresa McDermott of the Polk County auditor's office, who testified N.W. 78th Avenue is designated on an aerial map in their office as a "right of way which is the public access or...