State v. Jamison
Decision Date | 07 April 1952 |
Docket Number | No. 16615,16615 |
Citation | 70 S.E.2d 342,221 S.C. 312 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE v. JAMISON. |
Cassandra E. Maxwell, Orangeburg, Harold R. Boulware, Lincoln C. Jenkins, Jr., Columbia, for appellant.
Julian S. Wolfe, Sol., Hydrick & Hydrick, Orangeburg, for respondent.
Appellant was convicted of the charge of murder, with the jury recommending mercy, at the May, 1952, term of the Court of General Sessions for Orangeburg County. Before sentence was passed, appellant moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence did not justify the verdict of the jury, but on the other hand proved the killing accidental. This motion was refused and the appellant was sentenced to serve life imprisonment in the State Penitentiary.
This case was tried on the theory, as stated in the motion for a new trial, that the killing was accidental. However, the position is taken in the appeal now before this Court that such killing was justified in that appellant was acting in defense of his home. To dispose of this question it is necessary to refer to the testimony. Appellant stated that on the night in question, March 18th, he, William Berry (the deceased), his brother, Andrew Berry, Annie Jamison, mother of the appellant, and Zilla Mae McCray, went to a barbecue near the town of Bowman, South Carolina, where they spent several hours eating barbecue and drinking whiskey. After leaving, they proceeded to another place where the party was continued. Leaving there, they drove to the rear of appellant's home, arriving at approximately 5 A.M. The testimony of various witnesses as to what took place thereafter cannot be reconciled. However, appellant himself states that upon arriving at his home his mother inquired of the driver of the car, William Berry, how much she owed him and he stated, "there is more than one way to pay, pay with more than money," that she and the deceased proceeded into the house, he remaining in the car approximately twenty minutes before entering, and stated, Later in his testimony, he stated, Later on he testified that he saw the deceased lying on the ground and imagined he was dead and went across the highway to Frances Folk's house to tell them that he believed he had shot a man and stated, "I ain't going to let nobody go in my house, not going to let nobody run over us." Still later he testified that he went around to the back of the house because He further stated that he had not killed the deceased because he had taken money from his mother's pocketbook and that the deceased had not harmed him in any way, that he at that time did not know that William was shot and did not intend to shoot him. On cross-examination he was asked the question "Didn't you ask this man out of your yard?" to which he stated, "No, sir, I did not." Upon being further queried- about his stating that the deceased struck him, the following appears in the record:
Other witnesses testified to the effect that appellant followed his mother and the deceased into the house almost immediately, that the deceased had left the house by way of the front door and was seventy feet from the steps when shot at close range with a shot gun, so close in fact that the wound was two inches in diameter with no shot scattered around, the load entering the center of the chest in bulk. The doctor testified that in his opinion the deceased died immediately where he fell as there was considerable blood there and none any other place. There is testimony also that immediately after the shot was fired in the front of the house, which killed William Berry, appellant attempted to kill his brother, Andrew Berry, who was still sitting in the car at the rear of the house, stating "I done got one and I will get the other one," but was prevented from doing so by having the gun taken away from him. One of the arresting officers stated that he reached the scene at approximately 7:30 A.M. and found the body lying seventy feet from the front steps with an empty shell fifteen feet from the body, that he arrested appellant and while in the car he stated After being placed in jail, he made another statement the next day, but at no time made any different statement until the time of trial.
It must be kept in mind that on appeal from refusal of the trial court to direct a verdict or grant a motion for a new trial, the evidence and the inferences which may be reasonably drawn therefrom must be considered in the light most favorable to the State and if there be any evidence tending to prove the fact in issue or which reasonably conduces its conclusion as a fairly logical and legitimate deduction and not merely necessary a suspicion or conjecture in regard to it, the case should be submitted to the jury. State v. Brown, 205 S.C. 514, 32 S.E.2d 825; State v. Turner, 117 S.C. 470, 109 S.E. 119; State v. Quinn, 111 S.C. 174, 97 S.E. 62, 3 A.L.R. 1500; State v. Roddey, 126 S.C. 499, 120 S.E. 359; State v. Walker, 138 S.C. 293, 136 S.E. 215; State v. Epes, 209 S.C. 246, 39 S.E.2d 769.
The granting or refusal of a motion for a new trial is within the discretion of the Trial Judge and unless he commits an abuse of discretion, this Court is powerless to interfere. State v. Johnson, 213 S.C. 241, 49 S.E.2d 6.
We are of the opinion that the testimony, heretofore referred to, was sufficient to require the case being submitted to the jury and that there was no error in refusing appellant's motion for a new trial.
Appellant contends further that the State erred in...
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