State v. Jennings, 01-0507-CR.

• Decision Date: 05 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-0507-CR.,01-0507-CR.
• Citation: 259 Wis.2d 523,2003 WI 10,657 N.W.2d 393
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Kevin D. JENNINGS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

259 Wis.2d 523

2003 WI 10

657 N.W.2d 393

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Kevin D. JENNINGS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 01-0507-CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral argument October 15, 2002.

Decided March 5, 2003.

For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause was argued by James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general.

For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Stephen M. Compton, and Steven M. Compton, S.C., Delavan, and oral argument by Stephen M. Compton.

¶ 1. WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.

The State of Wisconsin (State) petitions this court to review a decision of the court of appeals that reversed the conviction of Kevin D. Jennings (Jennings).¹ At issue is whether a criminal complaint that is filed against a defendant, who is already incarcerated, is sufficient to commence a prosecution. Based on the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) (1999-2000)² and related criminal statutes that deal with the commencement of criminal prosecutions and warrantless arrests, we conclude that if an individual, like Jennings, is already in custody due to incarceration, a complaint is sufficient to commence a prosecution.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On December 4, 1998, Jennings was charged with one count of second-degree sexual assault in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) (1991-1992). According to the complaint, on December 5, 1992, Jennings allegedly accosted a Milwaukee woman, M.K., outside her home and forced her to engage in nonconsensual intercourse. M.K. reported the incident and was taken to the Sexual Assault Treatment Center, where vaginal swabs were taken.

¶ 3. Jennings was identified as the suspected assailant on December 1, 1998, when the State Crime Lab had a "cold hit" in its DNA database that matched Jennings' DNA to that of M.K.'s assailant. Jennings' DNA profile had been entered into the Crime Lab's databank on July 28, 1997, from Buccal swabs taken from Jennings in November 1994 when he was incarcerated at the Dodge Correctional Institution for conviction on another charge. ¶ 4. On December 3, 1998, two Milwaukee Police Detectives visited the Columbia Correctional Institution (Columbia), where Jennings was incarcerated for an unrelated crime, to inform Jennings of the DNA match and to question him about the sexual assault of M.K. Jennings was given a Miranda warning, which he waived, and he spoke with the detectives for approximately two hours regarding the sexual assault of M.K.

¶ 5. The next day, on December 4, 1998, the Milwaukee County District Attorney's office filed a criminal complaint alleging that Jennings had committed second-degree sexual assault on December 5, 1992, by forcing M.K. to engage in nonconsensual penis-to-vagina intercourse. The district attorney's office also obtained an order to produce that directed the superintendent of Columbia to make Jennings available to the sheriff of Milwaukee County at 8:30 a.m. on December 5, 1998, for an initial court appearance.

¶ 6. Apparently Jennings arrived too late to make the court appearance on December 5th, so his initial appearance before a court commissioner was on December 6, 1998. The court commissioner found probable cause based on the complaint and Jennings made a jurisdictional objection that the six-year statute of limitations had expired under Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) (1997-1998).³ Jennings argued that a prosecution had not commenced within the six-year statute of limitations because no warrant or summons had been issued, no indictment found, or information filed, as of December 5, 1998 — six years after the sexual assault of M.K. On December 14, 1998, the district attorney's office filed a criminal information alleging one count of second-degree sexual assault. Jennings waived his right to a preliminary hearing and entered a plea of not guilty.

¶ 7. On December 30, 1998, Jennings filed a motion to dismiss the sexual assault charge with prejudice, claiming that the six-year statute of limitations had expired. The circuit court denied Jennings' motion, concluding that in this case, the order to produce was the equivalent of a warrant or summons and that this was the best mechanism under the circumstances to bring Jennings before the court.

¶ 8. On June 21, 2000, the district attorney filed an amended information reducing the charge to third-degree sexual assault, to which Jennings pled no contest. In the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Judge Daniel L. Konkol sentenced Jennings to a five-year prison term to be served consecutively to the sentence Jennings was then serving. Despite entering a nocontest plea, Jennings reserved the right to challenge whether the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over him based on the alleged expiration of the six-year statute of limitations.

