State v. Jefferson
Decision Date | 07 March 2017 |
Docket Number | No. COA16-745,COA16-745 |
Citation | 798 S.E.2d 121,252 N.C.App. 174 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Shymel D. JEFFERSON, Defendant. |
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Jonathan P. Babb, for the State.
The Phillips Black Project, by John R. Mills, for Defendant-appellant.
Shymel D. Jefferson ("Defendant") appeals his sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after a term of twenty-five years, alleging the statute mandating his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution pursuant to Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). After review, we disagree.
On 25 January 2010, Defendant—then fifteen years old—was charged by petition with first-degree murder in Rockingham County Juvenile Court. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2200, which requires the juvenile court to transfer any defendant accused of a Class A felony to superior court, the case was transferred to Rockingham County Superior Court. On 8 February 2010, Defendant was indicted for the first-degree murder of Timothy Seay. The case was brought to trial on 29 May 2012. This Court summarized the facts as presented at trial in State v. Jefferson , No. 13-668, 232 N.C.App. 690, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 256 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2014) (unpublished).
by gunshots to the wrist and leg, respectively. Seay was killed by a gunshot wound to the head and was also shot one time in the chest, with the bullet getting lodged in his shoulder. Police later recovered two types of shell casings from the scene—.40 caliber and .380. Expert testimony established that the nine .380 casings found at the scene and the bullet in Seay's shoulder were fired from defendant's gun.
Jefferson , 2014 WL 859345 at *1-2, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 256 at *2-3. At trial, the medical examiner testified Seay was killed by the gunshot wound
to his head, which involved a larger caliber bullet than the gunshot wound to his chest. The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule. On 8 June 2012, under then-applicable state law, the trial court sentenced Defendant to a mandatory term of life without the possibility of parole.
During the pendency of Defendant's appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama , holding "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ " 567 U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2460, 183 L.Ed.2d at 414-15. In response, the General Assembly enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19B, which provided, inter alia , the sentence for a defendant found guilty of first-degree murder solely under the felony murder rule shall be life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19B(a)(1) (2015). Jefferson , 2014 WL 859345 at *2-3, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 256 at *6-7. A defendant sentenced under this act must serve a minimum of twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19A (2015).
As a result, this Court overturned Defendant's sentence on appeal and remanded to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to § 15A-1340.19B. Jefferson , 2014 WL 859345 at *2-3, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 256 at *6-7. On 29 February 2016, the trial court held resentencing proceedings, and imposed a sentence of life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years. Defendant entered notice of appeal in open court.
Defendant appeals a final judgment of the superior court. As such, his appeal is proper pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b) and 15A-1444(a)(1) (2015).
"When constitutional rights are implicated, the appropriate standard of review is de novo."
In re Adoption of S.D.W. , 367 N.C. 386, 391, 758 S.E.2d 374, 378 (2014) (citation omitted). When mounting a facial constitutional challenge1 , "[a] party must show that there are no circumstances under which the statute might be constitutional." Beaufort County Bd. of Educ. v. Beaufort County Bd. of Comm'rs , 363 N.C. 500, 502, 681 S.E.2d 278, 280 (2009). "[T]he presumption is that any act passed by the legislature is constitutional, and the court will not strike it down if [it] can be upheld on any reasonable ground." State v. Bryant , 359 N.C. 554, 564, 614 S.E.2d 479, 486 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
Defendant challenges the constitutionality of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19B(a)(1), contending the statute failed to provide the trial court with the discretion to consider mitigating factors and render an individualized sentence, as required by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama . Because the Supreme Court has not indicated the individualized sentencing required in Miller extends to sentences beyond life without parole, we must presume the statute is constitutional, and defer to the legislature.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments" on criminal defendants. U.S. Const. amend VIII. Central to any analysis of the Eighth Amendment is the concept of proportionality. The United States Supreme Court has held the right against cruel and unusual punishment "flows from the basic precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to both the offender and the offense." Miller , 567 U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2462, 183 L.Ed.2d at 417 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Applying this basic principle, the United States Supreme Court has issued three recent decisions limiting the State's ability to apply its "most severe penalties" to defendants who were less than eighteen years old when they committed their offenses. Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2466, 183 L.Ed.2d at 421.
First, in Roper v. Simmons , the Court considered "whether it is permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States to execute a juvenile offender who was older than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a capital crime." 543 U.S. 551, 555-56, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1187, 161 L.Ed.2d 1, 13 (2005). Because juveniles tend to display a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," are vulnerable to "negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure," and generally possess a character that is "not as well formed" as an adult's, the Court concluded juvenile offenders may not reliably "be classified among the worst offenders." Id. at 569, 125 S.Ct. at 1195, 161 L.Ed.2d at 21-22. Moreover, these same characteristics vitiate the penological justifications for the death penalty. Id. at 571, 125 S.Ct. at 1196, 161 L.Ed.2d at 23. Because they lack self-control and rational cost-benefit thinking, juveniles are less likely to respond to the death penalty as a deterrent, and are less likely to be fully culpable for their actions. Id. As a result, Roper categorically barred the application of capital punishment to juvenile defendants. Id. at 578, 125 S.Ct. at 1200, 161 L.Ed.2d at 28.
Next, in Graham v. Florida , the Court went further, barring the sentencing of juveniles to life without parole for non-homicide crimes. 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). While maintaining that a death sentence is "unique in its severity and irrevocability," the Court held it shared characteristics with a sentence of life without parole in that "[i]t deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence." Graham , 560 U.S. at 69-70, 130 S.Ct. at 2027, 176 L.Ed.2d at 842 (internal citation omitted). Again focusing on the ramifications of immaturity on the penological rationale for giving the harshest sentences to juvenile offenders, the Court established another categorical rule, prohibiting "the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide." Id. at 82, 130 S.Ct. at 2034, 176 L.Ed.2d at 850.
Finally, in Miller v. Alabama , the Court contemplated whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide. 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). Here, the Court synthesized its holdings in Roper and Graham to again institute a categorical bar. The Court trod more explicitly on the...
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