State v. John (2012-10) Doe
Decision Date | 10 February 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 40369.,40369. |
Citation | 322 P.3d 976,156 Idaho 243 |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. John (2012–10) DOE, Defendant–Respondent. |
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Twin Falls County Public Defender's Office, Twin Falls, for respondent. Wade F. Hyder argued.
This is an appeal from the district court acting in its appellate capacity. The State appeals the district court's decision affirming the magistrate court's holding that it did not have jurisdiction over John (2012–10) Doe because he was twenty-one years of age when the State filed its petition in juvenile court. We reverse the decision of the district court.
On May 13, 2011, the Twin Falls County Prosecutor filed a petition with the magistrate court, juvenile division, alleging that Doe committed three counts of lewd conduct with a minor between August 1, 2004, and February 28, 2005. At the time of the alleged acts, Doe, born in August of 1988, was a minor. However, at the time the petition was filed and served on Doe he was twenty-two years old.
On July 7, 2011, Doe appeared before the juvenile court for an admit/deny hearing. At that time, the State gave oral notice of its intention to ask the magistrate judge to waive Doe's case into adult criminal court. On July 21, 2011, the State filed the promised motion. In response, Doe filed a motion to dismiss the petition, asserting the juvenile court lost jurisdiction when he turned twenty-one.
The magistrate court set a hearing for August 18, 2011, to address both the State's waiver motion and Doe's motion to dismiss. At the motion hearing, an argument arose between the parties regarding which motion the court should consider first. Unsure how to proceed, the juvenile court granted both parties a continuance and re-set the hearing for September 29, 2011. Ultimately, the court decided to address Doe's motion to dismiss first. After argument on Doe's motion to dismiss concluded, the magistrate judge took the matter under advisement and reserved ruling on the State's waiver until after deciding the motion to dismiss.
On November 4, 2011, the magistrate court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order granting Doe's motion to dismiss. The court determined that although it had initial jurisdiction in the matter pursuant to I.C. § 20–505, it did not retain jurisdiction in the case because I.C. § 20–507 terminated the court's jurisdiction over Doe when he attained twenty-one years of age. The State appealed to the district court.
The district court heard oral argument on August 20, 2012, took the matter under advisement, and issued its Memorandum Opinion Re: Appeal from Juvenile Court on August 21, 2012. The district court affirmed the magistrate court's decision. The State timely appealed to this Court.
Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858–59, 303 P.3d 214, 217–18 (2013).
Additionally, "[t]his Court freely reviews the interpretation of a statute and its application to the facts." St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009) (citing State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 474, 163 P.3d 1183, 1186 (2007) ). "Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law ... over which appellate courts exercise free review." State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) (citation omitted).
This appeal presents a pure question of law; there are no issues of disputed fact raised by the parties. Specifically, this appeal requires this Court to analyze several statutes from Idaho's Juvenile Corrections Act (JCA), I.C. §§ 20–501 to 549.
The first relevant statute is I.C. § 20–505, titled Jurisdiction, which provides that a juvenile court "shall have exclusive, original jurisdiction over any juvenile and over any adult who was a juvenile at the time of any act, omission or status."
The second relevant statute is I.C. § 20–507, which works in conjunction with I.C. § 20–505. Titled Retention of Jurisdiction, I.C. § 20–507 provides:
Jurisdiction obtained by the court in the case of a juvenile offender shall be retained by it for the purposes of this act until he becomes twenty-one (21) years of age, unless terminated prior thereto. If a juvenile offender under the jurisdiction of the court and after attaining eighteen (18) years of age, is charged with a felony, he shall be treated as any other adult offender. If a person eighteen (18) years of age or older already under court jurisdiction is convicted of a felony, that conviction shall terminate the jurisdiction of the court, provided however, nothing herein contained shall prohibit any court from proceeding as provided in section 20–508(2), Idaho Code.
The third relevant statute is I.C. § 20–508(2). This provision, referenced in I.C. § 20–507, addresses waiver of the magistrate court's jurisdiction under the JCA and transfer to other courts. Specifically, I.C. § 20–508(2) provides:
A motion to waive jurisdiction under the juvenile corrections act and prosecute a juvenile under the criminal law may be made by the prosecuting attorney, the juvenile, or by motion of the court upon its own initiative. The motion shall be in writing and contain the grounds and reasons in support thereof.
Within the JCA, " ‘Juvenile’ means a person less than eighteen (18) years of age or who was less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time of any alleged act, omission or status." I.C. § 20–502(10).
The juvenile court found that it had "initial jurisdiction" over Doe under I.C. § 20–505 because, even though Doe was an adult when the petition was filed, he was a juvenile at the time of the alleged lewd conduct. Despite having initial jurisdiction, the juvenile court concluded that it did not retain jurisdiction over Doe based on the plain language of I.C. § 20–507 and this Court's opinion in State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 208 P.3d 730 (2009). Accordingly, the juvenile court granted Doe's motion to dismiss.
On intermediate appeal, the district court affirmed the juvenile court's decision to grant Doe's motion to dismiss. The district court found that I.C. § 20–505 conferred jurisdiction on the juvenile court because Doe was a juvenile at the time the alleged criminal acts occurred. However, despite having initial jurisdiction, the district court concluded that the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over Doe once he turned twenty-one. Like the magistrate court, the district court relied on the plain language of I.C. § 20–507 and this Court's opinion in Doe to hold that jurisdiction was terminated. With respect to I.C. § 20–507's last clause, which states that "nothing herein contained shall prohibit any court from proceeding as provided in [ I.C. § 20–508(2) ]," the district court concluded that the quoted language only modifies I.C. § 20–507's last sentence, not the statute as a whole. Thus, the district court held that when the court's jurisdiction under the JCA is terminated due to an offender reaching age twenty-one, the juvenile court cannot proceed under I.C. § 20–508(2).
On appeal to this Court, the State argues that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court's decision that it lost jurisdiction to rule on the State's waiver motion after finding that Doe was twenty-two years old. The State relies on the last clause of I.C. § 20–507 which provides that "nothing herein contained shall prohibit any court from proceeding as provided in [ I.C. § 20–508(2) ]." Based on this final clause and its reference to I.C. § 20–508(2), which addresses waiver, the State argues that even if the court did not retain jurisdiction in full, it still had authority to rule on the State's waiver motion. The State argues that the last clause of I.C. § 20–507 applies to the statute as a whole, not just the last sentence as the district court held.
"This Court freely reviews the interpretation of a statute and its application to the facts." St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd., 146 Idaho at 755, 203 P.3d at 685 (citing State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 474, 163...
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