State v. Jay

• Decision Date: 10 April 1902
• Citation: 89 N.W. 1070,116 Iowa 264
• Parties: STATE v. JAY.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

116 Iowa 264

89 N.W. 1070

STATE

v.JAY.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 10, 1902.

Appeal from district court, Boone county; J. R. Whitaker, Judge.

The defendant, being accused and convicted of the larceny of a mare, appeals. Reversed.Ganoe & Hollingsworth, for appellant.

Chas. W. Mullan, Atty. Gen., and Chas. A. Van Vleck, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

LADD, C. J.

In the course of the trial, George Keenhold was called as witness, and testified that as special deputy sheriff he arrested the defendant, and, being asked what was said by the latter, was first cross–examined as to the competency of any statements made by counsel for the defendant, as follows: “Q. You told him if he would tell where she was it would go easier with him, did you? A. I might have told him it would be better for him. The mare he had taken had been traded, and he wanted to tell where she was. After I asked him some statements, he said he would tell where the mare was. Q. That is, you asked him questions, as the testimony here shows, of Mr. Garner, that if he would tell this it would be easier for him? A. Perhaps I told him something like that; yes. Q. Didn't you, Mr. Keenhold, in fact tell him that before Garner came up? A. Yes, sir; perhaps I did. Q. And, when you told him it would go easier for him if he would tell about it, then he told you before Garner came up about the horse? A. He told me; yes. He told me where he had traded the horse, and where he could probably find her.” Direct examination continued: “When we were out at the well I told him I had a warrant for his arrest. He asked what for, and I told him. I asked him where the horse was. He said he wanted to do what was right, and I told him it would be much easier for him before a court or jury.” Over the objection of the defendant, the witness was allowed to testify that the accused then stated that he had taken the mare alleged to have been stolen from the pasture of its owner, and exchanged her with some horse traders on the way to Ames, and pointed out the horse in the road as one he had received, and that the mare traded would likely be found with said traders between Ames and Nevada.

It is insisted that this testimony of defendant's statements was incompetent, because these were induced by the promise or hope held out by Keenhold. It is elementary law that such statements must be entirely free and voluntary; that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor any direct or implied promises, however slight, in order to be admissible. It is not important to determine whether they amounted to a confession of guilt, or merely a declaration of facts tending to show guilt, for, as said in Greenleaf on Evidence, “the law excludes not only direct confessions, but any other declaration tending to implicate a prisoner in the crime charged, even though in terms it is an accusation of another or a refusal to confess.” The evidence leaves no doubt but that the officer, before anything was said by Jay, assured him that it would go easier with him if he would tell where the mare, alleged to have been stolen, was, and we have only to determine whether this was sufficient inducement to justify the exclusion of the evidence. In 3 Russ. Crimes (6th Ed.) p. 478, it is said: “The law cannot measure the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of influence has been exerted.” This rule is fully recognized in State v. Storms (Iowa) 85 N. W. 610, and State v. Novak (Iowa) 79 N. W. 465. See, also, Bram v. U. S., 168 U. S. 532, 18 Sup. Ct. 183, 42 L. Ed. 568;State v. Chambers, 39 Iowa, 179. What was said by the officer flattered the hope of the defendant, and was certainly in the nature of an inducement to speak. It was equivalent to saying that it would be better for him if he would disclose the locality of the mare alleged to have been stolen. Many decisions are referred to in Bram's Case where statements made by the prisoner were held inadmissible because of the language set out. Thus, in Rex v. Griffin, Russ. & R. 151, telling the prisoner that it would be better for him to confess; in Reg. v. Garner, 1 Den. Crown Cas. 329, saying, “It will be better for you to...