State v. James Michael Douglas

• Decision Date: 18 August 1999
• Docket Number: 99-LW-3403,9-99-11
• Citation: 1999 Ohio 842
• Parties: STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE v. JAMES MICHAEL DOUGLAS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT CASE NUMBER 9-99-11
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

1999-Ohio-842

STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE v. JAMES MICHAEL DOUGLAS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

No. 9-99-11

99-LW-3403 (3rd)

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District Marion

August 18, 1999

Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court.

DUSTIN REDMOND, Attorney at Law, Reg. #005642, 284 S. State Street Marion, OH 43302, For Appellant.

JIM SLAGLE, Prosecuting Attorney, Reg. #0032360, 133 1/2 E Center Street, Marion, OH 43302, For Appellee.

OPINION

BRYANT P. J.

This appeal is taken by defendant-appellant James Douglas from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Marion County.

On February 4, 1997, Douglas escaped from the Marion County Correctional Institution, where he was serving a 15 year to life sentence for murder. Douglas was arrested in Florida on May 17, 1997. Douglas was indicted by a grand jury in Ohio on the charge of escape and after extradition to Ohio, on October 19, 1998 Douglas entered a no-contest plea to the charge of escape. On January 7, 1999, Douglas was sentenced to serve a term of four years in prison to run consecutive to the underlying prison term. On appeal from that sentence Douglas makes the following assignments of error :

1. Appellants(sic) plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, nor intelligently entered. Said plea was made under duress of threats, coercion, and a misunderstanding of the state's sentencing recommendation.

2. The trial court erred in the prejudice of the appellant in denying appellant's summons for witnesses, therefore denying appellant the valid necessary defense of duress thus depriving defendants right to a fair trial, right to call witnesses and the right to an affirmative defense, and the right to review of mitigating circumstances.

3. Defendant was deprived the effective assistance of counsel as so guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and Article One Section 10, of the Ohio Constitution.

4. The States use of false, and misleading evidence, denied the trial court proper consideration to all the facts necessary for sentencing.

5. Defendant-appellant was heavily medicated with mind-altering drugs at the time of his plea. Drugs that affected his judgment and decision-making. Thus his plea was not knowing, nor voluntarily entered.

Douglas states initially that the plea he entered was not voluntary, knowledgeable nor intelligently entered because he misunderstood the state's sentencing recommendation and was subjected to duress and coercion. In order to be constitutionally valid, a plea of no-contest must be entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. These requirements are set out in Crim. Rule 11(C). If the defendant does not knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently enter his plea, or does not know the consequences of the entry of his plea it is considered a violation of due process and the entry of plea is invalid under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution. See Kercheval v. U.S. (1927). 274 U.S. 220, 223; Mabry v. Johnson (1984), 467 U.S. 504, 508-09; Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238; State v. Kelley (1991), 57 Ohio St. 3d 127; State v. Engle (1996), 74 Ohio St. 3d 525; Crim.R.11(C).

A plea of no contest is not an admission of guilt but of the truth of the charge alleged in the indictment or information. Before accepting the plea of no contest, the trial judge under Crim.Rule 11(C) must address the defendant personally and determine : first, the plea is voluntary, second, that the defendant understands the charges and the maximum penalty involved, third, that the defendant understands that upon entry of that plea the court will enter judgment and sentence and, finally, that the defendant is aware of the fact that that he is waiving his trial rights including the right to a trial by jury, the right to confront witnesses, proof by the state of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right against self-incrimination.

The Record discloses that the court addressed Douglas personally, that Douglas was asked about his knowledge and understanding of the plea of no contest to which inquiry he acknowledged that he was fully aware of the recommendation of the State and that he had plenty of time to talk with his attorney about the plea. The trial court informed Douglas of the minimum and maximum penalty that must be imposed for escape. Douglas was informed that he did not have to plead no contest and that if he wanted to do so the court would go forward with trial. Douglas declined. The court subsequently informed him of the trial rights he would be waiving including the right to a trial by jury, to confront witnesses, to present evidence, to have the case proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, to remain silent and to appeal the conviction. The record discloses that the plea of no contest entered by Douglas was entered after the court fully complied with Crim. Rule 11(C).

Douglas contends that his plea was not voluntary because he misunderstood the prosecutor's intended recommendation. Specifically he claims that in pre-trial negotiations the State offered him a three year term but that at the sentencing hearing the State recommended a five year term. The record contradicts this claim inasmuch as it shows that when questioned by the court at the plea proceedings as to the status or substance of any plea negotiations between the State and Douglas the State responded that there were no negotiations or agreements. Although present, Douglas did not challenge those representations. Moreover, the Prosecutor clearly stated that if Douglas did not plead guilty but instead plead no contest, that fact would affect the State's recommendation made at sentencing, contingent upon Douglas' acknowledgement or failure to acknowledge guilt. ...