State v. Jeffries, 6576-6-III

• Decision Date: 12 November 1985
• Docket Number: No. 6576-6-III,6576-6-III
• Citation: 42 Wn.App. 142,709 P.2d 819
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Kim Michael JEFFRIES, Appellant. . Panel 3
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 142

42 Wn.App. 142

709 P.2d 819

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Kim Michael JEFFRIES, Appellant.

No. 6576-6-III.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3 Panel 3.

Nov. 12, 1985.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 19, 1985.

Review Denied Feb. 21, 1986.

William J. Monnette, Young, Monnette & Vandegrift, Wenatchee, for appellant.

Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Dorothy Bullitt, Linda McQuaid, Asst. Attys. Gen., Pamela A. Morse, Rule 9, Legal Intern., Seattle, for respondent.

McINTURFF, Acting Chief Justice.

Kim Michael Jeffries appeals an order which directs him to pay restitution of $18,514.19 to the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries (Department). We affirm.

Mr. Jeffries was sentenced for second degree assault on December 13, 1983. He was given a 4-year suspended sentence pursuant to RCW 9.92.060 on the condition, inter alia, he serve 120 days in jail and pay restitution according to an order to be filed after a hearing.

The restitution hearing was held on May 8, 1984. By stipulation, a letter from the Department was admitted into evidence. The letter stated that the Department had paid the assault victim, Kenneth Nolte, $18,514.19 as the innocent victim of a crime. RCW 7.68.010, et seq. $14,000 was paid for the victim's disability resulting from the loss of an eye, and the other $4,514.19 was for medical bills and related expenses.

Mr. Jeffries testified that while on work release for the last 60 days of his jail sentence, he had started his own auto body repair business. His anticipated monthly expenses were estimated at $635. His other accrued long term debt was approximately $5,700 at the time of the hearing. Mr. Jeffries testified that by operating his own auto body business, he could earn as much or more as he could by working for another shop. He further indicated his assets were $2,000 in shop tools and a 1964 automobile.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered an order of restitution which modified the judgment and sentence to require Mr. Jeffries to pay $18,514.19 as restitution to the crime victims section of the Department. The order also extended the probationary period to 10 years to allow complete payment of the restitution.

Mr. Jeffries appeals, contending: (1) the Superior Court is without statutory authority to order restitution to the Department as a condition of the suspended sentence, and (2) the court abused its discretion by ordering the payment of the entire $18,514.19 in light of his ability to pay.

First, Mr. Jeffries contends the court exceeded its authority by ordering restitution be paid to the Department, citing State v. Theroff, 33 Wash.App. 741, 657 P.2d 800, review denied, 99 Wash.2d 1015 (1983), and RCW 9.92.060. We disagree.

The order requiring Mr. Jeffries to reimburse the Department does not conflict with our holding in Theroff. There, we reversed a probation order requiring Mr. Theroff to pay $10,000 to a third party charity because we held the charity suffered no loss or damage from the crime, and the trial court had thus exceeded its statutory authority.

Unlike the third party charity in Theroff, the Department has suffered a genuine loss as a result of the payment to Mr. Nolte. The Department's loss in this case is analogous to that in State v. Barnett, 36 Wash.App. 560, 675 P.2d 626, review denied, 101 Wash.2d 1011 (1984), where the court held that an insurance company which compensated the victim for losses from the criminal actions of Mr. Barnett was entitled to recover those losses as restitution.

Mr. Jeffries argues the Department is not a "person" within the meaning of the restitution statute, RCW 9.92.060. ¹

RCW 1.16.080 defines "person" for purposes of the entire code. Clearly, the term person may include the State or any of the State's agencies, including the Department herein. Liquor Control Board v. Personnel Board, 88 Wash.2d 368, 374, 561 P.2d 195 (1977); Loger v. Washington Timber Prods., Inc., 8 Wash.App. 921, 928, 509 P.2d 1009, review denied, 82 Wash.2d 1011 (1973).

Nor is the restitution statute, RCW 9.92.060, in conflict with the innocent victims statute, RCW 7.68.120, ² as Mr Jeffries contends.

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that where two or more legislative enactments relate to the same subject matter, and are not in actual conflict, they should be interpreted to give meaning and effect to all the separate statutes. State v. Zornes, 78 Wash.2d 9, 475 P.2d 109 (1970). Another rule of statutory construction is that where more than one statute has been enacted by the same legislative authority, relating to the same subject matter, the entire sequence of the statutes enacted should be considered in placing a judicial construction upon any one of the statutes. In re Marriage of Little, 96 Wash.2d 183, 634 P.2d 498 (1981).

Applying these rules to RCW 1.16.080, RCW 7.68.120, and RCW 9.92.060, we conclude the Legislature intended the Department to be a "person" entitled to benefits from a restitution in a criminal case fixing the actual amount to be paid back to the Department. The court had the authority and jurisdiction to enter the order of restitution challenged herein.

Lastly, Mr. Jeffries contends that even if the court had the authority to order restitution be paid to the Department, the court, nevertheless, abused its discretion by ordering the entire $18,514.19 be paid...