¶ 9. Jennings moved for post-conviction relief on January 29, 2001, challenging the judgment of conviction and the sentence on the grounds that the circuit court did not have personal jurisdiction over him because the statute of limitations had expired. Jennings' motion was denied, and he appealed the decision.

¶ 10. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the circuit court did not have personal jurisdiction over Jennings because the statute of limitations had expired on the sexual assault charge. The court of appeals determined that Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) is ambiguous in light of other criminal statutes that discuss the commencement of a criminal prosecution, but concluded that neither a complaint nor an order to produce can substitute for the requirement of a warrant or summons under § 939.74(1). The State petitioned this court for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

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¶ 11. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that this court reviews de novo. State v. Busch, 217 Wis. 2d 429, 441, 576 N.W.2d 904 (1998). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to discern the legislature's intent. Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, 219 Wis. 2d 250, 271, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998). A "`literal reading of a statute may be rejected if it would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result that does not reflect the legislature's intent.'" State ex rel. Szymanski v. Gamble, 2001 WI App 118, ¶ 12, 244 Wis. 2d 272, 630 N.W.2d 570 (quoting Logterman v. Dawson, 190 Wis. 2d 90, 104, 526 N.W.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1994)). This court has determined that "[w]hen a literal interpretation produces absurd or unreasonable results, or results that are clearly at odds with the legislature's intent, `[o]ur task is to give some alternative meaning' to the words." Alberte v. Anew Health Care Serv., Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶ 10, 232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515 (quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).

III. ANALYSIS

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¶ 12. The court of appeals agreed with the State that Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) is rendered ambiguous in light of the language in Wis. Stat. §§ 967.05(1) and 968.02(2), which both provide that a criminal complaint may commence a prosecution.⁴ "Where statutes on the same subject conflict or are inconsistent, [the] court must make every effort to harmonize them in order to give effect to the purpose of each statute." City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 185 Wis. 2d 499, 513, 517 N.W.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1994), aff'd, 193 Wis. 2d 168, 532 N.W.2d 690 (1995).

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¶ 13. In order to harmonize Wis. Stat. §§ 939.74(1), 967.05(1), and 968.02(2), the State essentially argues that the filing of a criminal complaint should satisfy the "warrant" requirement under § 939.74(1). Alternatively, the State claims that the issuance of an order to produce should be sufficient to satisfy the "summons" requirement under § 939.74(1). We first address whether the filing of a criminal complaint satisfies the "warrant" requirement under § 939.74(1) and is therefore sufficient to commence a prosecution for the six-year statute of limitations. Because we conclude it does, we do not address the State's alternative argument.

¶ 14. We agree with the State and the court of appeals that Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) is ambiguous when read in conjunction with Wis. Stat. §§ 967.05(1) and 968.02(2); therefore, we look to extrinsic sources to determine the legislature's intent. In order to ascertain the legislature's intent regarding the tolling period for the criminal statute of limitations under § 939.74(1), we examine sources such as: (1) the legislative history of § 939.74(1); (2) related criminal statutes that deal with the commencement of criminal prosecutions and warrantless arrests; and (3) case law regarding the sufficiency of a complaint for obtaining personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

A. Legislative History of Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1)

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¶ 15. The criminal statute of limitations is a well-recognized tenet of criminal procedure that serves important purposes. According to this court:

The criminal statutes of limitations serve a number of functions but the primary purpose is to protect the accused from having to defend himself against charges of remote misconduct. A corollary purpose is to ensure that criminal prosecutions will be based on evidence that is of recent origin. It also assures that law enforcement officials will act promptly to investigate and prosecute criminal activity. This helps to preserve the integrity of the decision-making process in the trial of criminal cases.

John v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 183, 194, 291 N.W.2d 502

(1980). This court has stated that compliance with the criminal statute of limitations is required for personal jurisdiction. State v. Pohlhammer, 78 Wis. 2d 516, 523, 254 N.W.2d 478 (1977). Nevertheless, this court has also recognized that the protection provided by the criminal statute of limitations, which "is subject to the control of the legislature, is not a fundamental right." State v. Sher, 149 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 437 N.W.2d 878 (1989) (emphasis added).

¶ 16. The...