State v. Johannes
| Decision Date | 15 March 1935 |
| Docket Number | No. 30159.,30159. |
| Citation | 194 Minn. 10,259 N.W. 537 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. PAVLIK v. JOHANNES, Chief of Police. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; A. W. Selover, Judge.
Habeas corpus proceeding by the State, on the relation of Joe J. Pavlik, against Michael J. Johannes, Chief of Police of the City of Minneapolis. From an order for relator's release from custody, defendant appeals.
Relator discharged.
R. S. Wiggin, City Atty., and John F. Bonner, Asst. City Atty., both of Minneapolis, for appellant.
M. H. Strothman, Jr., of Minneapolis, for respondent.
This appeal involves the constitutionality of section 11 of an ordinance passed by the city council of Minneapolis on March 9, 1934. This section of the ordinance provides: "No such establishment, barber shop or barber school licensed hereunder shall be kept open for business before the hour of 8:00 a. m. or after the hour of 6:30 p. m. of any day except that on Saturdays and days preceding legal holidays, as defined by the statutes of Minnesota, such places may remain open for business until the hour of 8:00 p. m."
Relator operated a barber shop in Minneapolis and was arrested for failure to observe the closing hour therein prescribed.
Upon his arrest, relator obtained a writ of habeas corpus, and, after a return was filed by respondent, a hearing was had thereon. Relator contends that the act is repugnant to the State and Federal Constitutions (Const. Minn. art. 1, § 7; Const. U. S. Amend. 14) and is not a proper exercise of the police power; is arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasonable, and demonstrably irrelevant to any proper legislative object, and consequently that it deprives him of his liberty and of his property without due process of law. After hearing, the court ordered that relator be released from custody, and from that order this appeal is taken.
A long line of decisions emanating from the Supreme Court of the United States state and restate the doctrine upon which the police power of the states is founded. That doctrine, too well settled to admit of doubt, is that the police power of a state may be invoked to regulate private enterprise whenever the general welfare of the people is to be furthered or protected, and the Legislature has a large discretion to determine, not only what the best interests of the public require, but the manner in which such interests may best be protected. A few examples of the wide scope of subjects upon which the police power has been exercised and subjected to regulatory legislation may be found in the following cases: Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 526, 37 S. Ct. 190, 61 L. Ed. 472, L. R. A. 1918A, 136, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 594 (billboards); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385 (fisheries); Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 27 S. Ct. 289, 51 L. Ed. 499 (grazing of sheep); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 S. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923; and Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 5 S. Ct. 730, 28 L. Ed. 1145 (). As was said in People v. Coulides, 148 Misc. 292, 265 N. Y. S. 765, 770: "Neither is police power limited entirely to regulations designed to promote public health, public morals, or public safety, or to the suppression of what is offensive, but extends to so dealing with conditions that exist as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people."
It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that every holder of property, no matter how absolute his title, holds it subject to the police power of the state. The police power embraces all regulation that seeks to preserve order, safety to its citizens, and the general welfare. Persons and property are subject to restraints and burdens which the Legislature may impose upon them in furtherance of the common good, and, although the exercise of the power may cause great inconvenience to an individual or group of individuals and may curtail the use or depreciate the value of property, if the measure tends to accomplish the purpose of its enactment and does not unreasonably exceed the needs of the occasion, is not arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious, it is a valid exercise of the police power. On the other hand the United States Supreme Court has held that every state power is limited by the inhibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 38 S. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149, L. R. A. 1918C, 210, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1201. Speaking of the right of regulation under the police power, this court in State ex rel. Wilcox v. Ryder, 126 Minn. 95, 147 N. W. 953, 958, 5 A. L. R. 1449, said "The measure must, on the one hand, tend to accomplish the purpose of its adoption, and, on the other, must not go beyond the reasonable demands of the occasion."
In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 1045, 29 A. L. R. 1446, the Supreme Court, speaking of the requirement of due process, said: "Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to * * * engage in any of the common occupations of life, * * * and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." (citing numerous cases) and further:
Appellant contends, however, that since the recent case of Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 510, 78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A. L. R. 1469, the courts no longer have a right to inquire into the reasonableness of a legislative enactment and that there is no limit to the power of the Legislature to regulate business. Such a contention, if upheld, would necessitate discarding the principles set forth above, exalt the police power above all constitutional restraints, relegate the judicial branch to a position entirely subordinate to the legislative will, and ultimately put an end to American constitutional government. A careful study of the case warrants no such conclusion.
The Nebbia Case arose under a legislative enactment of the state of New York which resulted in a fixed price for the retailing of milk. Nebbia was arrested for violation of the act and questioned its validity. The Supreme Court held the act to be constitutional and not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The holding amounts substantially to this: That a legislative act which results in "price fixing" is not, under the peculiar circumstances surrounding the milk industry in New York, unconstitutional, and is a valid exercise of the police power of that state. The result, although a departure from the usual field of legislative intervention, does not, however, as contended, limit the court's power to inquire into the reasonableness of a legislative act or, in our opinion, announce a new yardstick with which to measure the extent of the police power. It recognizes that in the normal situation the use of property and the making of contracts are matters of private concern and that governmental interference must not offend the due process clause.
The opinion sets out the history of the legislation there in question. The conclusions of an investigating committee were to the effect that milk was an essential food commodity; that it was necessary that it be clean and fit for consumption, and that certain safeguards were necessary to its production and handling for consumption, which greatly increased the cost of production and marketing; that the general price decline and other causes for low prices of milk had tended to the sacrifice of cleanliness and speed of delivery, which had a detrimental effect upon the commodity and tended to lessen its fitness for human consumption. To curtail these abuses and their resulting detrimental effect upon the public welfare of the people of New York, the Legislature enacted a statute which resulted in a minimum price being fixed for milk offered for sale at retail. It seems to us that the decision might well, under the results of this investigation, have been placed squarely on the ground that the law was a public health measure. As we read the decision, it is based on the generally accepted principles underlying the state's power to regulate business under its police power. The rules we have set forth above are substantially stated in the opinion, and the court, it seems, took every precaution to restate the fundamental law before holding that the object of the statute was a proper subject for the exercise of the police power. That there was no attempt to change the existing interpretation of the requirements of due process is apparent from the language of the opinion:
And it is also apparent that the court did not intend to relinquish its right to inquire into the validity of legislation of this kind when it said: "And the function of courts in the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or...
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